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This project analyzes the relationship between foreign-policy decision-making, surprise 
and misjudgment using a multi-method approach. In recent years, high profile foreign 
policy and intelligence failures have captured the attention of policymakers, the media 
and academics alike. Many retrospective studies of policy failure identify, implicitly or 
explicitly, psychological biases of pertinent decision-makers as contributing to poor 
outcomes. By focusing on the internal mechanics of information usage and decision 
processes, these studies draw from bureaucratic politics theory. An alternative paradigm 
used to explain state behavior, rational actor theory, focuses on the competition between 
states and often assumes that the bureaucratic process works perfect. Since each 
explanation stresses different aspects of the decision-making process, it is difficult to 
know whether conclusions derived with one paradigm are transportable to the other. The 
bureaucratic politics explanation often stresses the negative relationship between 
psychological biases and outcomes, whereas rational actor theory illustrated the benefits 
of feigning irrationality. This thesis improves our understanding of psychological biases 
in competitive interstate interactions by incorporating the possibility of misjudgment into 
a formal model of surprise attack. The project compares an efficient form of learning, 
Bayesian updating, to an inefficient learning mechanism whereby actors irrationally 
overweigh their prior beliefs relative to new information. This project then identifies 




policy failure, and situations where irrational over-suspicion can offer competitive 
advantage by altering another player’s behavior. The deductive analysis suggests that 
psychological biases may be over-used as an explanatory factor in retrospective studies of 
failure, that psychological bias is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for surprise, 
and that irrational over-suspicion can have a stabilizing impact on a hostile interaction. 
These deductive propositions are examined quantitatively using a dataset of international 
crises from 1918-2002, which suggests that irrationally entrenched beliefs may reduce the 
incentive to attempt surprise attack. This is followed by a qualitative analysis of the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis and 1967 Arab-Israeli War, showing that the model with a 














 This project is about decision-making and belief biases in the competitive 
international context, and specifically focuses on the relationship between foreign policy 
surprises and psychological biases. In the midst of the post-behavioral movement, Robert 
Jervis (1976) wrote his now canonical book about the role of psychology in foreign 
policy decision-making. The book was a departure from the dominant realist-liberal 
debates of the time. Jervis argued that psychology and the nature of decision-making 
played a central role in international affairs. The first part of the book addressed the 
importance of perception or beliefs in strategic situations, and later examined how 
psychological dynamics impact perceptions. Since publication, there have been a number 
of attempts to refine and expand our understanding of psychology and international 
affairs, however many of these works focus on decision-making in an internal 
bureaucratic context rather than the external competitive pressures inherent in 
international politics. Jervis’ book arguably remains the best blending of strategic theory 
and psychology. 
In the introductory lines of the final chapter, Jervis clarifies his position and offers 
some advice on psychological biases in foreign-policy decision-making: 
 
Although prescription is not the purpose of this book, our analysis suggests a number 
of measures that would decrease misperception. If decision-makers become aware of 




adopt safeguards to decrease their unwarranted confidence in prevailing beliefs, make 
them more sensitive to alternative explanations and images, and thus decrease the 
amount of discrepant information needed to make them reexamine their views. 
 
Jervis lays out a clear causal chain, which provides one possible perspective on the 
relationship between psychological biases and policymaking. Though incorrect beliefs 
cannot be avoided altogether, “common perceptual errors” and the pressures of the 
international environment lead to misperceptions. These misperceptions lead to faulty 
conclusions and poor policy. In many ways, Jervis echoes the sentiments of economists 
and game theorists stressing the importance of accurate beliefs and optimal strategies. 
However, one is tempted to ask whether psychological biases, specifically the deeply 
entrenched beliefs he refers to, can actually be beneficial in the competitive context of 
international politics where surprise and intelligence failures are endemic. 
 The question above drives the research program that follows. Conventional 
arguments in the study of foreign policy decision-making and national intelligence stress 
the negative attributes of psychological processing. Decision-making biases, cognitive 
biases and bounded rationality all interfere with efficient learning. It follows that this 
interference is bad and leads to inaccurate images. When these inaccurate images are 
used as the foundation for policy, the policy is more likely to fail. This argument is 
convincing, but there are also some counter arguments that have been marginalized due 
to the dominance of economic theory in political science and world politics. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the hypothesized role between belief bias and policy outcomes. The 
conventional argument, articulated by Jervis represented by Story 1, is the dominant 






Figure 1.1: Relationships Between Psychological Biases and Outcomes 
Summary: There are reasons to believe that actors are worse off when they exhibit anchoring bias and 
reasons to believe they might be better off. These different hypotheses are examined throughout the project. 
 
 
Decisions in international politics almost universally involve uncertainty and 
information constraints. Decision-makers rarely know all of the relevant history, or what 
might be called the true state of the world. The information constraints are certainly not 
limited to past events since the results of policies or decisions play out in complicated 
ways. Ambiguity is a central feature of international politics, it plays large role in 
decision-making, and opponents often try to manipulate information. Foreign policy 
decision-makers and intelligence analysts often have to interpret new information using 
their prior beliefs as a backdrop. When these actors irrationally overweight the 
importance or quality of their prior beliefs relative to new information, they are suffering 
from anchoring bias. It is rarely, if ever clear, however, how firmly policymakers should 
hold to their prior beliefs in the presence of contradictory evidence. Uncertainty and the 
use of prior beliefs makes it difficult to identify psychological biases, making it 
especially important to distinguish skeptical learning that is rational from anchoring that 





Story 2 – 
Countering 
Deception/Noise 






Deception has long played a role in international affairs and war, going at least as 
far back as the Trojan Horse. One dominant theory of war outbreak stresses the 
importance of countries’ incentive to misrepresent their true interests in an attempt to 
obtain a better bargained outcome. When countries’ misrepresent themselves, there is 
higher probability that bargaining breaks down and they go to war. Once countries 
choose to initiate hostilities, they may rely on deception in order to catch their opponents 
by surprise. Many successful cases of diplomatic or military surprise involved deception 
operations that cultivated certain beliefs in an opponent. Though a fringe argument, it has 
been suggested that biased beliefs can improve one’s immunity to deception operations. 
If attempts at deception will be missed or ignored, there is less incentive to utilize that 
strategy. Just as prior beliefs provide a context for interpreting ambiguous information, it 
is also important to examine when or how biased beliefs alter the deceptive-character of 
an opponent’s strategy. In short, can psychological biases like entrenched beliefs increase 
honest communication and deter attempts at surprise? 
 
The Bureaucratic and Strategic Models 
This project takes a thorough look at the relationship between misjudgment, 
surprise and policy failure, integrating two different causal models: the strategic model 
and the bureaucratic model. The strategic model focuses on the competitive context and 
information constraints prevalent in international politics, usually concluding that 
strategic surprise cannot be eliminated. The bureaucratic model focuses on the 




surprise is a problem that can be minimized through specific remedies or policy reforms. 
Figure 1.2 provides a simplified representation of these two models. 
 
Figure 1.2: Models of Foreign Policy Decision-making 
Summary: The bureaucratic model often focuses on how internal issues like group dynamics, assessment 
process and psychological biases, impact decisions. Rational actor models focus on the competitive 
processes and often assume that assessment and learning is perfectly rational. 
 
 
The strategic model of surprise usually assumes that the bureaucratic process 
works perfectly and assumes away misjudgment. By contrast, the bureaucratic model 
identifies bureaucratic process and misjudgment as major causes of surprise. These two 
models tell different stories. Currently, there are few analytically rigorous attempts to sort 
through the different assumptions, integrate the models and explore the impact of 
misjudgment in competitive contexts. It is important to ascertain if this lacuna is a critical 
shortcoming in our understanding of foreign policy and intelligence failure. 
 This project focuses on the treatment of misjudgment and deeply entrenched 






















intentions and capabilities play a significant role in many explanations of foreign policy 
decision-making. Deeply entrenched beliefs inhibit learning from new information and 
usually lead to inaccurate threat assessments. These assessments are subsequently cited as 
major reasons for foreign policy and intelligence failures. The bureaucratic model focuses 
on the assessment process and the impact of inaccurate beliefs on decisions, without 
explicitly considering the impact of opponents’ decisions on outcomes. The strategic 
model often assumes that assessments and beliefs are objectively accurate, and it focuses 
on the way optimal decisions interact with opponents’ decisions to produce outcomes. By 
incorporating deeply entrenched beliefs into a strategic model, we are able to reach a 
more comprehensive understanding of misjudgment and surprise. 
 
The Rationality of Irrationality 
 Robert Keohane once observed that Thomas Schelling articulated almost every 
major idea in international relations first (Scott 2007). This projects echoes Keohane 
sentiment, recognizing Schelling’s legacy and the applicability of his work here. During 
the 1950s and 1960s strategists were trying to adjust to a world with nuclear weapons and 
the possibility of massive retaliation. For U.S. strategists, the pressing question was how 
best to contain, or deter, the Soviets in a world were massive retaliation was possible and 
nuclear war could kill everyone. Schelling laid out a set of arguments that helped guide 
U.S. policy throughout the Cold War. 
 One of Schelling’s (1960) most notable arguments is referred to as the rationality 
of irrationality, whereby appearing irrational in a competitive environment could actually 




credible. One of his basic examples involved a buyer and seller who are trying to transact 
at one of two prices: low and high. The buyer prefers the low price and the seller the high 
price. If both players want to complete the transaction at either price, a player that can 
commit themselves to their preferred price may draw the other into an undesired strategy. 
Schelling imagines a world were declaring “cross my heart” is a binding commitment. In 
this world, the buyer can benefit by conveying that he will only pay the low price, and 
then bind himself to that strategy by saying “cross my heart.” The seller then has no 
choice but to adopt the low price strategy if they want to make the sale, despite a 
preference for the higher price. One common conceptualization is two drivers playing 
chicken. One driver throws the steering wheel out the window and the other has no 
choice but to swerve. 
 Schelling’s real concern was figuring out how the U.S. could use commitment 
strategies to deter Soviet aggression, particularly against West Berlin, given the 
possibility that any punishments could lead to nuclear war. While articulating the benefits 
of commitment, he also recognized that commitments must be credible to be successful. 
The U.S. could not commit to protect West Berlin with massive retaliation by declaring 
“cross my heart.” If massive nuclear retaliation was an irrational action, as it appeared to 
be given the possibility of all out nuclear war, then the U.S. commitment to protect Berlin 
was not credible and of no concern to the Soviets. In more modern economic terms, it 
would be cheap talk. While Schelling maintained that one possible strategy was 
appearing irrational, he outlined two strategies whereby a rational actor could seem 
irrational thereby justifying massive retaliation: burning bridges and “the threat that 




Burning bridges referred to a strategy that made inaction in the face of aggression 
impossible such that an actor could justify carrying out their threat. The example he 
offered was an advancing army who burned bridges to ensure they could not retreat. 
Within the context of West Berlin, the U.S. tried to credibly commit itself by stationing a 
contingent of U.S. forces in West Berlin. Should the Soviets break containment and try to 
take Berlin by force, the U.S. Berlin Brigade would be involved in the ensuing battle. The 
engagement of U.S. forces, and inevitable casualties, ensured that the U.S. would have to 
respond. 
Schelling’s other alternative, the threat that leaves something to chance, relies on 
randomization of action and expected payoffs in utility theory. He argued that a 
seemingly irrational act could be justified if it were one of many possible outcomes that 
are selected based on some probability. Randomization “ has been a device to make 
indivisible objects divisible, or incommensurate objects homogenous. Their ‘expected 
values’ are divisible when the objects themselves are not” (Schelling 1960). He argues 
that firm commitments that involve massive retaliation may not be credible, but 
randomized threats could be rational based on expect utility calculations. If there is a 
small chance that government bureaucracy or mechanics randomize outcomes, and one 
possible outcome is nuclear retaliation, then the threat may or may not be rationally 
credible. 
Schelling’s derivation of rational strategies to credibly signal an actor’s seemingly 
irrational commitments, the rationality of irrationality, remains a powerful tenet in 





Project Conclusions and Schelling’s Irrationality 
 This project is best considered a reformulation of Schelling’s theory that allows 
both qualitative revision and substantive expansion. Some of the conclusions from this 
project are substantively similar to Schelling’s main conclusions about the rationality of 
irrationality, but the mechanisms at work are qualitatively different. 
 There are three main propositions derived from the formal modeling part of the 
project. The conclusions are derived from comparing a model of surprise attack with 
perfectly rational actors to an identical model where the target may irrationally anchor on 
prior beliefs and the initiator knows the probability with which they face a rational or 
biased target. Anchoring bias or entrenched beliefs, can result in either irrational under-
suspicion, where a target believes the initiator is less threatening than they actually are, or 
irrational over-suspicion, where the target believes the initiator is more threatening than 
they actually are. There are three primary deductive conclusions: 1) irrational under-
suspicion does not increase the probability that a target is surprised since the initiator will 
attempt surprise as much as possible anyway; 2) the possibility of irrational over-
suspicion should deter an initiator from attempting surprise since target over-suspicion 
reduces the likelihood that the attempted surprise is effective; and 3) targets can derive 
utility benefits from their own irrational over-suspicion when the likelihood of suffering 
unnecessary defensive action (false alarms) is sufficiently small. 
 Many of these propositions bear significant resemblance to Schelling’s work, 
particularly the argument that irrationality can be beneficial and can deter other’s hostile 
actions. This project offers some qualitative differences and extensions. First, Zagare and 




instrumental, rationality” (Zagare and Kilgour 2000). Procedural rationality is the 
everyday conception of rational preferences or behavior. Instrumental rationality is a 
much more narrow concept. Instrumental rationality is an economist’s definition of 
rationality dictating that actors can compare any two possible outcomes to determine a 
relative preference and that the preference ordering be transitive (i.e. if an actor prefers 
option a to b and option b to c, they cannot prefer option c to a). By this definition, 
Schelling’s actor is instrumentally irrational despite trying to appear procedurally 
irrational. Zagare and Kilgour (2000) go on to note that Schelling’s player feigns 
procedural irrationality because it is in their interests. 
 In this project, the player does not feign irrationality for strategic purposes, but 
may actually have an irrational anchoring bias. Further, the target in this project does not 
even know whether they have biases that make them irrational. Irrationality, therefore, is 
not a deliberate strategic decision. This is distinct from Schelling’s actors that rationally 
feign irrationality for their own benefit. This suggests empirically observed psychological 
biases that naturally impact everyone may have the same effects as strategically feigning 
irrationality. 
 The anchoring bias modeled here and Schelling’s feigned irrationality yield 
similar results when 1) anchoring bias results in irrational over-suspicion, and 2) the 
initiator knows the target is biased. Here, however, we come to another important 
revision and extension. This project relaxes the assumption that one player knows that the 
other will play irrationally. While Schelling showed that seemingly irrational 
commitments could be made credible by randomization or bridge burning, this project 




sometimes) is sufficient to capitalize on the benefits irrationality. The initiator need not 
know whether the target is irrationally over-suspicious or not. The mere possibility that 
the target is irrational is enough for the initiator to change their strategy. An initiator 
should adopt the same strategy irrespective of whether the target is always irrational or 
occasionally irrational. This means that the possibility of irrationality is sufficient to 
derive any possible benefits from feigning irrationality or actually having irrationally 
anchored beliefs. Schelling’s actor relied on in the randomization in the final move of 
play to make the first stage commitment credible all of the time, but here, the 
randomization between rational and anchored targets is sufficient to alter an opponent’s 
strategy irrespective of stages or credibility. 
 The possibility that target could be either a rational or biased type
1
 also creates a 
caveat to the benefits of actual irrationality. Since Schelling’s actor was feigning 
irrationality, there was no concern that the actor might be excessively irrational. Here, a 
target can benefit from their bias as long as the possibility they are biased is below a 
threshold value. Once the probability that the target is actually biased (as opposed to 
being rational) gets too high, the likelihood of unnecessary defensive action (false alarm) 
gets sufficiently high that it cancels out the strategic benefits from irrationality. This 
deduction, combined with the result immediately above, means that a target is best off 
having some probability of being irrational, but not being irrational too often. 
The model also extends Schelling’s insights by both applying it to surprise attack, 
and deriving some interesting conclusions about psychological bias in surprise. One 
                                                 
1
 Note that type is game theory term used commonly used when one player is uncertain about the 
preferences of another. The different preference profiles of an actor correspond to different types. Here, 
type is also used to distinguish between a target that could be rational or irrational whenever there is some 
possibility of irrationality. This notion of type is consistent with the usage in game theory since there are 




conclusion about under-suspicion was noted above: irrational under-suspicion does not 
increase the probability that a target is surprised since the initiator will attempt surprise as 
much as possible anyway. This differs from many of the arguments made about 
psychological biases and surprise (Jervis 1976; Betts 1978; Heuer Jr. 1981; Kam 1988). 
The extension to surprise also shows that feigning irrationality or being irrational may 
deter surprises as well as challenges, the primary difference being the opaque information 
and the possibility of deception often associated with surprise attacks. The challenges that 
Schelling addressed were public challenges, like a Soviet confrontation over Berlin, 
rather than focusing on the type of confrontation such as surprise or diplomatic act. 
 A final deduction from the model, also tied to surprise, addresses the benefits and 
drawbacks of both rationality and irrational over-suspicion. Just as Schelling did, this 
project shows that actors could benefit from irrationality. There were some additional 
interesting conclusions based on the possibility that targets could be rational or irrational 
in any given interaction. Recall from above that the initiator, however, always acted as 
though the target was biased even when there was only some probability the target was 
an irrational type (where type represents their method of information updating). In this 
instance, there are some benefits to being rational and some benefits to being biased. 
Technically, the rational type has a higher utility. Since the initiator attempts surprise less 
often than they would when making a rational type indifferent between waiting and 
defensive action, the rational type benefits from less deception. The downside for the 
rational type is that they always wait, and they suffer surprise very often as a result. The 
biased type mixes defensive action and waiting, thereby suffering false alarms too often. 




initiator attempts surprise. The biased type has a slightly lower expected utility, but they 
are much less likely to suffer surprise. 
 
Project Organization 
 The analysis proceeds in a straightforward fashion. Having introduced the 
primary ideas of interest in this chapter, the next chapter takes a step back to examine 
prior contributions to foreign policy decision-making and intelligence. There is also a 
brief discussion of key psychological issues and brief diversion into behavioral 
economics. The behavioral economics literature helps set the stage for the first of two 
main theoretical chapters. The third chapter addresses belief updating, the impact of 
beliefs on decisions, and the relationship between rational and anchored beliefs. It also 
presents a mathematical approach to representing irrationally entrenched beliefs that is 
used in the formal model. Chapter 4 is the primary deductive modeling section of the 
project. The chapter begins by offering a basic model of surprise and then incrementally 
adds greater complexity, eventually incorporating irrationally entrenched beliefs into a 
formal model of surprise. The deductive results from a Bayesian rational model are 
compared to those of the model with a potentially irrational actor in order derive 
propositions about the impact of irrationally entrenched beliefs on the players’ strategies, 
the likelihood of surprise, and expected utility. 
 Chapter 5 is the start of the empirical analysis. The chapter statistically examines 
one of the deductive propositions from chapter four and starts by outlining the primary 
variables. Since the statistical analysis relies on proxies for key variables like attempted 




proposition, but the analysis suggests that there is some support for the theoretically 
deduced claim. Chapter 6 tries to overcome some of the shortcomings of the statistical 
analysis by examining two cases of foreign policy surprise in detail. The chapter begins 
by discussing the case study method and its importance for establishing causality in 
psychological theories of international politics. Then the chapter examines the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Each case study concludes with an 
explicit comparison of expected results from the model with rational actors against the 
model with a potentially irrational actor. The model with a potentially irrational actor 
seems to perform better than the model with perfectly rational actors, providing 
additional support for the deductions in chapter 4. The project concludes with a review of 
significant findings, discusses some limitations of the research, and offers some policy 














 This work draws from and is intellectually indebted to an extensive and diverse 
collection of scholarship. This project lies at the intersection of literature on intelligence, 
foreign policy decision-making, psychology and behavioral economics. Anything 
approximating a comprehensive review of each topic could be a book length work. This 
chapter focuses on the pieces that were influential in framing this research. The chapter 
proceeds by introducing the canonical pieces of intelligence and surprise literature. 
Intelligence literature justifiably focuses on the acquisition of information and analysis. 
The function of intelligence is the distribution of information to decision-makers in a 
timely fashion. Since practitioners, in large part, have driven the study of intelligence, 
this is a logical place to stop. Decision-maker response to the information and its impact 
on strategic outcomes, however, are important issues in foreign policy and security. 
 To explore these issues, it is important to move beyond the formative body of 
intelligence and surprise to the even larger body of work looking at foreign policy 
decision-making. This is a multifaceted literature that incorporates diverse analytical 
methodologies and emphasizes different aspects of the decision-making process. For 
example, game theoretic analyses focus on strategic elements such as national interests, 
information issues and institutional arrangements, whereas decision-process scholarship 




project focuses on strategic issues, and is most securely cast within the rational game 
theoretic approach, this literature is highlighted. The primary component of this section is 
an analysis of information updating and learning. Since the theory developed in 
subsequent chapters compares efficient or Bayesian updating with a biased mechanism, it 
is important to address the role of information processing in different contexts. 
 It is also important to understand some core psychological concepts and their 
prior application to international politics. Psychology and the study of international 
politics have always had a somewhat tenuous relationship. Much of this is driven by the 
empirical difficulties associated with applying psychological explanations to one-time 
events. These empirical concerns will be saved for Chapter 5. However, a number of 
scholars have maintained that psychology plays an important role in determining 
international outcomes. This work introduces some important challenges to the rationale 
choice paradigm, but as I argue throughout this project, these analyses need not be 
mutually exclusive. 
 The final section, a very brief and narrow review of behavioral economics, serves 
as a link between the relevant literature already reviewed and the theoretical components 
of the analysis. This project borrowed some general, but important ideas from the 
behavioral economic literature, namely the integration of psychological concepts into 
formal models of strategic interaction. This section will briefly highlight some core ideas 
associated with behavioral economics and review a few specific pieces of scholarship that 





Intelligence and Surprise 
 Intelligence literature can be broadly divided into three categories: practitioners’ 
accounts, official or governmental reports, and scholarly analysis (Maoz 2006). There are 
a few individuals who span the divide between practitioner and scholar effectively (Heuer 
Jr. 1981; Lowenthal 2003; Herman 1996), however, the scholarly work is the most 
theoretically and empirically developed. Practitioner accounts often describe the way in 
which information is gathered and governmental reports often address instances where 
the system did not function as intended. Scholarly work on intelligence has focused more 
broadly on outcomes and is consumed by issues of intelligence failure and strategic 
surprise. These two issues are of course linked since many instances of intelligence 
failure involve some level of strategic surprise. Scholarly work in intelligence is not 
without problems; there exists a bias towards some aspects of intelligence while ignoring 
others; there is little or no variability in the dependent variable; and there continue to be 
problems with case selection and research design (Maoz 2006). Having said that, there is 
still a clear, empirically supported dialogue, worth discussing. 
 The four common explanations for intelligence failure fault signal-to-noise ratios 
in noisy environments (Wohlstetter 1962), the possibility of deception (Whaley 1969), 
organizational constraints and tradeoffs (Betts 1978), and analysts’ psychological biases 
(Heuer Jr. 1981). In truth, each of these explanatory theories is probably sufficient to 
explain an instance of intelligence failure, but it also possible that multiple causes are 
operating at the same time. Each one of these presents a formative challenge in isolation, 
leading most analysts to the conclusion that intelligence failure and strategic surprise are 




Intelligence apparatus work in inherently noisy and uncertain environments. 
Wohlstetter (1962) applied signal transmission theory to the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor in 1941. She noted that states and intelligence apparatuses gather a lot of 
information. Much of the information is ambiguous or difficult to decipher since analysts 
get small pieces of information that need to be pieced together. Information that gets 
corrupted or is too ambiguous is often considered noise. Information that can be used to 
improve assessments or estimates is considered signals. It can be difficult to identify and 
separate the signal from the noise. It is also possible that some signals will be dismissed 
as noise, whereas some noise will be interpreted as signals (Wohlstetter 1962; Lowenthal 
2003). The intelligence community often refers to this problem as wheat versus chafe 
(Herman 1996; Lowenthal 2003) 
 Deception is another common cause of intelligence failure. In a competitive 
system, some actors seek to gain an advantage through the use of surprise (Whaley 1969). 
In recent history, states actively attempt to mask behavior through simulation (showing 
the false) and dissimulation (masking the real) (Whaley 1982). Analysis suggests that 
almost all attempts at surprise between 1910 and 1968 were successful, even when there 
was available warning (Whaley 1969). Deception itself is often further complicated by 
noise constraints. Information on an opponent may be worthless if the opponent is aware 
that the signal is being used to forecast intention (Jervis 1972). Simply acquiring 
information about an opponent is insufficient; one must also assess the opponent’s 
knowledge of these information-gathering efforts. These issues are magnified when one 
considers the costs associated with strategic response. Any attempt to make the warning 




 Stepping back from a unitary actor perspective, analysis of organizational 
constraints in intelligence led to the now conventional belief that intelligence failures are 
inevitable (Betts 1978). There are three irresolvable issues that plague intelligence: 
failure in perspective whereby actors fixate on beliefs and miss environmental changes, 
communication breakdowns, and the inability for organizational reform without 
tradeoffs. The first criticism stems from the nature of predication itself. Analysts and 
models that are most often accurate in predicting patterns are most likely to miss large 
changes and outlaying events (Handel 1989). The second issue, somewhat more self-
explanatory, addresses the communication breakdowns that are endemic to large and 
secretive organizations. The third element, and the primary justification for the 
inevitability of intelligence failure, is the inability to fix the major problems without 
sacrificing performance in another area. Analytic barriers to accuracy also play role and 
include ambiguous evidence, ambivalence of judgment, and atrophy of reforms. Given 
the presence of ambiguous evidence, analysts can often justify a number of conclusions, 
and this often leads to analytic ambivalence. Organizational attempts to improve rigor 
and overcome these constraints tend to whither over time. In this causal explanation, 
organizational issues and individual limitations in perspective, or psychological biases, 
are detrimental and a root cause of intelligence failure. 
 There is an additional explanation of failure that deals with the performance of the 
individual analyst (Heuer Jr. 1981). This perspective treats individual limitations and 
psychological biases in a more delicate and balanced fashion. Individuals are influenced 
by the lens through which they view the world, and that lens is developed through 




indispensable for interpreting ambiguous evidence may also contribute to intelligence 
failure. Preconceived notions, lenses, or biases are the backdrop necessary for the 
analysis of ambiguous evidence and partial information. Of course, these beliefs and 
biases can also lead an analyst astray, resulting in very inaccurate estimates. 
 There are also numerous analyses of intelligence failure that offer case specific 
reasons for intelligence failure such as U.S. surprise when North Korea attacked South 
Korea in 1950 (Stueck 2001), the Israeli attack that surprised Egypt in 1967 (Oren 2002), 
the Egyptian attack on Israel in 1973 (Bar-Joseph 2003), The Argentine attack on the 
Falklands that surprised the U.K (Hopple 1984), and the Iraqi attack on Kuwait that 
surprised the U.S. (Freedman and Karsh 1993). Analysis of the Argentine invasion of the 
Falkland Islands suggests that the root of the U.K. failure was in the intelligence-policy 
link (Hopple 1984). The British policy never signaled serious commitment, which 
emboldened the Argentines. British analysts never considered that their policy would 
have that undesired effect. Likewise, there are a multitude of explanations for failing to 
predict the downfall of the Iranian Shah in 1979. One explanation addresses the culture of 
the CIA, the lack of peer review, the willingness to rewrite history when it suits a picture, 
and the under-provision of analytical resources (Jervis 1979). Alternatively, it has been 
argued that failure stemmed from a lack of human intelligence brought about the Shah’s 
concerns over CIA presence and request that they be removed (Daugherty 2001). Israel’s 
1973 surprise has also generated different perspectives. The dominant one addresses 
Israel’s belief that the Egyptians would not attack without air superiority. A slightly 
different perspective maintains that these beliefs were only held by a couple of influential 




level competing voices (Bar-Joseph 2003). What becomes clear from reading these 
conflicting explanations is that many of the competing hypotheses have some degree of 
validity. It is rare that there is any singular cause for intelligence failure. 
 Analysis of the US failure at 9/11 has tended towards relying on multiple 
explanations (Parker and Stern 2005); however, others have argued that 9/11 was not a 
strategic intelligence failure (Pillar 2004). The common denominator is that 9/11 was not 
a “bolt from the blue.” In fact, most cases of surprise are not out of the blue, and almost 
all involve prior warning or indication of some sort (Whaley 1969; Betts 1982; Levite 
1987). Days leading to the Egyptian surprise on Israel were full of military and 
diplomatic maneuverings, not to mention the prior tension and protracted rivalry. Prior to 
Germany’s surprise attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Hitler assembled German forces 
on the Soviet border. Despite rebuffed diplomatic attempts, Stalin refused to interpret the 
German mobilization as a signal of impending attack. Almost every historical case 
exhibits some form of warning, whether attack-specific intelligence or a history of 
tension and conflict. It is important to note that almost all of the warnings of impending 
surprise could also be interpreted as signs that there is no imminent surprise. For 
example, Hitler’s decision not to engage in diplomatic conversations with the Soviets, 
and not make any demands, helped to strengthen Stalin’s belief that the Germans were 
not going to attack. The empirical availability, and interpretation, of warning is somewhat 
problematic for intelligence scholars. It makes it difficult to move beyond the four well-
developed explanations: noise, deception, organizational constraints, or psychology. 
 Often curiously missing from intelligence literature is a discussion of how 




intelligence is vague and open to interpretation, even in its finished form. Prior to the 
9/11 attacks, there were numerous warnings of increased Jihad traffic and speculation of 
a large attack. Nonetheless, this intelligence brought no significant policy shifts. When 
Stalin’s generals brought intelligence of the impending attack from the front, Stalin 
ordered only minor defensive measures for fear of antagonizing Hitler into action.  
 The intelligence failure literature lacks clear consensus on a definition of failure. 
Work by, and oriented for, practitioners views intelligence failure as an inability to 
produce accurate and timely warning. This is the argument for viewing 9/11 as a tactical, 
but not a strategic intelligence failure (Pillar 2004). The emphasis is on the availability of 
information and the quality of the intelligence product. Scholars of surprise and warning 
have tended to take intelligence failure a step further, equating it with policy failure. By 
this standard, intelligence output is only successful when accurate warnings are shaped 
into policy. Practitioners have chosen to eschew this approach to failure for obvious 
reasons: it is their job to provide accurate and timely information, not to set policy. 
Policymaker’s response is out of their hands and beyond their control. The intelligence 
officer’s job is done when the intelligence is put into a manner that the decision-maker 
finds useful in crafting policy. Those who have gravitated to the broader policy-based 
definition have obvious reasons as well: cases of surprise attack and the policy failures 
that result from faulty information are inherently interesting. These events are also 
readily observable, an element that should not be overlooked in social science (and one 
that can be particularly troubling in studies of intelligence). 
 Despite the tendencies for scholars, consciously or unconsciously, to equate 




rigorous fashion. Decision-making and policy response are often viewed as deterministic 
or secondary. When the intelligence is poor, bad policies are expected. When the 
intelligence is good, it is often assumed that accurate policies are crafted in response. The 
approach looks at the quality of warning as a key indicator of policy outcome (Levite 
1987). However, given the ambiguity associated with international competition, most 
intelligence analysis involves subjectivity that may involve individual biases. This 
suggests that the relationship between information in competitive environments, 
analytical perspectives and the possibility of psychological biases, and policy outcomes 
should be examined further. 
 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
 The study of decision-making in international politics can be split into two broad 
categories. The first category addresses strategic decision-making where competitive 
pressures play an explicit role in policy selection. The second category focuses on the 
decision process, using internal characteristics to explain why certain policies are 
selected. These two categories do not capture all of the literature, but serve as a useful 
organizing tool. 
 Early strategic modeling treated states as unitary actors with clear national 
interests (Schelling 1960; Allison 1971, 1999). The models relied on the realist 
assumptions that all states were essentially identical and acted in their own self-interest 
(Waltz 1979). Initial realist research (Morgenthau 1948) assumed that all states tried to 
maximize their power, and later iterations considered that states may seek to maximize 




politics, decision-makers often choose polices based upon each player’s preferences over 
outcomes, the information available, the structure of the game (who gets to move first, 
etc.), the choices, and their beliefs. Formal models of decision-making rely upon 
economic notions of equilibrium. Assuming that the individuals are rational, formal 
models rely upon logical deduction. This approach to decision-making provides an 
internally consistent method for predicting behavior. Most models are intended to be 
simplified or abstract versions of general issues. Models never integrate all the nuance of 
real life, but try to use basic situations to identify expected strategies and outcomes. The 
primary advantages of formal modeling include the internal rigor, logical conclusions, 
and ability to identify counterintuitive insights. 
Formal modeling with unitary actors has addressed issues as diverse as the 
balance-of-power (Niou and Ordeshook 1990; Powell 1991), bargaining and war 
outbreak (Kilgour and Zagare 1991; Fearon 1995), deterrence (Langlois 1991; Nalebuff 
1991), alliance behavior (Alfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Morrow 1991), nuclear 
proliferation (Beuno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Wagner 1991), arms races (Powell 
1993; Kydd 1997), arms control (Wittman 1989; Kilgour and Brams 1992; Feaver and 
Niou 1996), and international cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Morrow 1994b; Downs et al. 
1996; Fearon 1998). In an attempt to produce theories of the democratic peace, formal 
modelers dropped unitary actor assumptions. Different institutional arrangements have 
been employed to gain insights about the role of domestic politics in international 
decision-making. Models address domestic audience costs (Fearon 1994), opposition 




The logic of formal models helps to sort through complicated interactions with 
diverse interests while still arriving at internally consistent explanations. In short, the 
approach achieves a degree of parsimony that is difficult to attain otherwise. However, 
the simplification of complicated interactions is one of the primary challenges to the use 
of formal models. An alternative approach to foreign policy decision-making relies upon 
bureaucratic politics. Unlike the logical processes that accompany fixed interests and 
structures, bureaucratic politics stresses negotiated decision-making where individual 
roles and conceptions of interest may change. Much of the detail stripped away from 
formal approaches to decision-making is central to explanation and prediction. The nature 
of the decision-making unit, the centralization of authority, personal relationships, 
parochial or organizational interests, personal history, and issue framing can influence 
outcomes (George 1980). Unlike formal approaches where alternatives and interests are 
exogenously dictated, alternatives and interests arise from debate among the main players 
(Allison 1971, 1999). 
There are three general approaches to the study of bureaucratic politics. This 
paradigm has been used to explain the policy preferences that arise among multiple actors 
(Smith 1985), to understand and predict the final policy outcomes (Vandenbroucke 
1984), and evaluate the quality of the outcome to understand whether the process of 
bureaucratic bargaining was beneficial or detrimental (George 1980). While bureaucratic 
bargaining has been applied to areas as diverse as arms control (Halperin 1972; Feaver 
1993), foreign policy crises and military response (Janis 1972; Allison 1971, 1999; Legro 
1995), most of literature focuses on decision machinery. Therefore, much of the research 




and Aldag 1997), collective risk-taking (Vertzberger 1997), importance of parochial 
interests (Smith 1985), bargaining power (Hermann and Hermann 1989), and psychology 
and cognition (Ripley 1995). 
Bureaucratic politics approaches have been assailed for their lack of parsimony, 
adequate specification and empirical rigor (Welch 1998). There are almost infinite 
variables that could influence policy outcomes, and identifying all of them is nearly 
impossible. Further complicating matters, identifying the primary variables takes in-
depth, detailed analysis that restricts testing across cases. The large number of variables 
and small number of cases create an inferential problem often referred to as too few 
degrees of freedom. However, the bureaucratic politics still has intuitive appeal to those 
with an interest in the policymaking process and its outcomes. In reality, the 
policymaking process is very complicated and both individual and group elements play 
an important role (George 1980). 
Despite the attention to detail in the decision-making process, the bureaucratic 
politics approach does not really address issues of information and learning (Stern and 
Verbeek 1998). Yaacov Vertzberger (1984) examines how the interaction of the decision-
making group and the information providers impacts “(1) the search, selection and 
evaluation of information, (2) the degree of openness to dissonant information, and (3) 
processes of adaptation to the new incoming information.” Groups, organizations and 
institutions develop coherent values or beliefs that influence members. When individuals 
belong to different groups, they run the risk of belief conflicts. Vertzberger argues that 
individuals normally try to alleviate the conflict by negotiating some compromise 




rather than the organization or referent group). It may be difficult to resolve these issues, 
particularly when faced with a trade-off between parochialism and embarrassment. The 
conflicts and compromises alter the group’s ability to accept new or dissonant 
information and make adaptation difficult. This is especially true when the decision-
makers choose risky alternatives or experience polarization. According this explanation, 
the individual’s beliefs, and the groups they belong to, all influence the ability to process 
information and adapt. 
Alexander George (1980) also examines the role and use of information in 
bureaucratic contexts, but puts greater emphasis on contextual and individual 
information-processing issues. The complexities and ambiguity of foreign policymaking 
have a significant effect upon the decision-makers. The uncertainty often leads to 
different forms of procrastination. When confronted with time pressure and uncertainty, 
leaders tend to rely on mechanisms such as bolstering, satisficing, incrementalism, 
consensus politics, historical analogies, and personal ideology when crafting decisions. 
Organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics may complicate the decision-making 
process. Often times, information gathering and processing units will tend towards 
collecting information benefiting the specific organization. Organizational evaluation of 
policy suffers from similar parochial interest. Bureaucrats will also try to leverage all 
available resources, information being central among them, to gain bargaining power. 
This often results in exaggeration or over simplification of information and analysis. 
Alternatively, individuals or organizations may withhold information for the benefit of 
another group, or to avoid the policy problem altogether. Standard operating procedures 




simplify information management and policymaking, however, they can also create blind 
spots that impact learning or belief formation. Managing these constraints is a difficult 
process. 
Charles Hermann (1990) explores different areas where learning might take place 
within the governmental system while trying to explain the source of foreign policy 
change within an existing administration or regime. Examples include Nixon’s trip to 
China, and Anwar Sadat’s peace with Israel after the 1973 war. Each of these events 
involves major foreign policy changes without leadership change. Hermann identified 
four potential changes agents: leader led, bureaucratic advocacy overcoming inertia, 
domestic restructuring among political elites, or external shocks. More than one may be 
operative at the same time, but each involve some sort of learning. In many cases, modest 
amounts of information are often ignored and only major events or negative feedback 
motivate policy changes associated with learning. Other work has addressed policy 
change and strategic assessment in war (Gartner 1997). Here, organizations tend to adopt 
reasonably simple quantitative indices in accordance with their objectives, what is termed 
the dominant indicator approach. The indicators provide feedback to decision makers 
who must decided whether to change the methods by which war is fought or the larger 
goals of the war. Sudden and dramatic changes in these indicators are more likely to 
effect policy. 
Whereas the bureaucratic politics approach to information and learning presents a 
myriad of issues including contextual, individual, psychological and organizational 
forces, formal approaches to decision-making have less to say about information 




states react to the power distribution in the system, and learning is essentially irrelevant 
(Reiter 1996). In formal treatments of decision-making, information updating is 
mechanical and often operates efficiently according to Bayes Rule. In many instances 
relevant actors are presumed to start with common prior, that is to say identical 
probabilistic beliefs. There are a few notable deviations from the common priors or 
Bayesian assumptions, but these are exceptions (Myerson 1991; Sakovics 2001; Smith 
and Stam 2004). Some actors may benefit from acquiring private information, and the 
rest need to form updated beliefs as the game progresses. This updating process is akin to 
learning, more specifically diagnostic learning (Levy 1994). The actors with incomplete 
information use whatever information available to create new probability estimates. 
Information source might include the behavior of their rivals, signals from third parties, 
outside advisors or private information. The information available to actors plays a large 
role in determining expected outcomes. To this effect, it would be wrong to assert that 
information is irrelevant in formal modeling. However, the information processing in 
these contexts assumes optimal mechanical learning and excludes many of the individual, 
psychological and group issues associated with learning. 
Other works in international politics that have specifically addressed learning in a 
decision-making context adopt a bounded rationality approach that is closer to the 
bureaucratic politics approaches (Reiter 1996; Gartner 1997). Bounded rationality 
assumes that individuals have constraints on their processing abilities. Analysis of small 
power’s alliance decisions in the 20
th
 century shows that systemic or power explanations 
are not sufficient, and that state behavior exhibits historical learning (Reiter 1996). 




not surprising that decision-maker’s beliefs play an important role. These beliefs are 
altered by previous national experience (Reiter 1996). According to organizational 
theory, learning occurs infrequently, is stimulated by major events, and is targeted to 
avoid past failures (Levitt and March 1988). Empirical analysis shows that states often 
learned lessons from their own experience and ignore experiences of other states. There is 
also no guarantee that states learned the correct lessons about alliance behavior, and 
learning has led to poor policymaking. One example is Romania in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Romania made some substantial territorial gains after World War I resulting from its 
treaty with the Allied Powers. After the war, however, Romania became a status quo 
power and chose against allying itself with either of major power alliances in the 1920s 
and 1930s, joining the Little Entente instead. By the late 1930s, Romania found 
themselves offering significant concessions to Nazi Germany after rejecting alliance 
offers (Reiter 1996). Reiter (1996) argued that learning model did appear to outperform 
the standard realist balance-of-threat theory, which had only marginal explanatory power. 
Systemic threats appeared to have a greater impact than direct challenges, but the 
statistical relationship was contrary to expectations. These findings support earlier work 
suggesting that states learn from their own past experiences (Leng 1983; Huth and 
Russett 1984). 
It is worth noting that showing the importance of past history on policy is 
different from explaining how states actually learn and how the lessons are applied. Jack 
Levy (1994) attempted to address theoretical and empirical deficiencies in foreign policy 
learning. Drawing distinctions from other scholars who take an applied or normative 




confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a 
result of observation and interpretation of evidence.” Learning may not result in policy 
changes, or be correct in some normative sense and this can make any analysis of 
learning empirically difficult. Individuals do not necessarily process information in a 
straightforward or rational manner, and there is a large body of literature that examines 
how psychology influences foreign policy decision-making. Since individual learning is 
much more closely tied to cognition and psychology, we turn there next. 
 
Psychology in International Relations 
 The discussion on learning was decidedly a-psychological. In part this was done 
in order to review the primary theoretical and empirical contributions to learning in 
foreign policy contexts. However, almost all of the work reviewed above addressed the 
psychological and cognitive components of learning. Learning involves the organization 
of stored information in a metaphoric web, what are commonly called schemata. 
Learning occurs when additional information is added to the schemata, new relationships 
or paths are drawn between information within schemata, or new relationships and 
connections are built between schemata. There is no single or dominant learning model 
within psychology. Of course, learning represents a small component of psychology and 
this section focuses on the broader applications in international politics. 
 The introduction identified Jervis’ (1976) work as canonical in international 
security. In the first section, Jervis showed how different strategic contexts called for 
drastically different courses of action. The spiral model showed how hard-line policies 




This creates an obvious dilemma since the appropriate policy is determined by the 
strategic context (or state of the world), but the policymaker may be unaware of the 
context. The best a policymaker can do is rely upon their perception of the state of the 
world. Since perception plays such an important role in the selection of strategy and the 
success of the outcome, it is important to understand the root of misperception. The 
canonical status of the work does not stem from its authoritative proof of any set of 
propositions, but rather from its theoretical contribution and incredibly broad application 
of different psychological concepts. Jervis addresses cognitive consistency (the tendency 
to seek consistency in beliefs, and between beliefs and actions), the evoked set (the 
information that is readily accessed during decision-making), learning, and attitude 
change (where attitudes are a mixture of beliefs and emotional associations). These 
concepts are then applied to common strategic misperceptions including tendencies 
towards analyzing opponents as highly centralized entities, and overestimating one’s own 
influence upon target behavior and motives. He also addresses the role of motivated 
biases such as wishful thinking, and the relationship between cognitive dissonance and 
policy inertia. 
 Tetlock (1998a) split subsequent psychological research in international politics 
into two categories: 1) explanations of behavior focusing on cognitive heuristics, and 2) 
the impact of different kinds of systemic biases. The distinction seems slightly unnatural 
since heuristics and biases are not clearly separable. Heuristics are decision-making, 
problem solving, or learning shortcuts. When confronted with a decision, people rarely 
do all the possible calculations as predicted by bounded rationality. Instead, people tend 




may lead to systemic bias (Kahneman et al. 1982). This makes the distinction between 
the two a little blurry. For example, the representativeness heuristics causes individuals to 
assume that objects similar in appearance have similar traits. Normally, this heuristic 
works well enough for identification; however, it can also lead to a bias called the 
regressive fallacy. When suffering from a regressive fallacy, individuals believe that 
there is a causal relationship between two independent items. This heuristic has also been 
tied to the gambler’s fallacy whereby individuals believe that their behavior may have an 
impact on independent events. Despite the relationship between heuristics and bias, the 
two are often separated in applications to international politics (see Reiter 1996 for an 
example of tying them together). 
 The separation is largely a result of the causal processes of interest. For example, 
Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) focus on the importance of integrative complexity and the 
tendency towards heuristic behavior. Integrative complexity is measure of information 
processing. When there is low integrative complexity, people rely on heuristics, take rigid 
positions and restrict information use. Alternatively, high levels of processing and 
cognitive complexity are associated with complexity, flexibility and extended 
information search. Psychology experiments have shown that people tend toward 
heuristics when information quantity, time pressure, and threat get higher. Together, this 
suggests that integrative complexity and heuristics seem well suited to decision-making 
in international politics. According to this perspective, integrative complexity alters the 
expected decision-making behavior. Decisions made with higher integrative complexity 




complexity is a predictor of applied analytic prowess and bias, which is related to 
outcomes. 
 The alternative approach focuses directly the presence of cognitive and 
judgmental biases. Rather than using integrative complexity, which is exceedingly 
difficult to observe, scholars rely on different biases in building causal theories. 
Experiments have shown that people experience numerous different kinds of biases 
(Nisbett and Ross 1980). Most biases involve causal relationships, information updating, 
and confidence. Applications of bias in foreign policy descriptively address the impact of 
the bias on the decision-making unit, and predictive applications usually associate biases 
with inferior outcomes. 
 This type of psychological analysis has been applied to numerous areas of interest 
in international politics. Deterrence failures are equated with overconfidence whereby the 
deterring party falsely believes that the opponent will not challenge (Lebow 1981). A 
similar process leads aggressive states to overestimate the probability that an opponent 
will capitulate. These types of policy failures may also be the result of motivated biases 
like wishful thinking (Stein 1991). Simplified decision-making and bias has also been 
used to explain the preference for offensive military doctrines (Snyder 1983). Other work 
has addressed how decision-makers apply history, focusing on the biases and 
preconceived notions that lead to inaccurate conclusions (Neustadt and May 1986; 
Vertzberger 1986). George (1980) relies on psychology in his analysis of individual 
decision-making, specifically tendencies to avoid ambiguous situations, procrastinate, 
utilize historical analogy when ill-suited to a situation, and rely upon ideology and 




Sometimes policymakers are open to new information and carefully consider all the 
options (Stein and Tanter 1980). 
 Recently, there have been numerous attempts to apply prospect theory to 
international politics. Prospect theory addresses decision-making in risky situations. The 
theory, which has a good deal of empirical support in laboratory settings, argues that 
people react differently to gains and losses. People tend to be risk averse in the zone of 
gains and risk seeking in the zone of losses. The theory also addressed people’s tendency 
to overweight payoffs associated with low probability events and underweight the 
payoffs associated with high probability events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect 
theory has been applied to broad phenomenon like bargaining and war (Butler 2007), 
risk-taking in American foreign policy (McDermott 1998), and great power intervention 
(Taliaferro 2004). It has also been applied to specific cases, often compared to expected 
utility models. Mark Haas (2001) looks at satisficing decisions in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and Rose McDermott and Jacek Kugler (2001) examine decision-making in the 
Gulf War.  
 One of, if not the, most cited biases in international politics is a tendency towards 
relying on prior beliefs or preconceived notions. Philip Tetlock (1998b, 1999) has 
addressed this issue in numerous ways. He argued that experts have a tendency to ignore 
dissonant information and maintain their prior beliefs by using a complicated set of 
defense mechanisms (Tetlock 1999). Psychological studies were conducted that 
confronted professional observers of politics with situations that were similar to the types 
of problems they might try to solve on a regular basis. The participants were provided 




a tendency to maintain belief in the quality of their own counterfactuals. Specifically, 
there is a tendency to view arguments that are wrong as almost right, but correct 
assessments are rarely perceived as almost wrong (Tetlock 1998b). The power and inertia 
of prior beliefs have been used to explain U.S. intelligence failures in Vietnam (Wirtz 
1991), the tendency for militaries to use outdated doctrines successful in the prior war 
(Levy 1984), and miscalculation and misperception in conflict initiation (Jervis 1976; 
Levy 1994). Recently, there have also been efforts to explain enduring rivalries and 
protracted conflicts using psychological bias. States tend to have inert views of their role 
in the international system, even when the system undergoes changes that should 
facilitate revaluation of roles and identity (Thies 2001). It has also been argued that that 
the combination of national security conceptions and conflicts leads to a rapid lock-in 
creating rigid beliefs about the rivalry (Mor 2004). This behavior might be rational given 
the differential consequences of different types of errors, but the maintenance of these 
beliefs may or may not be rational given new information. Preconceived notions and 
prior beliefs have also been identified as one of the major impediments to ending 
protracted conflicts (Bar-Tal 2000). 
 Despite a growing literature on psychology in international relations, there is still 
debate about its merits and explanatory power. These concerns are generated from two 
perspectives: 1) the possibility and difficulty of addressing alternative explanations and 
2) the difficulty associated with empirically evaluating psychological explanations of 
behavior. Both positions warrant brief discussion here, and will be addressed again later 
in Chapter 5. Dominant explanations of behavior in international politics center on 




contexts are sufficient to explain behavior. These explanations may abstract away much 
of the decision process, but their parsimony and predictive ability justify the 
simplification. Often, when simple strategic explanations are not sufficient, we tend to 
look for explanations based upon domestic politics or international norms. This often 
leaves psychological explanations as a marginal competitor to alternative theories. The 
flip side of this argument is that the psychological dynamics discussed here such as 
heuristics and biases are almost always operating in decision-making. The primary 
question is whether incorporating psychology provides additional descriptive and 
predictive power to current theories. 
 The second issue addresses the empirical difficulties associated with proving 
causal arguments involving psychology. Empirical research from psychology is usually 
based upon laboratory experiments with multiple trials and control groups. In 
international politics, this type of research design is impossible to achieve. The events of 
interest occur once. Certainly general events like surprise attacks recur, but they often 
involve different people, information sets and strategic contexts. Even more problematic 
is the inability to decisively observe heuristics or biases. Therefore, psychological 
analyses usually rely upon detailed case studies that try to understand the primary 
decision-makers beliefs and decision processing. When compared to alternative 
explanations with observable variables, psychology in international politics has a large 
empirical hill to climb. 
 Having said that, many of the existing theories of international politics rely upon 
psychology in one form or another (Goldgrier and Tetlock 1998). Many neorealist 




same is true for constructivist theories relying on identities and norms. The tacit 
incorporation of psychology and decision-making processes into the predominant 
theories of international politics suggest that there is a place for psychological 
explanations. Arguably, one of the major problems is that psychology is often pit against 
alternative theories as competition rather than compliment. Much could be learned by 
carefully incorporating psychology into the relevant strategic contexts. To try and bridge 
this gap, we provide a brief introduction to behavioral economics, the attempt to integrate 
psychology into standard economic decision-making theories. 
 
A Brief Introduction to Behavioral Economics 
 Behavioral economics grew out of prospect theory, its wide acceptance, and the 
need to address empirical violations of the dominant theoretical models. By showing that 
people systemically violate certain tenets associated with rationality, specifically in 
regards to risk-seeking behavior and valuation under uncertainty, prospect theory 
provided new tools to address empirical puzzles. Some of these empirical puzzles were 
rooted in approaches to risk, ambiguity (Ellsberg 1962), and bargaining impasses. Others 
focused on violations of theory in the securities markets. For example, scholars have 
documented underreactions to public news announcements violating the efficient market 
hypothesis (Groth et al. 1979; Grinblatt et al. 1984), short-term positive momentum in 
returns (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Daniel et al. 1998), long-term negative reversals in 
asset returns (DeBondt and Thaler 1985; 1987), and stock price movements in opposite 




phenomenon led a number of economists toward the integration of psychology into 
economic reasoning. 
 The field has progressed along three methodological avenues. Consistent with 
mainstream economics, behavioral economists continue to rely econometrics and 
financial market data. Many of the initial puzzles that motivated the movement were just 
such analyses, and it remains an important empirical component. The second approach 
common to behavioral economics is the use of laboratory experiments. Borrowing from 
psychology, scholars have used experiments to identify and address specific decision-
making mechanisms. This tool is relatively new to economics, but it has played a 
significant role the development of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and 
bargaining impasse (Babcock and Lowenstein 1992). Most recently, behavioral 
economists have started formalizing propositions about psychology and decision-making 
in formal models (Rabin and Schrag’s 1998; Compte and Postlewaite 2004). The hope is 
that these models will yield greater theoretical understanding of processes observed 
empirically. The application of psychology to formal models of behavior is tricky. Just as 
one needs to make tradeoffs and simplifications in game structures, the same applies to 
psychological mechanisms. 
 Behavioral economic modeling is split between efforts addressing the market 
anomalies, and those tailored to decision-making. With the exception of the bargaining 
literature, many of the formal models are decision-theoretic. That is to say, most of the 
models address the impact of psychological dynamics on a single decision-maker, as 
opposed to multiple players conditioning their behavior on one another. Behavioral 




bubbles and panics (Smith, Suchanek and William 1988). Decision-theoretic market-
focused models have relied on biases such as representiveness and conservatism 
(Barberis et al. 1998), or overconfidence (Daniel et al. 1998) to explain the anomalies in 
investor behavior and market pricing. Both models address how a biased actor will act 
with incomplete information in decision-theoretic contexts. 
  Two models proved particularly useful in framing and developing this research. 
Both works address the role of judgmental biases in non-market decision-making. The 
first is Mathew Rabin and Joel Schrag’s (1998) model of confirmatory bias. 
Confirmatory bias is the tendency to interpret signals as confirming preexisting views. 
Rabin and Schrag allow a decision maker to update in biased fashion by incorporating 
confirmatory bias and show how the bias skews beliefs. They allow for two possible 
states of the world and assume there is a signal associated with each state. The decision-
maker views one signal in each period and uses it to update their beliefs in a Bayesian 
fashion. However, there is some probability that the individual will misinterpret less 
likely signals and incorrectly use the information to bolster existing beliefs. An individual 
may develop strong beliefs about the state even when the signals are random, and these 
beliefs are strongly history-dependent. One of the deductive results was that a few signals 
early on could have strong lock-in effects and make the individual blind to the 
randomness in the environment. In the extreme, decision-makers may continue to 
maintain and reinforce inaccurate estimates even when there is infinite information 
available. 
The second model, by Olivier Compte and Andrew Postlewaite (2004), addresses 




themselves: 1) there is a tendency for individuals to believe they are better then they are 
at a given activity, and 2) when individuals are more confident, they tend to perform that 
activity better. Compte and Postlewaite examine the decision behavior of an individual 
whose performance is altered by confidence. The individual evaluates the probability of 
success, where the likelihood of success is determined by their previous successes 
divided by past trials. The model assumes that the individual’s capabilities do not 
improve over time, specifically that the actual skill level is exogenous to the model and 
held constant throughout repeated decisions and outcomes. Confidence biases leads 
individuals in inflate this probability. The inflated or biased beliefs about the probability 
of success leads the individual to accept gambles that would otherwise reject if they had 
an accurate assessment of previous success. However, the increase in perceived 
probability of success also raises the likelihood that the individual is successful. They 
show that the decrease in utility stemming from the sub-optimal gambles is more than 
offset by the increased performance (due to second order effects). This leads them to 
conclude that some level of self-confidence bias is optimal and performance enhancing. 













Beliefs, Signals, and Biases 
 
 Intelligence failure is a term commonly used to denote breakdowns in the 
assessment or bureaucratic process that result in surprise. People experience surprise 
when they are confronted with unexpected outcomes. This implies that people have 
expectations or beliefs about what is going to happen. Studies of foreign policy and 
intelligence failure often argue that people experienced surprise because they did not 
change their beliefs about the future commensurate with the information available. 
Retrospective studies of intelligence failure often argue that information was discounted, 
or interpreted in certain ways, ultimately resulting in surprise.
2
 To assess this argument, 
we have to take a closer look at rational and irrational beliefs and belief change. We 
argue that the distinction between rationality and irrationality is not as straightforward as 
we ordinarily think. 
 The chapter begins by defining beliefs in a very specific way and thinking about 
how those beliefs may change when confronted with new information. This section is 
intended to familiarize the reader with a rational-actor approach to beliefs and learning. 
Next, the chapter addresses strategic signaling, which examines how these beliefs and 
learning mechanisms operate in competitive contexts. This moves beyond beliefs and 
belief change to explore how other actors may behave to alter one’s beliefs. In doing so, 
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we hope to build familiarity with some concepts about competitive interaction that are 
important in later chapters. The chapter concludes by addressing biases and specifically 
deeply entrenched beliefs. We provide a definition for entrenched beliefs and show how 
they may differ from rational learning mechanisms. 
 The central task of this chapter is to distinguish between rationally strong prior 
beliefs and deeply entrenched beliefs. The previous chapter noted a problem in 
differentiating the two, and the importance of doing so in order to develop a better 
understanding of misjudgment in competitive situations. Actors with rationally strong 
prior beliefs are expected to discount new information, appropriately given certain prior 
beliefs. If beliefs are rationally derived, there is nothing irrational or biased about this 
information discounting. Deeply entrenched beliefs refer to an error in judgmental 
processing where information is discounted irrationally. Drawing this distinction, and 
specifying a way to differentiate the two, helps set the stage for a more in-depth look at 
the relationship between entrenched beliefs and surprise. 
 
Rational Beliefs and Learning 
 Before leaving the house most mornings, people check the weather report to find 
out whether it is going to rain. If the probability of rain is high enough, then people may 
choose to carry an umbrella. In these instances people are forming or updating their 
beliefs about the chance of rain for that day. There is some probability it will rain, and 
some probability it will not. This probability is what economists call a belief, and 
specifically a belief about the state of the world (Morrow 1994a). Beliefs arise from 




about what has or will happen. Technically, a belief is a conjecture about a probability 
distribution (Watson 2002), summarizing an actor’s judgment about was has happened or 
will happen. This economics-based definition is different from the way we define beliefs 
in everyday use, which usually conveys the mental acceptance of truth (Heritage 
Dictionary 2007). In the context here, beliefs may be long held or fleeting. Actors can 
hold beliefs about the weather, about history, about others’ behavior, about preferences, 
and so on. People can hold beliefs about any number of things, but the common element 
is that a belief represents a probability distribution over a set of possible states or 
outcomes that are uncertain. 
One’s belief about the likelihood of rain plays a large role in the subsequent 
decision to take an umbrella. If the probability of rain is zero there is no reason to take 
the umbrella. Contrastingly, we are likely to take the umbrella if rain is a certainty. 
Between those two extremes lies an entire spectrum of possibilities between zero and 
100%. The probability of rain on any given day may be 17%, 43% or 86%. The decision 
to bring the umbrella is based upon our beliefs about the likelihood of rain, as well as our 
preferences for not getting wet. 
Someone who wants to avoid getting wet at almost any cost may choose to take 
the umbrella if they believe the likelihood of rain is anything higher than zero. This 
person has a low belief threshold necessary to justify taking the umbrella (perhaps a 10% 
chance). That is to say, at any chance of rain greater than this critical belief threshold, 
they carry an umbrella. At any belief below this critical belief, the umbrella is left at 
home (Morrow 1994a). A different person, who cares less about getting wet, will have a 




when the chance of rain is above 80%. This illustrates how preferences and beliefs can 
influence behavior. When the probability is less than your threshold or critical belief you 
leave the umbrella, otherwise, you take it. We can define a critical belief as the point, or 
belief, at which you are indifferent between your choices, in this example, bringing or not 
bringing the umbrella. 
We have illustrated how our beliefs and preferences come together to influence 
our behavior, but we have not addressed how beliefs change. Changing our beliefs about 
the likelihood of different states is a form of learning (Levy 1994). Learning, however, is 
a much broader concept. Economists usually limit their statements about belief change to 
the term belief updating. So, we will begin by providing a basic framework for belief 
updating. 
We discussed the existence of a critical belief in the rain example above, but have 
not addressed how we come to understanding that our belief is above or below the critical 
value. This is the essence of belief updating. One could apply different cognitive rules to 
the example above (Reiter 1996; Tetlock 1999). For instance, you might believe the latest 
morning weather report verbatim. If the report says there is an 80% chance of rain, that is 
what you believe. This simple rule, however, ignores any prior beliefs you might have 
held. Perhaps a weather report the night before indicated there was a 10% chance of rain. 
Now you have to decide whether you trust the new report, the old report, or some mix of 
the two. Perhaps you are inclined to trust the new report more since it has the latest data. 
That would appear to be a rational way to update your beliefs. However, if it were 
beautifully sunny the entire previous week, and the morning weather predicted an 80% 




entirely rational to ignore this new report altogether based upon past experience. In 
actuality, we are likely to use our knowledge of recent weather and the accuracy of recent 
weather reports to form some new belief about the likelihood of rain. 
Social scientists often presume that people update their beliefs in a logically 
consistent way according to Bayes Rule (Gerber and Green 1999). Bayes Rule, which 
will be dealt with in more detail in the next section, is based upon conditional 
probabilities. Conditional probabilities are ways of limiting a pool of information in order 
to focus on the relevant data (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1990). Economists often focus 
on one event occurring given the observation of a prior event (Gibbons 1992). For 
example, assume there is a bag with four gumballs, two are red and two are blue. The 
initial probability of drawing a red is 2/4 or 50%. However, if we observe the removal of 
a blue ball, the conditional probability of subsequently selecting red is 2/3. We can say 
that the probability of selecting red given that a blue was initially chosen is 2/3. So, our 
belief about the color of the gumball we select is conditional on the observation of the 
gumball selected earlier. 
Bayesian updating looks at the likelihood of an event contingent upon prior 
information (Myerson 1991; Gerber and Green 1999). Lets return to the rain example one 
final time. Lets assume we just moved to London, England and have no idea what the 
weather is like. We wake up the first morning to find that it is raining. The second day we 
wake to find a bright sunny day. We note that it rained one of two days (1/2). On the third 
day, we wake up again to find it raining, and note that it rained two of three days (2/3). 
For the rest of the week we wake to rain and resolve to living in a place where it rained 




rain, but each observation was not weighted equally. As you get more information about 
prior events, newer information has less of an effect on your beliefs. For example, the 
likelihood of rain was 100% after the first observation, 50% after the second, and 67% 
after the third. Subsequently, in days four, five and six, the rational beliefs were 75%, 
80%, and 83%, respectively. By day seven, we are resolved to believe that the Bayesian 
likelihood of rain on any given day is 86%. This concept is an important part of Bayesian 
rational updating and worthy of closer examination. 
The Bayesian concept above can be represented mathematically as, 
DaysTotal
RainofDays
RainofLikelihood = . 
On day three, we began the day believing that the likelihood of rain was 1/2 or 50%. This 
was the rational prior belief about the likelihood of rain. Upon observing the rain on day 
three, we updated our belief that likelihood of rain was 2/3 or 67%. This called the 
posterior belief, and is a rational belief based upon prior and new information. The value 
of this new information often diminishes with the strength of the prior. For example, on 
day three, the prior belief of rain was 2/3. If the sun came out on day four, we should 
update our belief to reflect that it rained 2/4 days or 50%. If we had observed rain six out 
seven days (6/7) or 86%, observing one day of sun on day eight should only cause us to 
change our belief to 6/8 or 75%. In fact, on day seven, we would need to observe sun for 
five straight days in order to rationally believe that likelihood of rain was 50%. 
 We can set up a more extreme case. Once again, lets assume that our prior belief 
of rain on day three is 67%, which is to say we observed rain two of three days. If we 
observe one day of sun, our belief rationally changes to 2/4 or 50%. Lets fast forward and 




observed rain 200 days, so our rational prior belief about the likelihood of rain is still 
67%. If the sun comes out on day 301, we know that it has rained 200 of our 301 day 
stay. One day of sun changes our beliefs from a 67% chance of rain, actually 66.66…%, 
to 66.4%. Observing one day of sun on day four and day 301 do not have the same 
impact on posterior beliefs. Given the strength of our posterior beliefs on day 301, the 
new information is rationally discounted relative to prior information. 
 We can generalize the Bayesian concept we have been looking at further, and 







This notation simply states that the probability of event A is calculated by looking at the 
number of instances of a divided by the total number of instances a+b (Gerber and Green 
1999). In the example above, the event is the likelihood of rain, where a is the number of 
rainy days observed and b is the number of sunny days observed. This highlights that our 
prior beliefs, and the strength of our prior beliefs, both influence our posterior beliefs and 
receptivity to new information. When prior beliefs are embryonic, in the early stages of 
formation, some small piece of new information may have a large effect. Contrastingly, 
beliefs rationally well supported by history are less vulnerable to small pieces of new 
information that should have little effect on our posterior beliefs. 
 This is an important concept that is often overlooked in many studies that address 
poor learning, irrational information updating, or entrenched beliefs in foreign policy and 
surprise. Information may be ignored because of faulty updating, but one must also 




absence of any attempt to differentiate discounting due to rational priors from biased 
updating makes any subsequent attempts to attribute causality tenuous at best. 
In the middle of World War II, the Germans launched a surprise attack against the 
Soviets codenamed Operation Blau (Blau 1955). This attack is less well known than 
Operation Barbarossa, which was the formal initiation of hostilities between the Germans 
and the Soviets. Despite minimal historical attention, Blau is among the most fascinating 
cases of intelligence failure during the war. Operation Blau called for the large-scale 
offensive on the Southern German-Soviet battlefront. The Soviets were convinced the 
German offensive in spring 1942 would target the Northern front toward Moscow 
(Whaley 1969; Glantz 1990). A southern attack would help the Germans secure 
Ukrainian grain and oil from the Caucasus, but Adolph Hitler had taken large risks and 
losses in an attempt to take Moscow in 1941. Joseph Stalin and many military leaders 
were convinced that Moscow would be the primary target of the spring offensive. 
Operation Blau, the southern surprise attack, commenced on June 28, 1942. The 
Soviets were not prepared to counter the attack since the majority of troops remained 
stationed up north to protect Moscow (Glantz and House 1995). Germany’s initial attack 
was a success, however, the Soviets did eventually fight the advancing Germans to a 
standstill. The fascinating part of the Blau saga actually took place before the German 
attack. By mid-May 1942, there were signs that Germany might attempt a southern attack 
in response to a Soviet advance earlier in the month. One such sign was the emergence of 
German air superiority in the region (Whaley 1969; Glantz 1990). The Germans were 
careful in their planning for the operations. Many of the combat units that would be used 




distributed maps of Moscow (Blau 1955). Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels planted 
a newspaper story that Moscow was the target on May 15, only to denounce the 
newspaper and the author on May 20 (Whaley 1969). Goebbels followed up the 
newspaper article by sending an emissary to Portugal with instructions to leak 
information about an imminent attack towards Moscow (Whaley 1969). In a final attempt 
at deception, on May 25, the Germans issued orders to replace the battle-hardened 
German units with weaker Allied units in the south (Blau 1955). The irony associated 
with all of the German deception activities was that the Soviets were already convinced 
that the attack would target Moscow (Glantz 1990), making it seem as though all of this 
planning was moot. 
Then, on June 19, just nine days before the start of Operation Blau, the Soviets 
downed a small German plane. The plane was carrying a German officer heavily 
involved with planning the upcoming attack. The officer had violated orders to destroy all 
the documentation associated with the attack and was carrying the order of battle and 
tactical plans for the initial stages of Operation Blau (Higgins 1966; Whaley 1969). 
Soviet field intelligence recovered the plan from the downed aircraft, but did not know 
what to make of this information. The plans were forwarded to Moscow. The leadership 
in Moscow examined the plans and almost immediately discounted the authenticity 
(Whaley 1969; Glantz 1990). The most recent evidence on Soviet intelligence during the 
war suggests that Stalin and the military commanders were convinced that the battle plan 
was one more German attempt at deception (Glantz 1990). When the operation 
commenced on June 28, the early stages of the offensive proceeded almost exactly as the 




leadership, continued to believe that the plan was intended as misdirection into mid-July 
(Higgins 1966; Whaley 1969). 
As analysts and social scientists, we are compelled to ask whether the Soviet 
decision to discount the battle plan was reasonable or ill advised. Too often we tend to 
rely on hindsight and assume that decision-makers must have been suffering from some 
sort of bias, however, the discussion in this chapter points out the need to distinguish 
between strong prior beliefs and judgmental bias. Taking a step back, one has to consider 
the Soviet position prior to finding the battle plan. 
The Soviets were caught by surprise by the initial Barbarossa invasion in 1941 
(Clark 1965). Military leaders encouraged Stalin to improve defensive positions and call 
up additional troops, but Stalin was hesitant to provide Hitler with a motive for attacking 
(Gorodetsky 1999). The Germans, however, were not passive participants in the initial 
surprise (Whaley 1969; Gorodetsky 1999). Hitler regularly stressed that the German 
military buildup along the Soviet border were preparations for an invasion of Britain. At 
the same time, Hitler ensured that Germany maintained diplomatic relations with the 
Soviets, and dangled the possibility of deepening their ties. Against this backdrop, Stalin 
interpreted the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s accurate warnings of the 
impending attack on the Soviets as misinformation (Jervis 1976; Gorodetsky 1999). By 
1942, the Soviets had repeatedly been the targets of German misinformation and 
deception campaigns. 
There are also strategic and tactical issues to consider. During the initial stages of 
the war between the Germans and Soviets in 1941, Hitler expended significant resources 




dearly for this effort. Soviet leaders were convinced that these tremendous costs signaled 
that Germany was intent on moving toward Moscow in 1942 (Glantz 1990). Months after 
Operation Blau, as late as November 1942, Stalin still believed that the southern attack 
was a costly feint and that the real attack would target Moscow Higgins 1966, Whaley 
1969). 
Looking at the evidence in retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it is tempting 
to argue that the Soviets suffered from entrenched beliefs when evaluating the likelihood 
of a Southern attack. The Soviets began with the prior belief that Moscow was the target 
of the next German offensive. When confronted with an accurate battle plan of the 
impending Southern attack, with sufficient time to take defensive action, the Soviets 
ignored the information. On the surface, this seems as though it might reflect judgmental 
bias. However, we must consider Soviet prior beliefs and the possibility that the battle 
plan was part of a deception campaign. It would be wrong to simply assume that this is 
evidence of entrenched beliefs without considering the alternative possibility that the 
Soviets had sufficiently strong priors. When one considers the costs the Germans paid in 
their attempt to capture Moscow, and the plethora of sophisticated disinformation 
campaigns targeting the Soviets, it becomes more difficult to argue that the Soviet 
surprise was the result of entrenched beliefs. It might be just as plausible that the decision 
to discount the captured battle plan was perfectly rational based upon the strength of prior 
beliefs. The Soviets might also have calculated that losses along the Moscow line would 
have been more costly than losses down South. The decision to concentrate efforts along 
the Moscow line could, therefore, also be viewed as a hedge even if an attack was 




In short, Operation Blau represents a situation where the victim of surprise had 
unusually valuable intelligence about their opponent’s strategy, but the information was 
heavily discounted. It is easy to say that the Soviets made a mistake in retrospect, but it is 
much more difficult to differentiate rational from impaired belief updating. This is not 
say that irrational or biased updating is irrelevant or unusual. As we will discuss below, 
biased updating might be more common than perfectly rational updating. However, it is 
important to specify a clear distinction between rational and irrational learning if we are 
use bias as a causal mechanism. 
 In the next section, it stops raining. We move away from the everyday examples 
above, and focus on international competition. Instead of worrying about our umbrella, 
we are worried about the likelihood that our opponent is aggressive and willing to attack. 
Beliefs, the relationships between beliefs and actions, critical beliefs, prior and posterior 
beliefs and the belief updating process continue to play an important role, but now we can 
use these tools to assess our opponent and decide how to respond. The Operation Blau 
example introduced the nature of competitive pressures, and below we will specify these 
types of interactions in greater detail. 
 
Strategy, Signals and Beliefs 
 Prior to Operation Blau, the Soviets were trying to determine whether the 
Germans would attack north towards Moscow or further south. The primary source of 
uncertainty was where the Germans would attack, not if. Prior to the Barbarossa attack in 
1941, however, the primary source of Soviet uncertainty was whether the Germans would 




Germans were aggressive or docile. This distinction, aggressive or docile, will be a 
primary source of uncertainty in subsequent chapters. This section begins by introducing 
some basic concepts associated with signaling models, then goes on to show how beliefs 
and Bayesian updating play a role in competitive contexts with uncertainty. We also 
show how other actors’ strategies can provide information, or act as signals, that may be 
used to reduce uncertainty. 
 Lets assume that the Soviets were trying to determine whether the Germans were 
aggressive or docile prior to the 1941 Barbarossa attack. Following convention, we can 
say that Germany had two possible “types,” aggressive and docile. The aggressive type 
has different intentions, or preferences for attacking the Soviets, then the docile type. 
Typing, or the use of different types, is a way of introducing uncertainty into a 
competitive situation (Morrow 1994a). It is common to assume that an actor knows its 
own type, which is to say that Germany knows whether it is aggressive or docile. The 
Soviets, however, are uncertain about Germany’s type. The actual selection of type is 
often called a “move by nature,” where Germany’s type is selected from a probability 
distribution known to both actors. For example, Germany may be the aggressive type 
40% of the time and the docile type 60% of the time. Economic models and game theory 
often assume that these probability distributions are common knowledge (Myerson 
1991). Every player knows this probability, and they both know they know, etc. 
Therefore, the Soviets know the likelihood that Germany will be aggressive, however, 
they are uncertain whether the Germany they actually face is aggressive or docile. This 




 We can outline an interaction that includes the sequence of moves that Germany 
and the Soviets can choose from. After learning its type, Germany can decide whether it 
wants to make a public demand or prepare for a surprise attack. Some historians argue 
that Stalin expected Hitler to make demands prior to any military hostilities (Gorodetsky 
1999). The Soviets needed to select an appropriate course of action given their beliefs. 
The Soviets could respond by taking defensive action or waiting. We can assume that 
Soviets would like to make defensive preparations when Germany is aggressive and wait 
when Germany is docile. In this sequence of actions, the Soviets can use German 
demands as a signal, and Germany takes this into account when selecting a strategy. 
Signaling models like this are useful for studying information transmission, since a player 
can observe opponents’ moves and update their beliefs accordingly. In this interaction, 
German demands are the signal of interest, however, an opponent’s moves may involve 
any number of behaviors such as actions or statements. Signaling models have been used 
extensively in international security and particularly in the study of deterrence (Schultz 
1998). 
 We now have a basic framework that describes the dilemma faced by the Soviets 
prior to the Barbarossa attack: nature determines the German aggressive intentions, 
Germany decides whether to make a public demand or prepare for surprise attack, and the 
Soviets then decide whether to take preparatory action or not. Just as we wanted to have 
the most accurate beliefs about the chance of rain in the previous section, the Soviets 
want to develop with the best possible assessment that Germany is aggressive. Given 
Soviet preferences, the Soviets will have a critical belief, similar again to umbrella 




type is above this critical belief, the Soviets always take action. Alternatively, if the 
Soviets believe that the likelihood Germany is aggressive is below the critical belief, the 
Soviets always wait. 
 This begs the question, how do the Soviets update their beliefs about Germany’s 
type? Many economic and game theoretic models use Bayes’ Rule as a learning or belief 
updating mechanism (Myerson 1991). Bayesian updating is a logically consistent way of 
revising beliefs based upon the information available. Recall that Soviets know the 
likelihood that Germany is aggressive, since this is common knowledge. We can label 
this probability Pr(A), which simply stands for the probability that Germany is an 
aggressive type. The Soviets want to know the probability that Germany is aggressive 
given the absence of a public demand. This is a conditional probability that can 
represented as Pr(A|~D), where A again represents the likelihood that Germany is 
aggressive and ~D means that Germany chose not to make a public demand. Note that ~ 
is the logical sign used to indicate the absence or “not,” and | is the sign used to denote 
given that or conditional upon. In order to reach a logical posterior belief given the 
German signal, Pr(A|~D), the Soviets must have an estimate of the likelihood that 
Germany will attempt a surprise attack Pr(~D). It is worth noting that the probability of a 
German surprise attack is a combination of likelihood that the aggressive type attempts 
surprise Pr(~D|A), the likelihood that docile type attempts surprise Pr(~D|~A), and the 
prior likelihood that Germany is aggressive in the first place. This can be represented as 
follows, 
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which can also be represented with abbreviations as, 
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This calculation provides an objectively accurate estimate that the Soviets can use for 
future decisions. However, we have not said anything about Germany’s conditional 
strategies Pr(~D|A) and Pr(~D|~A). The Germans know that Bayesian Soviets will 
engage in such information updating, so the Germans can adopt a signaling strategy 
aimed at manipulating Soviet beliefs in certain ways (Morrow 1994a). Germany’s 
decision to make demands, in this context, can be logically deduced given the actors’ 
preferences. We will look at some basic aspects of strategy selection before addressing 
entrenched beliefs. 
 A quick numerical example can help to illustrate the logic of Bayes’ Rule. Lets 
assume that Germany has aggressive intentions towards the Soviets 40% of the time and 
docile intentions 60%. Lets presume that Stalin figures that Germany makes no demand 
50% when they are aggressive. After all, attacking the Soviet Union is still a risky 
proposition even if the Germans are highly resolved. Stalin further estimates that the 
Germans make no demand 70% of the time when docile. Here, Stalin presumes that a 
docile Germany wishes to instigate public standoff most of the time. Using the same 
abbreviations we did above, we can say that Pr(Aggressive)=40%, Pr(No 
Demand|Aaggressive)=50% and Pr(No Demand|Docile)=70%. The Soviet posterior 













In the scenario above, the Soviet Bayesian rational posterior that Germany is aggressive 
for no demand is approximately 32%. The Soviets posterior belief that Germany is 
aggressive is now below the prior belief. In the absence of a public demand, therefore, the 
Soviets believe the likelihood of facing an aggressive Germany is lower then they 
initially believed. Under such conditions it might be perfectly rational to avoid taking 
defensive measures. 
 The hypothetical example above displayed the mechanics of Bayes’ Rule, but it 
did not address the origins of the signaling strategy. For example, why would Germany 
opt not to make demands when aggressive 50% of the time versus 70% of the time? This 
is what we address next. 
Germany must decide whether it wants to make a public demand or prepare for 
surprise, knowing that the Soviets observe the signal and update their beliefs. When the 
aggressive and docile German types always select different moves, this is called complete 
separation. Separating signals alleviate all uncertainty since the two different types 
always send signals that clearly differentiate themselves (Gibbons 1992). For example, 
the docile type may always make demands and the aggressive type may always prepare 
for surprise. Given such a separating strategy, the Soviets know that the Germans are 
docile whenever they observe public demands, and that the Germans are aggressive in the 
absence of any such demands. 
 Alternatively, complete pooling occurs when both types always select the same 
move all of the time (Gibbons 1992). Complete pooling offers no incremental 




aggressive and docile types may never make demands. In this case, the Soviets observe 
the absence of demands, but have no idea which type they are facing. The Soviets have 
no choice but to rely on their initial beliefs about the sender’s distribution of types. 
 Between complete pooling and complete separation are semi-separating strategies 
(Gibbons 1992). These strategies are probabilistic. An example of such a strategy is a 
case where the aggressive type makes demands 50% of the time, and the docile type 
makes never makes demands. After observing the absence of a demand, the Soviets can 
use the prior belief, and Germany’s optimal strategy, to refine the belief they are facing 
an aggressive type. Mixing strategies makes it difficult for the Soviets to determine 
whether an attack is truly forthcoming, but Germany’s action carries some signaling 
information that is useful for the Soviets. 
 Semi-separating or mixed strategies are based upon making other players 
indifferent between choices. For example, an aggressive Germany should not make 
demands just often enough that the Soviet’s expected payoffs for taking action and 
waiting are equal. Mixed strategies are deduced from the initial distribution over type and 
the actor’s preferences. If the initial common knowledge probability that Germany is 
aggressive changes, Germany’s mixed strategy also changes in order to ensure that the 
Soviets remain indifferent.
3
 This is important in differentiating strong priors from 
entrenched beliefs, and highlights a central feature of signaling models that will be 
important throughout this paper. 
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 The sender always prefers that the target acquiesce, but in the absence of a strategy capable of 
accomplishing this end, game theory focuses on strategies that are unilaterally enforcing. A unilaterally 
enforcing strategy is one that, given an opponent’s strategy, most reliably provides the best possible 
outcome on average. In equilibrium neither player has an incentive to alter such a strategy. A strategy that 
makes the target indifferent means the target does no better or worse by standing firm or acquiescing, and is 




The Soviets have to estimate Germany’s type considering all possible types that 
the Germans could be (Morrow 1994a). This is the essence of the problem of judgment 
under uncertainty, and central to the rational choice explanations of intelligence. To this 
effect, Germany’s decision to make no demand is not representative of a single 
observation of no demand. The signal represents an entire probability distribution of 
optimal German strategies given types. Therefore, the Soviets are not reacting to the 
single observation of no demand, but reacting to the likelihood that the aggressive type is 
among those that choose no demand. When the Soviets are indifferent, they should play a 
mixed strategy where defensive action is itself probabilistic. At any point or strategy 
other than indifference, the Soviets strictly prefer either to act or wait all of the time. This 
way of thinking about signals seems a little abnormal, but it is common to many signaling 
games. 
The strength of the prior once again plays a role in belief updating according to 
Bayes’ Rule. Ordinarily, Germany’s conditional strategy will change if prior beliefs 
change. For this example, we will hold Germany’s strategy constant and examine the 
impact of changing prior beliefs on posterior beliefs. Lets assume that Germany makes no 
demand 50% of the time they are aggressive and 100% of the time when docile. If the 
prior belief that Germany is aggressive is 50%, then the posterior belief that Germany is 
aggressive using Bayes’ Rule is 33%. Therefore, the Soviet belief that Germany was 
aggressive declined from 50% to 33% upon observing Germany’s signal. This is a change 
of 17%. Alternatively, if the prior of the aggressive type was 90%, then Bayes’ Rule 
indicates that the posterior belief should reflect that Germany is aggressive 82% of the 




8%. This illustrates the impact of strong beliefs in Bayes’ Rule. The Soviet beliefs were 
subject to greater changes at 50% than 90%, which seems perfectly logical. If we are 
90% sure that an event will occur, new information should have less of an impact on our 
beliefs. If we are only 50% sure that an event will occur, which indicates high 
uncertainty, new information may be very useful. 
The example above also illustrates how the Germans may have caught the Soviets 
off guard. If the Soviets’ initial prior belief was that Germany was aggressive 50% of the 
time, the absence of a demand may have reinforced the belief that Germany was non-
threatening. German strategy may have caused a significant change in Soviet beliefs. If 
the prior likelihood of German aggression were 90%, that same strategy would not have 
been as effective in altering Soviet threat perceptions. The Soviets would be less likely to 
believe that the Germans were docile, irrespective of Germany’s strategy. It would have 
been more difficult for Germany to catch the Soviets by surprise. 
This leads to a final point in this section. Just as we showed above, beliefs help to 
determine behavior and strategies. The Soviets select their strategy based upon their 
posterior beliefs. The Germans select their signaling strategy in order to influence the 
Soviet’s posterior beliefs. This means that both actors adopt strategies that are tied to 
their prior beliefs about aggression. We would expect changes in the actors’ strategies 
should prior beliefs change. 
Now that we have introduced Bayes Rule, shown how prior and posterior beliefs 
impact strategy and considered the impact of strong priors, we can examine an alternative 






Biases, Anchoring and Entrenched Beliefs 
 We can think of Bayes’ Rule as being a rational approach to information 
updating. Bayes’ Rule is a logically deductive approach to learning that is objectively 
accurate. When actors have sufficient information to apply Bayes’ Rule, the result is a 
statistically rational forecast of the probability of an event occurring. People, however, 
are not necessarily rational. Psychologists have gathered extensive data on the ways that 
people deviate from “rational” learning, assessment or estimation. In this section, we 
explore some of these deviations and specifically focus on deeply entrenched beliefs. We 
begin by looking at different types of psychological biases, then focus more closely on 
judgmental biases. We subsequently focus the discussion on anchoring bias and deeply 
entrenched beliefs. The section concludes by offering a mathematical representation of 
entrenched belief updating, shows how it logically varies from Bayesian updating and 
discusses some possible implication for behavior. 
 Psychologists and economists have noted that people systemically deviate from 
rational behavior (Ellsberg 1962; Kahneman and Tversky 1974; Nisbett and Ross 1980). 
Errors in learning and assessment are often referred to as psychological or cognitive 
biases. Cognitive biases are systemic and involuntary distortions in the mind that lead to 
perceptual errors or judgments that deviate from reality. Psychologists have further 
distinguished between different types of cognitive biases such as judgmental biases, 
decision biases, social biases and memory biases (Baron 2000). Each form of bias applies 
to different situations and involves different processing mechanisms. Since we are most 




Judgmental biases refer to inaccurate estimates of causal relationships (Nisbett 
and Ross 1980). For example, the gambler’s fallacy refers to the tendency to assume 
individual random events are influenced by previous random events (Estes 1964). For 
example, a player may roll a six sided dice three times and get a one each time. They then 
believe the likelihood of rolling one is very low on a subsequent roll, however, the 
probability of getting one is still 1/6. The actual probability is unchanged. Another 
judgmental bias is hindsight bias (Fischhoff and Beyth 1975). This is the tendency to see 
past events as predictable in hindsight, a problem that is almost unavoidable in analysis 
of surprise and intelligence failures. 
Judgmental biases may be motivated or unmotivated biases. A motivated bias 
refers to an estimative error driven by self-interest or notions of self worth. For example, 
overconfidence bias leads people to overestimate their own capabilities (Svenson 1981). 
In these instances, people are motivated to induce a perceptual error. Unmotivated biases 
refer to estimative errors that arise without any concern for self-interest. Ambiguity 
effects are not motivated by self-interest. Ambiguity effects are the tendency to avoid 
selecting or discount options with missing information (Ellsberg 1962). In these 
instances, lack of information makes it more difficult to estimate probabilities, and such 
choices appear less attractive even if they are not. 
One of the most common forms of judgmental bias is called anchoring bias. The 
literature review already introduced the basic ideas behind anchoring, but we briefly 
provide some additional clarity here. Anchoring refers to the tendency to rely too heavily 
on a single piece or subset of information (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). The subset of 




overweight certain information and adjust estimates toward the anchored value. 
Anchoring bias can arise in both motivated and unmotivated contexts. Motivated 
anchoring bias occurs when an individual ignores information because they are certain of 
being correct (Tetlock 1998). In this context, anchoring is tied to a sense of self worth or 
estimative skill. Other times, anchoring can be completely unmotivated. Research has 
shown that people may anchor on sets of previously cued random numbers unconsciously 
(Nisbett and Ross 1980). 
Anchoring on initial or prior beliefs is commonly referred to as having deeply 
entrenched beliefs. The previous section showed how all assessment or belief updating 
relies upon prior beliefs, however, entrenched beliefs are analytically distinct. Unlike 
strong rational prior beliefs, entrenched beliefs represent an irrational over-weighting of 
prior beliefs. Early or initial information, which serves as the basic foundation for 
inference, exerts excessive influence over subsequent belief revision (Nisbett and Ross 
1980). When individuals suffer from entrenched beliefs, new information is discounted or 
ignored in order to preserve the prior or anchored belief. Entrenched beliefs result in 
information discounting beyond what would be considered Bayesian rational. 
Since psychological biases, and specifically entrenched beliefs, are commonly 
invoked in studies of surprise and intelligence failure, it is important to specify the 
concept clearly. That is to say, we must find a way to distinguish between rational and 
irrational information discounting if entrenched beliefs are to be used as an explanatory 
variable. This is why it was important to introduce Bayesian updating in detail above. If 
Bayesian updating is a rational way to integrate new information, we can formalize some 




A convenient way to think of entrenched beliefs is to think of a weighted average 
between rational prior and posterior beliefs.
4
 By using a weighted average of prior and 
posterior beliefs, we can anchor the beliefs to the prior. The strength of the entrenched 
beliefs can be determined by the magnitude of actual anchoring bias. For example, we 
can say that the prior belief is weighted by the anchoring bias and the Bayesian posterior 
belief is weighted by 1-anchoring bias, where the anchoring is between zero and one. 
When the anchoring bias is set at the minimum level of zero, the entrenched and the 
Bayesian rational posterior beliefs are equal. When the anchoring bias is set at its 
maximum level of one, the entrenched posterior beliefs are equal to the prior beliefs. 
Technically, we can think of entrenched beliefs as, 
( ) PosteriorBayesianAnchorpriorAnchorPosteriorEntrenched ×−+×= 1 . 
At any anchor level greater than zero, the actor using this updating mechanism is 
exhibiting entrenched beliefs since they are overweighting prior beliefs relative to the 
Bayesian posterior. This simple specification clearly distinguishes between Bayesian and 
entrenched beliefs without deviating too far from any of the updating concepts discussed 
earlier. Its form is also general enough to allow for both irrational under-suspicion and 
over-suspicion, which we address again below. 
 We can also represent entrenched beliefs in terms of the German-Soviet example 
above. Recall that the Soviets wanted to get the best possible estimate that the Germans 
were aggressive prior to the 1941 Barbarossa attack. The Soviets use Germany’s behavior 
as a signal to update their beliefs about the likelihood of aggression. Germany can choose 
to make a demand or not. The Germans did not make any demands, and the Soviets 
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 Prior mathematical representations of bias have similarly looked at confirmation bias (Rabin and Schrag 




updated their beliefs conditional upon the German strategy. If the Soviets had entrenched 
beliefs, their beliefs would deviate from the Bayesian example above. Entrenched beliefs 
could be represented as, 
( ) ( )
( )













We can also use the abbreviated notation where A represents an aggressive Germany, ~D 
represents Germany’s decision to make no demand and b represents the anchored value. 
The entrenched belief about German aggression would be, 









 It is worth noting that the mathematical definition of entrenchment allows 
entrenched beliefs in either direction. For example, it does not dictate that the Soviets 
anchor on a high likelihood that the Germans are aggressive. The definition of entrenched 
beliefs does not indicate whether entrenchment favors aggressive beliefs that result in 
over-suspicion or docile beliefs that dictate under-suspicion. The definition and 
associated math simply allow an actor with entrenched beliefs to overweight their prior 
beliefs, irrespective of what those beliefs actually are. Therefore, the mathematical 
approach described here is a general definition of entrenchment. 
 These equations provide a clear distinction between rational discounting of 
information and irrational entrenchment. We can apply this definition of entrenched 
beliefs to the Barbarossa example to examine the effects of anchoring bias or entrenched 
beliefs. It is easiest to return to a numerical example above. Lets assume that the prior 




best strategy given the prior belief is no demand 50% of the time they are aggressive and 
100% of the time when docile. Under these conditions, the posterior belief that Germany 
is aggressive using Bayes’ Rule is 43%. If the Soviets fell prey to anchoring bias, then 
their posterior belief would be something between 43% and 60%. If the Soviet anchoring 
bias were 0.5, then they would weigh the prior belief and Bayesian posterior belief 
equally. The Soviets would believe that the likelihood of facing an aggressive Germany 
given no demand was 52% (0.5x60%+0.5x43%). In this case, the Soviet entrenched 
belief about German aggression is greater than the Bayesian rational belief. 
 The relationship between prior belief, Bayesian posterior beliefs, entrenched 
beliefs and anchoring bias are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The entrenched belief ranges 
between the prior and Bayesian posterior beliefs, and moves from the posterior to the 
prior belief as anchoring bias gets more severe. In each graph, the dashed line represents 
the prior belief, the solid grey line represents the Bayesian posterior belief and the solid 
black line represents the entrenched belief. Figure 3.1a, based upon the example just 
above, shows what happens when the Bayesian posterior belief is below the prior belief. 
As anchoring bias increases, the entrenched belief increases from the Bayesian posterior 
of 43% to the prior belief of 60%. Entrenched beliefs result in irrational over-suspicion. 
The effect of entrenched beliefs reverses when the Bayesian posterior belief is 
greater than the prior belief. This is represented in Figure 3.1b. Assume the Germans do 
not make a demand 100% of the time when aggressive and 50% of the time when docile. 
If the prior belief that Germany is aggressive is 60%, then the Bayesian posterior belief is 
75%. Under these conditions, increasing anchoring bias results in a decreasing 




anchoring bias to 60% with maximum anchoring, therefore, Figure 3.1b illustrates 
irrational under-suspicion. 
 
Figure 3.1: Anchoring Bias, Prior Beliefs and Irrational Posterior Beliefs 
 
 Figure 3.1 clearly shows how anchoring and entrenchment can impact posterior 
beliefs. When the prior belief is greater than the posterior, entrenched Soviets will 
overestimate the probability that Germany is aggressive, which we call irrational over-
suspicion. Contrastingly, entrenched Soviets will underestimate the likelihood that 
Germany is aggressive when the prior belief is below the posterior belief, referred to 
irrational under-suspicion. This again highlights the fact that entrenched beliefs can result 
in overestimation or underestimation of a threat. 
 Before concluding this section, it is important consider the competitive or 
strategic implications now that we have defined and explored entrenched beliefs. To do 
this, we return to critical beliefs and optimal strategies. The critical belief was a threshold 
value that helped determine behavior. In the Soviet-German example, the critical belief 
helps determine whether the Soviets take defensive action or wait. If the Soviets believed 







































Note: In Figure 3.1a Pr(A)=60%, Pr(~D|A)=50%, Pr(~D|~A)=100% and the Bayesian posterior Pr(A|~D)=43%. In Figure 




























































Otherwise, the Soviets preferred to wait. When the Soviets’ posterior belief is equal to the 
critical value, this means that Soviets are indifferent between waiting and acting. 
Technically, they get the same expected payoff from either choice. The Soviets are free to 
wait and act with some probability, or mix strategies, at this critical belief. The Soviets 
can choose a mixed strategy that then makes the Germans indifferent between making 
and not making a demand. This type of indifference behavior is a typical result or 
equilibrium. 
 Germany picks a signaling strategy, mixing between making and not making 
demands, to make the Soviets indifferent if possible. The strategy that makes the Soviets 
indifferent occurs when the Soviet Bayesian posterior belief equals their critical belief. 
This means that the posterior lines in Figure 3.1 equal the Soviets critical belief, 
assuming that Germany has selected the optimal strategy in each case. We can further 
deduce that entrenchment results in Soviet posterior beliefs that deviate from the critical 
belief. In other words, if the Germans adopt the optimal strategy that ensures Soviet 
Bayesian posterior beliefs are equal to the critical beliefs, then entrenched Soviets will 
not be indifferent between acting and waiting. 
Entrenched beliefs can potentially have a significant impact on Soviet behavior. 
Figure 3.1a shows that entrenched Soviets are irrationally over-suspicious. This means 
that Soviets think the Germans are more likely to be aggressive then they actually are, 
and this belief motivates the Soviets to take action all of the time. Figure 3.1b illustrates 
the case where entrenched Soviets are irrationally under-suspicious. The Soviets, 
therefore, underestimate the likelihood of facing an aggressive Germany and choose to 




assessment and irrational behavior, provided that the Germans play their optimal 
strategies. 
It is interesting to note that anchoring bias in these competitive contexts can 
actually lead to overconfidence bias.
5
 When the Soviets have Bayesian rational beliefs 
and the Germans adopt an optimal strategy, then the Soviets know that they will be 
indifferent between waiting and acting. This allows the Soviets to mix their strategy. 
Entrenched Soviets, however, are likely to believe that one strategy is preferred to the 
other. For example, Soviets with entrenched beliefs in Figure 3.1a will believe that 
waiting is always preferred to acting. The Soviets overestimate the expected payoffs to 
waiting all of the time because their assessment about German types is inaccurate. The 
Soviets believe that their average payoff will be higher than it actually is. Recalling the 
discussion above, overconfidence bias is the tendency to believe that one will perform 
better than they actually will. Therefore, Soviet overconfidence bias, a biased assessment 
that they are making the right decision, can be driven by anchoring or deeply entrenched 
beliefs. 
All of this suggests that deeply entrenched beliefs can have a significant, and 
potentially detrimental, impact on behavior and outcomes. This is a common theme in 
foreign policy and intelligence literature. However, it is not sufficient to assume that 
biases, in this case entrenched beliefs, always result in bad outcomes. One central idea 
running through this chapter was the difficulty associated with differentiating or 
distinguishing between strong priors and entrenched beliefs. We ordinarily assume that 
entrenched beliefs are detrimental to decisions and outcomes, but rarely address the 
strategic or competitive nature of decision-making. For example, what happens when the 
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Germans are aware that the Soviets may have entrenched beliefs? Does this change 
Germany’s behavior? If so, it is unsuitable to simply assume that entrenched beliefs are 
detrimental to the Soviets. After showing how we can analytically or mathematically 
distinguish between strong prior beliefs and entrenched beliefs, we need to take a further 
step to explore the relationship between bias and competitive outcomes. This is the topic 
of the next chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter provided a definition of beliefs, carefully walked through Bayesian 
logic and Bayesian updating, introduced the way that Bayesian beliefs play a role in 
competitive situations and provided a definition of entrenched beliefs that was technically 
distinct from strong prior beliefs. Each of these concepts plays a crucial role in the next 
chapter where we present a full game theoretic model of surprise and consider the logical 
impact of entrenched beliefs. 
We conclude by summing up some of the central themes of this chapter. It is 
important to recognize that information discounting is not necessarily indicative of 
irrationality or deeply entrenched beliefs. Discounting information based upon strong 
Bayesian priors is a perfectly reasonable way to update or learn. In fact, failing to 
discount sufficiently can also result in inaccurate assessment. This problem may be 
particularly acute in intelligence where deception and counterintelligence efforts produce 
misinformation. Accepting information too easily runs the risk of falling prey to 




important to begin with clear distinctions between rational and irrational learning. We 
also examined how a strong prior impacts the belief updating process. 
The other central idea introduced in the chapter was the problem of decision-
making under uncertainty. We explained how a single observation, such as Germany’s 
demand, is indicative of more than a single observation. Upon observing the demand, the 
Soviets need to consider the possibility that an aggressive type is among the types that 
make a demand. German behavior, therefore, is indicative of an entire probability 
distribution of optimal decisions. This strategic decision is based upon prior beliefs. If 
prior beliefs change, then strategy is expected to change as well. Since entrenched beliefs 
are distinct from strong priors beliefs, it is important to consider the impact of entrenched 













Psychological Biases in a Model of Strategic Surprise 
 
The purpose of this project is to examine the impact of rational and biased beliefs 
on decision-making, specifically as it applies to foreign policy. Psychological biases and 
predispositions are often cited as causal variables in cases of foreign-policy surprises 
such as the Cuban Missile Crisis or North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. In this 
chapter, we introduce a model of surprise attack and systemically evaluate the impact of 
biased beliefs on outcomes. Scholars often argue that biases, specifically deeply 
entrenched beliefs, increase the likelihood of suffering surprise, thereby reducing the 
overall welfare of those with biased or rigid belief systems. Interestingly, Philip Tetlock 
(1999) has shown that decision-makers, in many cases successful ones, exhibit cognitive 
consistency that allows them to maintain previously held beliefs despite contradictory 
evidence. This begs an important question: how is it that these people become successful 
given their rigid or entrenched beliefs despite the widely held belief that such behavior is 
potentially dangerous and damaging? To answer this question, we first need to 
understand how psychological biases or predispositions impact decisions and outcomes. 
The previous chapter introduced the one form psychological bias called 
entrenched beliefs, contrasted them with rational beliefs and showed how biases might 
impact behavior. This chapter pushes this investigation further by examining the impact 




sender decides how to challenge a target, and incorporate the possibility of surprise. The 
model offers a sender the opportunity to challenge a target, and if they do challenge the 
target, they can choose to trigger a crisis diplomatically or can attempt a surprise attack. 
The target must decide whether to take preemptive defensive measures or wait. That 
decision is largely motivated by the target’s beliefs about the sender. When the target 
believes that a sender holds aggressive intentions, they have incentive to take defensive 
action, otherwise they prefer to wait. 
To explore the impact of biases, specifically irrationally entrenched beliefs, this 
analysis compares the behavior of perfectly rational actors against those who may exhibit 
deeply entrenched beliefs, and in so doing identifies the way that entrenched beliefs are 
expected to influence competitive behavior. Competitive behavior in this context refers to 
the decisions or strategies of both actors, the sender and target. In this model, the target is 
the only player with incomplete information that observes signals, and is therefore the 
only player that learns or updates their previously held beliefs. We begin by looking at a 
target that updates its beliefs rationally, which creates a benchmark for rational behavior. 
This benchmark or baseline provides a logically coherent justification for the actors’ 
behavior. Then the analysis proceeds by incorporating the possibility that the target may 
exhibit biased updating, specifically deeply entrenched beliefs. The general specification 
of entrenched beliefs allows both under-suspicion and over-suspicion, where direction of 
bias is determined by the initial conditions. We examine the way that actors respond to 
the target’s deeply entrenched beliefs under different initial conditions and then use the 





The deductive analysis in this chapter shows why and when psychological biases 
or predispositions should impact expected outcomes. Providing theoretical support for 
Tetlock’s (1999) empirical findings, this chapter shows that decision-makers can benefit 
from irrationally entrenched or rigid beliefs under certain conditions. Starting with the 
assumption that leaders often exhibit entrenched beliefs, the analysis here helps to 
explain why these biases can be advantageous rather than simply assuming they are 
detrimental. Game theoretic analysis shows that the possibility of bias resulting in 
irrational over-suspicion may change opponent’s behavior, specifically focusing on the 
way that target bias may change the sender’s strategy. Target entrenched beliefs that the 
sender is friendly, promoting under-suspicion, have no impact on either sender or target 
behavior or expected utility. Alternatively, senders should change their strategy when an 
entrenched target is over-suspicious owing to beliefs that the sender is likely to be 
aggressive. The sender, in this situation, is best off adopting a less provocative strategy. 
In the model developed in this chapter, a sender is equally likely or less likely to attempt 
surprise against a biased target. The target, therefore, can benefit from an overly rigid 
belief system as long as the sender knows the target may be biased. 
Together this leads to two important conclusions. Conditions exist where 
entrenched or overly rigid beliefs can be beneficial to those that hold these beliefs. This 
chapter will identify those conditions and explain why this is true in greater detail. The 
second important conclusion provides a different perspective on the recognition and 
exploitation of others’ biases. Literature on surprise, deception and strategic management 
ordinarily argues that decision-makers either ignore opponent’s biases or can take 




outcomes by finding their opponents’ blind spots. The analysis here offers a contradictory 
conclusion: 1) there is a logical reason and natural tendency to take others’ biases into 
account and 2) opponent’s biases should make one more conservative for fear of 
provoking an unwanted response. This suggests that entrenched beliefs or psychological 
biases should be recognized as risks to manage rather than opportunities to exploit. 
This chapter proceeds by introducing a basic model of surprise, and then adds 
additional complications or refinements. The next section specifies the basic model of 
surprise that will be used throughout the chapter. After discussing solutions to the basic 
model, we add incomplete information where the target knows that the sender’s 
intentions are drawn from a probability distribution. The chapter first offers equilibrium 
solutions for a perfectly rational actor, then examines the way that beliefs and behavior 
change when a target has entrenched beliefs. Finally, we compare the rational and biased 
models to get a better understanding of the effects of bias and see who benefits. 
 
The Basic Surprise Attack Model 
 This section introduces a basic framework for thinking about surprise attack, and 
establishes a construct that can be used to evaluate the role of beliefs later. Surprise often 
refers to an emotional state of disbelief resulting from observation of an unexpected 
event. The concept of surprise attack is more tangible and refers to outcomes rather than 
psychological states. A surprise attack is a military operation that is intended to catch an 
opponent unprepared (Betts 1982). When the opponent’s military force is caught 
unprepared at the time of attack, the attempted surprise is successful. A model of surprise 




 Surprise, however, is only possible when there is some degree of uncertainty. If 
an opposing force knew they were going to be attacked, they would take defensive 
precautions to thwart the attempt. A surprise attack can only be successful when the 
opposing force believes there is some chance that the status quo will be preserved and 
there is no impending attack. The surprise, in essence, is a result of uncertainty over the 
opponent’s plans to attack or not. When an attack is expected, the attempted surprise is 
unlikely to be successful. Alternatively, the surprise is more likely to catch an opposing 
force unprepared when that force believes the likelihood of attack is sufficiently small. In 
summary: surprise is possible because of uncertainty, actors have incentives to take 
defensive action when they believe an attack is coming, prefer to wait when an attack 
seems unlikely, and it is this later state that facilitates successful surprise attacks. 
 The model captures the uncertainty surrounding surprise attacks, and the pressure 
to take defensive action. The basic surprise model consists of two players, the sender and 
target, with three total decision stages. As the model is explained, abbreviations of key 
terms are offered in parentheses. This shorthand notation is useful later in the 
mathematical sections. The sender begins the game by deciding whether to challenge (C) 
or preserve the status quo (~C). If and only if the sender chooses to challenge the target, 
the sender then must decide whether to challenge the target publicly (M) or attempt 
surprise (~M). A public challenge can take many forms such as diplomatic exchange, a 
warning, or a major military mobilization prior to hostilities. An attempted surprise, 
which we call a private challenge, implies that the sender is preparing to attack the target 
without sending any signals of the sender’s plan. In the final decision stage, the target 




 The three decision stages combine create six possible outcomes to the game. 
When the sender attempts to preserve the status quo, there is no need to select the type of 
challenge, and the game ends when the target decides whether to act or wait. If the target 
waits in response, the status quo is maintained (Q). Should the target choose to take 
action against a sender attempting to preserve the status quo, the target suffers a false 
alarm (F). The other four outcomes pertain to senders that choose to challenge. When the 
sender challenges publicly and the target waits, this is considered acquiescing (E) to the 
demand. A public challenge that is met by target action ends in a standoff (D). If the 
sender chooses a private challenge and the target chooses to wait, the sender successfully 
surprises (S) the target. If the target takes action against the sender’s private challenge, 
the attempted surprise is thwarted (R). 
 In order to capture the essence of surprise, the model must include some type of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty in formal models can arise from either imperfect or incomplete 
information (Morrow 1994a). Imperfect information refers to situations where an actor is 
uncertain about the previous moves of other players. Alternatively, actors have 
incomplete information when they are uncertain about the game itself or the 
characteristics of other players, and this is often used to add uncertainty about opponent’s 
preferences and intentions. Incomplete information plays a large role later in the chapter, 
but uncertainty is incorporated into the basic model by using imperfect information. 
The model assumes that the target is unable to differentiate between private 
challenges and attempts to preserve the status quo. The target observes public challenges, 
and knows that the sender has made a demand. In the absence of a public challenge, we 




preparing for surprise attack. In other words, the target is uncertain about the sender’s 
previous moves when they do not observe a public challenge. Since the target cannot 
clearly differentiate between attempts at preserving the status quo and surprise, which we 
call an ambiguous signal, the target has uncertainty and surprise becomes possible. 
Technically, the basic surprise model is a game of complete but imperfect information. 
This does not mean that the ambiguous signal carries no information value. When the 
target observes the ambiguous signal, they can rule out the possibility of a public 
challenge and use that information to select an appropriate strategy. 
The full game tree for the basic surprise model is found in Figure 4.1, and the 
dashed line connecting the target’s nodes represents uncertainty about the sender’s past 
behavior. The diagram summarizes the moves, outcomes and information sets discussed 
in the previous paragraphs. 
 



























The only aspect of the model that has not been specified yet is the actors’ 
preferences over outcomes. This model uses preference rankings similar to basic 
deterrence models where actors prefer to secure an opponent’s acquiescence without 
violence. In formal models with discrete outcomes, there may be a number of possible 
preference orders, and this model is no exception. We solve the model using a few 
specific preference rules, and later discuss how changes in preferences impact the 
expected results. 
We introduce the sender’s preferences first and then discuss the target’s 
preferences. The utilities for each of these outcomes is denoted by US(.) and UT(.), for the 
sender and target, respectively. All things being equal, the sender prefers that the target 
wait when they choose to challenge. This means that the sender prefers acquiescing to 
standoff and a successful surprise to one that is thwarted. We also assume that the sender 
is indifferent between maintaining the status quo and triggering a false alarm.
6
 One 
possible preference ordering for the sender, and one that is used in this section, can be 
summarized as follows: US(E)>US(S)>US(Q)=US(F)>US(D)>US(R). This notation says 
that sender’s preference over outcomes is: 1) target acquiescence, 2) successful surprise, 
3) status quo and false alarm, 4) public standoff, and 5) a thwarted surprise. This 
preference order may be complicated by the sender’s appetite for violence or public 
standoffs, and the impact of alternative preference ordering is revisited below. 
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 This assumes that the target’s action is defensive and not akin to preemptive or preventative attack. There 
are two situations that could falsify this assumption. First, a sender might actually derive benefit from the 
target’s false alarm, since the target expends resources on unnecessary defensive measures. Alternatively, a 
defensive reaction that results in a military strike would be detrimental to a sender seeking to preserve the 
status quo. However, if we assume that the target’s actions are limited to defensive measures, then it is 
reasonable to assume that a sender will be indifferent since the final result is their desired preservation the 
status quo. In a repeated game, this assumption should be changed to reflect the fact that false alarms can 





The target, consistent with most deterrence models, prefers to maintain the status 
quo above all other outcomes. The target’s least preferred outcome is acquiescence, 
which is an assumption necessary to derive useful conclusions. If the target preferred 
giving in to public challenges rather than standing firm, the sender could always 
challenge publicly and succeed without resorting to violence. This negates the roles of 
uncertainty and learning, which are two primary areas of interest in this analysis. 
Presumably, the target also prefers thwarting a surprise to suffering a successful attack. 
Target preferences in this section, listed from most to least preferred are as follows: 1) 
status quo, 2) thwarted surprise, 3) false alarm, 4) public standoff, 5) successful surprise, 
and 6) acquiesce to sender. The summarized notation is 
UT(Q)>UT(R)>UT(F)>UT(D)>UT(S)>UT(E). 
Now we have all the information necessary to derive solutions for this simple 
game of surprise. The next section introduces the mathematical solutions to the game 
above. The implications of these solutions are then discussed in the section after. 
 
Solutions. Since the Basic Surprise Model described above is a game of imperfect 
information, Bayesian equilibrium is an appropriate solution concept. In a Bayesian 
equilibrium, each player selects a strategy for all possible contingencies given their 
beliefs, and no player can improve their expected payoffs by unilaterally changing their 
strategy. Game theoretic equilibria often involve strategies intended to make players 
indifferent between their available choices. When players are indifferent between 
possible moves, they cannot improve their expected payoffs by simply changing strategy. 




 We begin by looking at the target’s equilibrium strategy since that is easier to 
derive. When the sender chooses to challenge publicly, the target has perfect information 
about the history of the game. The target knows that the sender has made some public 
demand. If the target prefers a public standoff to acquiescence, as indicated in the 
preference ordering above, the target’s dominant strategy is to take action. The target will 
never wait and acquiesce. 
The target’s strategy selection, however, does become more complicated when the 
sender chooses to challenge privately or not challenge at all. In these cases, the target has 
imperfect information and does not know whether or not they face an attempted surprise. 
The target’s best strategy is to make the sender indifferent between a private challenge 
and attempts to preserve the status quo. The target makes the sender indifferent when, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )SUnRnUQUnFnU SSSS −+=−+ 11 , 
where n is the probability that target takes action and 1-n is the probability the target 
waits. The sender is indifferent when the target mixes between acting and waiting such 
that, 
( ) ( )








The target will always act when the sender challenges publicly, will act with probability 
n* when they have imperfect information, and will wait with probability 1-n*. 
 The sender has to decide whether to challenge and then decide whether to 
challenge publicly or privately. The sender can never make the target indifferent when 
they challenge publicly since there is perfect information, but the sender can make the 
target indifferent when they challenge privately or preserve the status quo. The target is 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )SUkQkURUkFkU TTTT −+=−+ 11 , 
where k is the target’s belief that the sender preserved the status quo and 1-k is the 
probability that the sender attempts surprise. The target is actually is actually indifferent 
when, 
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Therefore, the target is indifferent between waiting and acting when the sender adopts a 
strategy that makes the target believe there is no challenge with probability k* and private 
challenges with probability 1-k*. 
 The sender’s equilibrium strategy requires challenging and selecting challenge 
type in order to ensure that they preserve the status quo with probability k*. The 
probability k* is the equivalent of saying the probability that sender preserves the status 
quo given an ambiguous signal. The ambiguous signal, the sender’s decision to preserve 
the status quo or challenge privately, is labeled state B. The conditional probability that 
the sender preserves the status quo given the ambiguous signal is, 
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where C still represents the decision to challenge and ~M is the decision to challenge 
privately. We summarize the sender’s strategic choices by assuming that the sender 
challenges with probability x, does not challenge with probability 1-x, opts for a public 
approach given a challenge with probability y, and opts for a private approach given a 















Substituting the value of k* derived above for k yields an equilibrium strategy where the 
sender challenges with probability, 
( ) ( )








or opts for a private challenge with probability, 
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Unfortunately, this is not yet sufficient to specify a full equilibrium. Close 
examination of x* and y* shows that the two strategies are contingent upon one another. 
The likelihood of challenge is contingent upon the likelihood of private action, and the 
likelihood of private action is contingent upon the likelihood of challenge. This means 
there is no clear indication of equilibrium behavior yet. To complete the equilibrium, we 
have to identify the combination of x* and y* that maximizes the sender’s expected 
utility. 
If the sender opts for a strategy that yields an ambiguous signal, the target will 
play their equilibrium strategy n*. When the target acts with probability n*, the sender’s 
expected payoff from the ambiguous signal is, 
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The sender strategy is dictated by their preference for public standoff (US(D)) relative to 




prefers a public standoff, US(D)>EUS(B), then the sender adopts a strategy where they 
always challenge publicly. This means that x*=1 and y*=0. 
 Alternatively, when the expected payoffs from playing an ambiguous strategy are 
preferred to public standoff, EUS(B)>US(D), there is no incentive for the sender to 
challenge publicly. The sender has incentive to maximize the probability they play 
strategies that involve the ambiguous signal, or set xy+(1-x) as high as possible. 
Minimizing the likelihood of a public standoff means never challenging publicly or 
setting 1-y*=0, which also means that all challenges are private and y*=1. When y*=1, 
the sender challenges in equilibrium with probability, 
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 We have identified two possible equilibria given the preference for public 
standoff. The equilibria are listed in the following order: {the sender’s decision to 
challenge or preserve, the sender’s decision to use public or private means, the target’s 
decision to act or not given an ambiguous signal, the target’s decision to act or not given 
a public challenge, and the target’s beliefs in equilibrium}. When US(D)>EUS(B), the 
equilibrium is {C, M, ~ n*~W (1-n*)W, ~W, k=0}. The sender always challenges 
publicly, the target always acts, and there is no reason to believe the sender ever 
preserves the status quo. When EUS(B)>US(D), there is a mixed equilibrium {x*C (1-
x*)~C, ~M, n*~W (1-n*)W, ~W, k=k*}. The sender mixes between challenge and 
preserve, always uses private means when challenging, the target mixes between acting 
and waiting, and the target has the critical belief that makes them indifferent. These 





Discussion. There are two equilibria of the basic surprise model contingent on the 
sender’s value for a public standoff. When the sender has a high value for a public 
standoff, both actors adopt pure strategies. The sender always challenges publicly, and 
the target always takes action in response. In this case, the sender never attempts surprise 
or sends ambiguous signals. If the sender prefers to avoid a public standoff, both players 
adopt mixed strategies. The sender mixes between preserving the status quo and private 
challenges, and the target mixes between acting and waiting. The sender never challenges 
publicly, implying that the target only observes the ambiguous signal and forms some 
belief about the likelihood of surprise based upon the equilibrium strategy. 
 The first result discussed above, the pure strategy equilibrium ending in public 
standoff, is relatively straightforward. If the sender’s payoff for a public standoff is 
greater than the expected payoff for attempting surprise, the sender challenges publicly 
knowing that the target will take action. It is also worth noting that the payoff for the 
public standoff is a sure thing, whereas the payoff for the mixed strategy carries 
uncertainty. A sender who is averse to uncertainty is also likely to prefer public standoffs 
to mixed strategies that will yield one of four possible outcomes. This result, however, is 
relatively uninteresting since it predicts deterministic outcomes with complete 
information. It predicts the same specific course of action for every play of the game, and 
the result is always a public standoff. 
 The mixed strategy result is substantively more interesting and the comparative 
static results are summarized in Table 4.1. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the sender 
mixes between attempted surprise and preservation of the status quo, while the target 




maintained, there are false alarms, there are thwarted surprises and there are successful 
surprises. Table 4.1 shows the predicted changes in the indifference belief k*, the 
sender’s optimal strategy x* (the probability the sender challenges privately), and the 
target’s optimal strategy n* (the probability the target acts). These comparative static 
results are reviewed at greater length below. 
 








UT(Q) - + 0 
UT(F) + - 0 
UT(R) + - 0 
UT(S) - + 0 
US(Q) 0 0 - 
US(F) 0 0 - 
US(R) 0 0 + 
US(S) 0 0 + 
Note: The table reflects partial derivatives, the changes in beliefs and strategies conditional on an increase 
in each preference value. 
 
One of the central results from the Basic Surprise Model is that successful 
surprise is a probabilistic outcome of rational action. Successful surprise is not 
conditional on breakdowns in bureaucratic machinery or biased analysis. Surprise is the 
result of uncertainty, in this case imperfect information about the sender’s past moves, 
and the actors’ preferences over outcomes. Both players respond rationally, and the target 
has rational beliefs about the sender’s previous play that are objectively accurate 
according to Bayes’ Rule. This basic model shows that mistakes, biases or 
misinformation campaigns are not necessary to explain surprise. Private information is 




 The model also offers insights into the likelihood of attempted and successful 
surprise. The sender is more likely to attempt surprise as the target places higher values 
on preserving the status quo and suffering surprise. Both of these outcomes occur when 
the target chooses to wait. As the values for the status quo and surprise increase, the 
target has more incentive to wait, and the sender has greater incentive to challenge. 
Alternatively, the likelihood of attempted surprise decreases as the target’s preference for 
false alarms and thwarted surprise increases. This provides the target with greater 
incentives to act, which reduces the sender’s incentive to attempt surprise. A second 
conclusion derived from the complete information model is that the sender is more likely 
to attempt surprise when the target has a high value for the status quo and is not 
particularly concerned about suffering surprise. When the target has a high value for 
status quo and high value despite suffering surprise, the target has less incentive to take 
action. The sender is more likely to attempt surprise when the target is less likely to take 
action since it increases the likelihood that sender’s surprise is successful. This means 
that targets with high values for the status quo and surprise are more likely to face 
surprise attempts. 
 Attempted surprise is only one half of successful surprise. The other element that 
determines successful surprise is the target’s decision to take action. The target is more 
likely to take defensive action as the sender’s preferences for successful or thwarted 
surprises increases. Combined, this increases the sender’s incentive to attempt surprise, 
which unsurprisingly increases the target’s incentive to act. The target is more likely to 




to challenge. Surprise, therefore, is likely to be successful when the target places a high 
value on the status quo and surprise, and the sender places a high value on the status quo. 
 We can move from the abstract players and outcomes in the model towards a 
realistic assessment of the type of states that are likely victims of surprise. Our 
assessment draws from the partial derivatives in Table 1 showing how a change in any 
single preference impacts expected outcomes holding all other preferences constant. 
States are more likely to be the target of surprise when they value the status quo, have 
high costs for false alarms, have a low utility for thwarting surprise, and are not severely 
injured by a successful surprise. Traditionally, great powers are perceived to have a high 
value for the status quo
7
 and are capable of absorbing a surprise attack due to the size and 
scope of their military force. Major successful surprise attacks targeting great powers, 
such as the German attack on Soviets in 1941 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 
1941, shows the resilience of these victims. This means that great powers should also 
have lower utility for thwarting the surprise since they expect to absorb the attack. 
Nuclear weapons change this calculus somewhat by empowering smaller rivals that 
might be capable of imposing significant losses on large militaries and populations. The 
costs of false alarms and the benefits of thwarting surprise also depend on the costs 
associated with defensive mobilization. Both large and small states may have high 
mobilization costs, however, it is particularly costly for countries that rely on large 
civilian reserves such as Israel. Mobilizations can grind the economy to a halt when 
reservists are pulled away from their civilian jobs. 
These results from the Basic Surprise Model are analogous to existing theories of 
surprise, but this work points to slightly different causal mechanisms and conclusions. 
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Theories of surprise usually maintain that surprise attacks are used by weaker powers 
against stronger foes. Surprise becomes a force multiplier giving the weaker state a 
greater chance for military victory (Gooch and Perlmutter 1982; Handel 1989; Kam 
1988). The analysis suggests that force differential establishes a situation where surprise 
is used, but it does not dictate the likelihood of surprise. Recall that states with a high 
value for public standoffs, presumably because they possess stronger militaries or 
international support, do not use surprise at all. Once the public standoff is unpalatable, 
powerful status quo countries are more likely to be targets of attempted surprise, but the 
reason is not driven by the force differential. The reason these states are more likely to be 
targeted is because the surprise is more likely to succeed. The analysis also showed that 
those facing high costs of mobilization are also more vulnerable to surprise. This leads to 
the conclusion that great powers and small countries may be particularly attractive targets 
for attempted surprise. 
 States are more likely to take defensive precautions against possible surprise 
when their opponent places high value on attempted surprise, whether they are successful 
or not. When potential initiators have a high value for status quo, there is less of a reason 
to expect surprise, and potential targets are less likely take defensive action. Here we see 
observe a situation typical of the paradoxical nature of military strategy (Luttwak 1987). 
Surprise attacks are more likely to be successful when the initiator is perceived to be a 
status quo power. Those with little reason to attack are more likely to achieve surprise. 
States believed to be revisionist are less likely to achieve surprise, an issue that will be 




 Surprise attacks are more likely to be successful when they are carried out by 
content or status quo states that target great powers or small states. Attacks are more 
likely to be thwarted when carried out by revisionist initiators targeting great powers or 
small states. Senders are more likely to achieve surprise when they appear or act as 
though they are content before any attack. Targets are more likely to experience false 
alarms when they are mid-sized powers facing revisionist initiators, and the status quo is 
most likely to be upheld when content initiators face mid-sized powers. 
 The basic model showed how surprise is a product of uncertainty, and the way 
that uncertainty and state preferences over outcomes can combine to influence the 
likelihood of different outcomes. This basic exercise has already improved our 
understanding of the necessary and sufficient conditions for surprise. We showed that 
surprise was a possible outcome whenever the sender preferred the mixed strategy to a 
pure public challenge strategy EUS(B)>US(D), the sender attempts surprise as part of the 
mixed strategy when UT(Q)>UT(F),  and the target acts as part of the mixed strategy 
US(S)>US(Q). In the next section, we introduce a model with additional information 
constraints. We use this model to evaluate propositions about entrenched beliefs and 
surprise, and show why targets may benefit from deliberate analytical closure or 
entrenched beliefs. 
 
The Surprise Model with Incomplete Information 
 Since the Basic Surprise Model only incorporated imperfect information, the 
target only formed beliefs about the sender’s past behavior. The target had complete 




sender’s intentions. When we add incomplete information to the model, the target is 
concerned with the sender’s previous behavior and their intentions or type. The target 
learns about the sender and updates their beliefs accordingly. By adding incomplete 
information, we can incorporate the possibility of bias where targets are slow to update 
their prior beliefs, and then examine the impact of these biases on expected outcomes. 
 Incomplete information is added to the Surprise Model by assuming that there are 
two possible types of senders. This was discussed at some length in the previous chapter 
and will be reviewed briefly here. Different types are incorporated to add uncertainty 
about an actor’s preferences. In this model, we assume that the sender can be aggressive 
(A) or docile (~A). The actual type of sender is drawn from a probability distribution, 
which is often called a move by nature. After nature selects the type of sender, the game 
proceeds in the exact same fashion as the basic model above: the sender can challenge or 
not, the challenge can be public or private, and the target decides whether to act or not. 
In this model, as in many models of incomplete information, the probability 
distribution of the sender’s type is common knowledge. This means that both actors know 
the likelihood with which nature will select an aggressive type, and both actors know 
they know, ad infintum (Morrow 1994a). The target knows this probability, but it does 
not whether nature actually selects the aggressive or docile sender type. The sender 
actually observes which type is drawn and knows whether they are aggressive or docile 
when selecting their strategy. Since the sender knows its type, and the target only knows 
the probability of the sender’s type, there is asymmetric information. The sender has 
information about its type that is not available to the target. The target uses the common 




form a posterior belief.
8
 The likelihood that nature select the aggressive sender, Pr(A), is 
p. Since there are only two types of senders in this model, the likelihood the sender is 
docile is 1-p. 
Introducing two types of sender means that we also have to specify the 
preferences associated with each type. The preferences specified here are intended to 
reflect a realistic preference structure, while keeping the preference order simple enough 
to derive parsimonious solutions. Again, later in the chapter we will look at alternative 
plausible preference structures and the impact on expected outcomes. First, the sender 
places different values on outcomes when they are aggressive and docile. Outcomes for 
the aggressive sender are indicated in capital letters, so the preference notation is 
unchanged from the section above. The docile sender has different preferences, and the 
values placed on these outcomes are indicated by lowercase letters corresponding to the 
capital letters above (US(q), US(f), US(r), US(s), US(d), US(e)). For example, the 
aggressive sender’s payoff for surprise is US(S) and the docile sender’s payoff is US(s). 
All of the docile sender’s outcome values are less than or equal to the aggressive type’s 
outcomes. 
There are two assumptions about the sender’s preferences that are helpful for 
solving the game. We assume that the aggressive sender strictly prefers a public standoff 
to the status quo. Since the aggressive sender can ensure a public standoff by publicly 
challenging, the aggressive sender will never preserve the status quo. This means that the 
aggressive sender always challenges, only deciding whether to challenge publicly or 
privately. The docile sender strictly prefers the status quo to all other options, which 
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means they have incentive to preserve the status quo all of the time.
9
 Combining these 
two assumptions with the preference ordering above is sufficient to solve for the game’s 
equilibria. The incomplete information model is found in Figure 4.2. 
 



















































Solutions. We can solve the incomplete information model using the indifference 
technique in the previous section. Recall that the equilibrium solutions required that each 
player select the strategy that makes their opponent indifferent between available moves, 
if such a strategy exists. In these cases, neither actor can do any better by unilaterally 
changing their strategy. The primary difference between the incomplete information and 
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basic surprise models is the role of prior and posterior beliefs. A solution profile needs to 
dictate the way that both types of senders behave, the target’s response and the target’s 
posterior beliefs. 
 In the incomplete information model, the aggressive sender challenges with 
probability X and attempts surprise upon challenging with probability Y. The docile 
sender challenges with probability x and attempts surprise with probability y. However, 
the assumptions discussed above limit the sender’s possible strategies. If the aggressive 
sender always prefers to challenge, then X=1. When the docile sender does not challenge, 
x=0, and by extension there is no need for the docile sender to select a type of challenge. 
The sender completes their strategic profile by selecting public/private challenge strategy 
Y that makes the target believe they are indifferent if possible. 
 The target knows that the aggressive sender always challenges and the docile 
sender does not. In the absence of a public challenge, the target is indifferent between 
acting and waiting when, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )FUpRUpQUpSUp TTTT *1**1* −+=−+ , 
where p* is the critical belief that makes the target indifferent. Solving for the critical 
belief yields the following condition, 
( ) ( )








The constraint for p* shows that threat perceptions is actually endogenous to the model. 
When the target believes that sender is aggressive more often than this critical value, 
p>p*, the sender is perceived to be threatening and target always acts. Conversely, if the 
target believes that the sender is aggressive less often then the critical value, p<p*, sender 




that the sender is aggressive and docile, this probability alone does not warrant a threat. 
The prior belief and the critical threshold determine the threat level. 
The sender adopts a challenge strategy such that target’s posterior belief is equal 
to p*, if such a strategy is possible. The target begins with the prior belief that the sender 
is aggressive with probability p, and their Bayesian posterior belief about the sender’s 
type is, 
( ) ( ) ( )












We can derive the sender’s mixed equilibrium strategy by setting the critical belief equal 
to the Bayesian posterior belief, p*=PrBayes(A|C~M). The aggressive sender attempts 
surprise with probability, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )









 Taking defensive action is still the target’s dominant strategy given a public 
challenge. In the absence of the public challenge, the target adopts a strategy aimed at 
making the aggressive sender type indifferent between public and private challenges. The 
docile sender is never indifferent since they prefer to preserve the status quo. The target’s 
strategy that makes the aggressive sender indifferent must meet the following condition, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )DUSUnRnU TTT =−+ 1 , 
where n is the probability that the target acts. This means that the mixed strategy 
equilibrium for the target is, 
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As long as the aggressive sender has a higher value for a public standoff than a thwarted 
surprise, the target’s mixed strategy equilibrium exists. 
 Now we can characterize the set of equilibria for the incomplete information 
game. There are two standard Bayesian equilibria for this game, one based on pure 
strategies and the other based on mixed strategies. The equilibria are listed as follows: 
{the sender’s strategy when aggressive; the sender’s strategy when docile; the target’s 
strategy when observing a public challenge; the target’s strategy when observing the 
ambiguous signal: the target’s belief}. The pooling equilibrium is {C, ~M; ~C; A; ~A: 
p<p*}. A pooling strategy is a choice set in which the sender transmits the same signal to 
the target all of the time. In this case, the sender either challenges privately or does not 
challenge, thereby always sending the ambiguous signal. The pooling equilibrium exists 
whenever the prior likelihood that the sender is aggressive, p, is below the critical value 
p*. In this case, the sender is perceived to be non-threatening, and this assessment is 
endogenous to the model. When the prior belief equals the critical belief, p=p*, the 
sender always attempts surprise given a challenge, Y=1. Mathematically, Y>1 when p<p*, 
implying that the aggressive sender adopts a pure strategy of private challenge. The 
aggressive sender always attempts surprise and the docile sender always preserves the 
status quo. The target always waits since they believe they are more likely to face a 
docile sender. This pure strategy is also a pooling strategy of sorts since the sender 
always acts in order to send the ambiguous signal, irrespective of type. The only two 
expected outcomes are status quo and surprise. 
 The mixed strategy equilibrium is {C, Ye ~M, (1-Ye) M; ~C; A; n* A, (1-n*) ~A: 




probability of challenging by surprise Ye, the target’s equilibrium probability of acting n* 
after observing the ambiguous signal, and the target’s ex post belief that they are facing 
an aggressive type p*. The common knowledge assumption dictates that both the sender 
and the target know all of the information necessary to derive these three equilibrium 
constraints. The target does not know what type they are facing, and cannot distinguish 
private challenges from attempts to preserve the status quo, but they do know the 
preferences for each type of the sender and the sender knows the target’s preferences as 
well. 
In the mixed strategy, the aggressive sender attempts surprise with probability Ye 
and challenges publicly with probability 1-Ye. The docile sender always attempts to 
preserve the status quo. The target acts with probability n*, waits with probability 1-n*, 
and believes that sender is aggressive with probability p*. In the mixed strategy 
equilibrium, the game can end with status quo, false alarm, successful surprise, thwarted 
surprise or public standoff. We examine the likelihood of outcomes and partial 
derivatives in the discussion section below. It is worth noting that this solution actually 
becomes a corner solution, making specification of an additional equilibrium 
unnecessary. A corner solution is one where the strategies are bounded by some value, 
often on the interval [0,1], and the equilibrium dictates that a player adopts a strategy that 
permanently bounds them at the minimum or maximum value. When p=100%, then Ye=0. 
This means that a sender who is always aggressive always challenges publicly, and the 
target always takes defensive action. Since the semi-separating equilibrium completely 





Discussion. The analysis above identified two equilibria for the incomplete information 
model. When the sender was perceived to be non-threatening, had a sufficiently low prior 
likelihood of being aggressive, there was a pooling equilibrium where the sender always 
conveyed ambiguous signals. The docile sender always attempted to preserve the status 
quo and the aggressive sender always attempted surprise. The target always waited in 
response. When the sender was perceived to be a threat, or the prior likelihood of being 
aggressive surpassed the critical belief, the sender adopted a mixed or semi-separating 
strategy. The docile sender would preserve the status quo, but the aggressive sender 
would mix between public and private challenges. In response, the target would play a 
strategy that mixed waiting and acting. Table 4.2 shows the predicted effects of 
preference changes on equilibrium strategies based on partial derivatives. The table 
highlights comparative static relationships that are addressed in greater detail below. 
 








p 0 - 0 
UT(Q) + + 0 
UT(F) - - 0 
UT(R) - - 0 
UT(S) + + 0 
US(Q) 0 0 0 
US(F) 0 0 0 
US(D) 0 0 - 
US(R) 0 0 + 
US(S) 0 0 + 
Note: The table reflects partial derivatives, the changes in beliefs and strategies conditional on an increase 





 A non-threatening sender, one with a sufficiently low likelihood of being 
aggressive, adopts the pooling strategy because there is nothing they can do, or no signal 
they can send, that can make the target take defensive action. Since the target starts the 
game with the prior belief that the sender is sufficiently docile to be perceived as non-
threatening, the aggressive sender does not have to make much of an effort to mask their 
intentions. The target’s prior beliefs provide an umbrella of sorts that is sufficient to 
cover the aggressive sender’s planned surprise. If the target has beliefs that prevent it 
from taking defensive action, any attempted attack will be a successful surprise. The 
target’s decision to wait is a product of the high likelihood that sender is docile and 
therefore preserving the status quo. Should the target take action, there is a high 
likelihood that they will suffer a false alarm. The target finds they are better off waiting 
and suffering the rare surprise than adopting a mixed strategy that ensures many false 
alarms. 
  The semi-separating result is substantively more interesting, and it is the 
equilibrium when the sender is perceived to be a threat, specifically when the prior belief 
the sender is aggressive exceeds the critical threshold. Before examining the 
characteristics of the equilibrium, it is worth taking a moment to look at the critical belief 
that determines whether the players adopt the pooling or semi-separating equilibrium and 
the target’s threat assessment. The critical belief value increases as the target’s utility for 
waiting increases. In other words, as the target’s value for the status quo or surprise 
outcomes increase, the critical belief that makes the sender indifferent increases as well. 
Conversely, as the values of outcomes associated with taking action, false alarm and 




a large incentive to thwart a surprise and low costs for false alarms have lower critical 
belief thresholds. These states are more likely to perceive the sender to be threatening, 
have greater incentive to take action, and the sender is more likely to adopt a semi-
separating strategy. Pooling outcomes are more likely when the target state is not really 
worried about surprise and have a high value for the status quo. This shows how the 
target’s preferences over outcomes and the sender’s prior likelihood of aggression are 
tied to endogenous threat perception and the different equilibria deduced above. 
 In the semi-separating equilibrium, the aggressive sender mixes between public 
and private challenges. Here, the sender is unable to hide behind the target’s prior belief 
that the sender is likely to be docile. If the aggressive sender attempted surprise every 
time, the target would always have incentive to take action. The sender avoids this by 
publicly challenging just often enough that the target’s posterior belief that sender is 
aggressive given the ambiguous signal is equal to the critical belief. As the sender’s prior 
likelihood of being aggressive increases, the sender needs to publicly challenge more 
often to ensure that the target’s posterior belief remains equal to the critical belief. 
Predictably, the sender should attempt surprise less often as the likelihood they are 
aggressive increases. After all, it should be more difficult for a state that is always 
aggressive to catch a target state by surprise. 
 The sender’s semi-separating equilibrium strategy is a function of the likelihood 
they are aggressive and the target’s preferences over outcomes. The aggressive sender is 
more likely to attempt surprise when the target has higher values for the status quo and 
surprise. In technical terms, the likelihood the sender attempts surprise is increasing in 




that applied to the critical belief value. When the target’s utility for the status quo and 
surprise increase, that means the target’s value of waiting has increased. The aggressive 
sender has more incentive to attempt surprise, sending the ambiguous signal, knowing 
that the target has greater incentives to wait. The sender can attempt surprise more often 
while keeping the target indifferent between waiting and acting. Conversely, the sender’s 
attempted surprise is decreasing in the target’s utility for false alarms and thwarted 
surprise. When false alarms are not costly, and thwarted surprise is especially beneficial, 
the sender has to attempt surprise less often in order to keep the target indifferent given 
the greater incentives to take action. Finally, the sender’s likelihood of attempting 
surprise is decreasing in the prior probability that the sender is aggressive. If the target 
knows the sender has a higher likelihood of being aggressive, the sender can only keep 
the target indifferent by attempting surprise less often.  
 The target’s strategy in the semi-separating equilibrium is a function of the 
sender’s preferences over outcomes. The aggressive sender can always opt to challenge 
the target publicly thereby securing the payoff from a public standoff. The aggressive 
sender will only mix between public and private challenges when the expected utility of 
the two challenges is equal. If the expected utility from public challenge is greater than 
that of private challenges, the aggressive sender will always challenge publicly. The 
target, therefore, selects a strategy that makes the sender indifferent between public and 
private challenges. The target accomplishes this by mixing acting and waiting, given an 
ambiguous signal, such that the sender’s expected utility from private challenges is equal 
to the expected utility in a public challenge. The sender is less likely to take action when 




for public challenge, and the target can wait more often as a response. The likelihood that 
the target takes action in the mixed strategy is increasing in the sender’s value for 
successful and thwarted surprise. When the sender gets greater value for attempting 
surprise, the target responds by acting more often to increase the likelihood that sender 
suffers a thwarted surprise. This makes attempted surprise less attractive to the aggressive 
sender, thereby ensuring they remain indifferent between their policy choices. 
 The substantive results here are similar to those of the basic surprise model, with 
the exception that prior beliefs about the sender play an important role. States with a high 
value for status quo that are not significantly harmed by surprise attacks are more likely 
to be great powers. Those with a low value for status quo, or are particularly vulnerable 
to surprise attacks, are more likely to be small and insecure states. These small states, 
such as Israel, are probably disproportionately affected by false alarms since mobilization 
is a statewide endeavor that brings a halt to the economy and everyday life. Small or 
weak states are also likely to place greater emphasis on thwarting surprise since the state 
may be unable to mount a military response after taking the initial blow. This means that 
the critical belief value, the belief that makes target states indifferent between acting and 
waiting, should be higher for great powers than small states. This means great powers are 
more likely to find themselves in the pooling equilibrium whereby the target never has 
incentive to act because the initial prior and perceived threat is not sufficient to warrant 
concern. Small powers, with a lower critical belief, are more sensitive to possible threats 
meaning they face opponents opting for a semi-separating strategy. 
 These results extend to the sender’s propensity to attempt surprise in the semi-




and are less vulnerable to initial attacks, challenging states have a greater incentive to 
attempt surprise. This analysis suggests that the classic analogy, great powers are 
slumbering giants, may be correct. Challenging states know they can get away with 
attempting surprise more often while keeping the target indifferent. Small powers with 
lower costs for false alarms, greater incentives to thwart the surprise, and high costs for 
successful surprise, should face attempted surprise less often. It is more difficult to lull 
these states into a sense of security. 
 The target state is less likely to take action as the sender’s preference for public 
standoffs increases. Challengers are likely to have a high value for public standoffs when 
they are great powers, since great powers should have more bargaining leverage in the 
subsequent standoff. Conversely, targets are more likely to act as the challengers value 
for successful and thwarted surprises increase. Interpreting this result is a little more 
opaque. Small states are more likely to benefit from successful surprise, since surprise is 
supposed to be a force multiplier. These same small states, however, are likely to suffer 
significant costs when these attempts get thwarted. Large or great powers would prefer to 
avoid a thwarted surprise, but these instances will rarely be disastrous. It seems as though 
targets are more likely to take action against small powers, those that benefit from 
surprise, but this generalization may be overly broad given the deductive results. 
 In this model, the likelihood that a target suffers surprise is tied to the prior 
probability that the sender is aggressive. The target is most likely to suffer surprise when 
the prior probability of sender aggression is equal to the posterior critical belief value. As 
the prior probability declines from the critical belief, a waiting target is less likely to face 




aggressive increases, the sender should attempt surprise less often if any attempts at 
surprise are to be successful in the semi-separating equilibrium. We also argued that 
senders are more likely to attempt surprise against larger powers, but it was difficult to 
classify the target’s propensity to respond with defensive action. 
 The next model incorporates the possibility of a biased target. After solving for 
the equilibria of the model, we compare the results from the Bayesian model discussed 
above against the potentially biased model, revealing some unexpected features of bias. 
 
The Surprise Model With Bias 
 The game structure of the potentially biased model introduced here is almost 
identical to the incomplete information game introduced in the previous section. There 
are two players, a sender and target. There are two possible types of sender, aggressive 
and docile, and the actual type is drawn by nature. The sender can choose to preserve or 
challenge the status quo, and challenges can be public or private. The target then decides 
whether to take defensive action or wait. The players’ preferences over outcomes are the 
same as the surprise model with incomplete information. 
The only difference here is that we include two possible types of targets. 
Deviating from conventional use of types, where actors usually have different preferences 
over outcomes, the two types of targets have identical preferences. The difference 
between the two types is the way they update their beliefs. In this model, the target can be 
perfectly Bayesian or biased. When the target is Bayesian, they update their beliefs using 
the Bayesian method in the previous section where posterior beliefs are, 
( ) ( ) ( )















A biased target, on the other hand, suffers from deeply entrenched beliefs, which were 
introduced in Chapter 3. A target suffering from deeply entrenched beliefs irrationally 
discounts or ignores new information relative to their prior beliefs. The posterior belief 
resulting from this biased updating process is specified as weighted average between the 
prior belief and the Bayesian rational posterior such that, 
( ) ( ) ( )MCDbbqMCD BayesBias ~|~Pr1~|~Pr −+= . 
The variable b represents the strength of the deeply entrenched belief. When b equals 
zero, the target is perfectly Bayesian, and when b equals one, the target ignores all new 
information. We use a point estimate for the level of anchoring bias and introduce 
uncertainty by offering the possibility of a Bayesian or biased target. 
 This revised game begins with the selection of the target’s type, where the target 
may update beliefs in an entrenched or Bayesian fashion. With probability z the target is 
entrenched and is Bayesian with probability 1-z. The sender knows the probability z, but 
neither player knows which type is selected. This assumption means that the sender has 
incomplete information about the target’s belief updating quality. The sender knows that 
the target may have entrenched beliefs, but does not know whether the target will actually 
exhibit entrenched behavior. In other words, the sender knows that there is some 
probability z that the target will have anchoring bias b. This assumes that the sender has 
some knowledge about the receiver’s preexisting beliefs and potential biases. While these 
assumptions simplify the types of uncertainty faced by the sender, this is also a plausible 
assumption in international politics. Decision-makers are always interested in their 
opponent’s beliefs and preconceived notions, and they are constantly trying to gather 




target believes they are updating their information throughout the game as best as 
possible. They are unaware whether they are using the Bayesian or entrenched 
mechanisms. If the target knew which they were using, they could simply adjust their 
calculations accordingly. Such adjustments would cancel out any strategic impact of 
entrenched beliefs. 
 After the target’s type is selected, the sender’s type is selected by nature and the 
actors make their moves. The next section reports the deductive results for the potentially 
biased model, and then these results are compared to the standard Bayesian results. 
 
Solutions. This section uses the same notation and assumptions that were used in the 
incomplete information model. As a review, the aggressive sender challenges with 
probability X and attempts surprise with probability Y. The docile sender challenges with 
probability x and attempts surprise with probability y. The aggressive sender always 
prefers to challenge, meaning X=1, and the docile sender does not challenge, so x=0. The 
sender completes their strategic profile by selecting a public/private challenge strategy Y 
that makes the target believe they are indifferent. Since there are two types of targets, 
Bayesian and biased, we have to solve for the indifference characteristics of both types. 
The notation Ye is used to reflect the public/private challenge strategy that makes the 
Bayesian type indifferent, and Yb is used to denote the challenge strategy that makes the 
biased type indifferent. In the rest of the chapter we refer to Ye as the Bayesian-aimed 
strategy and Yb as the biased-aimed strategy. 
 Once again, the target is indifferent between acting and waiting upon observing 
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where p* is the critical belief. The target’s critical belief remains unchanged, 
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Recall the target always waits when their posterior belief p<p*, and always acts when the 
posterior belief p>p*. The sender’s equilibrium is aimed at making the target believe that 
the sender is aggressive with probability p*. In the potentially biased model, the Bayesian 
type updates beliefs as specified in the solution set above. The strategy that makes that 
Bayesian target indifferent is, 
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This strategy, however, cannot make the biased target indifferent. Since the biased target 
entrenches upon the prior belief about the sender, the strategy that makes the biased 
target indifferent is, 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )












 The target once again selects a strategy that makes the aggressive sender type 
indifferent between public and private challenges such that, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )DUSUnRnU SSS =−+ 1 . 
This means that the target’s mixed strategy aimed at making the sender indifferent is the 
same for both models, which is not surprising since the result is contingent upon the 
sender’s payoffs. The strategy that makes the sender aggressive indifferent is, 
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 The equilibrium results here are similar to those deduced in the Bayesian model 
above. We will specify these equilibria for completeness without addressing redundant 
details. There are two standard Bayesian equilibria for this game, one based on pure 
strategies and the other based on mixed strategies. The equilibria are listed as follows: 
{the sender’s strategy when aggressive; the sender’s strategy when docile; the entrenched 
target’s strategy when observing a public challenge; the Bayesian target’s strategy when 
observing a public challenge; the entrenched target’s strategy when observing the 
ambiguous signal; the Bayesian target’s strategy when observing the ambiguous signal: 
the target’s belief}. The pure strategy equilibrium for the potentially biased is {C, ~M; 
~C; A; A; ~A; ~A: p<p*}, and the semi-separating strategy is {C, Yb ~M, (1-Yb) M; ~C; 
A; A; n A, (1-n) ~A; ~A: p=p*}. The rationale is similar, when the prior belief about the 
sender is below the critical value, the aggressive sender can always achieve surprise. This 
results in a pure strategy equilibrium where the sender pools on the ambiguous signal. 
When prior beliefs exceed the threshold value, the sender attempts surprise just often 
enough to keep the biased target indifferent. Unlike the previous semi-separating 
equilibrium, there is an additional corner solution contingent on the anchoring bias. We 
find it is possible that Yb=0 even when p<100%. When the target is biased there is a 
threshold on the anchoring value such that Yb=0 when, 
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If b>b*, the target is too biased to be indifferent and the sender gets no benefit from 
attempting deception. If we add bias to the equilibrium, we can characterize the corner 





At first glance, it is difficult to compare the sender’s optimal strategies in the two 
models, Ye and Yb. If however, we substitute p* for the prior belief p, the sender’s 
likelihood of attempted surprise is the same, or Ye=Yb. For any value where the prior 
probability the sender is aggressive is greater than the critical value, p>p*, then Ye>Yb. 
When there is the possibility of target bias, the sender must decide whether to play Yb or 
Ye. Biased targets always mix at Yb and act at Ye, and Bayesian target always waits at Yb 
and mixes at Ye. To find the sender’s best response, we set EUS(Ye)=EUS(Yb), and find 
that EUS(Yb)>EUS(Ye), whenever, 
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The value of the threshold above is always greater than one, and since 0<z<1, the sender 
always enjoys a higher utility from Yb. The sender’s decision is summarized in Table 4.3. 
It shows how each target responds to each of the sender’s possible strategies. Since the 
both targets will play mixed strategies, albeit under different conditions, the sender is 
better off adopting a strategy that encourages the target to wait. 
 




















Target type plays 
mixed strategy 
Note: The table shows that the Bayesian-aimed strategy will elicit action form the biased type, while the 
biased-aimed elicits waiting from the Bayesian type. The sender is always better off adopting the biased-





This solution section concludes by examining the impact of entrenched beliefs on 
the target’s utility and likelihood of surprise. To examine the target’s change in utility 
from the possibility of entrenchment, the values for surprise and status quo are 
normalized. Surprise is the target’s least or second least preferred option, so it is assumed 
that it yields a payoff of zero (UT(S)=0). The target’s most preferred option, status quo, is 
assumed to be equal to one (UT(Q)=1). Under these conditions, the target’s expected 
utility given potential entrenchment is higher whenever, 
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Since 0<b<1, this condition is only violated when the initial likelihood of being 
entrenched z and the likelihood of acting in a mixed strategy n are very high in 
conjunction. In any other circumstance, EUTb(p>p*)>EUTe(p>p*). Alternatively, the 
target’s utility given the possibility of entrenchment is higher than the Bayesian rational 
outcome when z<zU where, 
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 The final issue we want to address here is the likelihood of successful surprise. In 
the standard Bayesian model, the target is surprised with probability qYe(1-n). The 
likelihood of being surprised in the entrenched model is zqYb(1-n)+(1-z)qYb. Despite the 












When the likelihood of entrenchment is high, then the target has a higher likelihood of 
taking action given the entrenched-aimed signal. 
 
Discussion. This section discusses the primary conclusions, as well as the assumptions 
and causal processes underlying these results. The solutions and propositions are 
introduced conceptually, without the mathematical derivations or thresholds. The 
predicted effects of entrenched beliefs are summarized in Table 4.4. The table shows a set 
of conditions along the top, and along the side it shows the effects of bias relative to the 
Bayesian rational outcome. 
 
Table 4.4: Predicted Effects of the Entrenched Beliefs on Outcomes 


























 + + + + 
Target Expected Utility 0 + - NA NA 
Pr(Attempted Surprise, Y) 0 - - - - 
Pr(Surprise) 0 NA NA - + 
Pr(Surprise|Target Bayes) 0 + + + + 
Pr(Surprise|Target Biased) 0 - - - - 
Note: The table shows the difference in expected outcomes when comparing the Bayesian rational model to 
the possibly entrenched model. Some outcomes are denoted NA since zU could be larger or smaller than z
S
. 
1. Entrenched beliefs have no impact on the posterior beliefs in the restricted case due to endogenously 
determined strategies, but can result in under-suspicion for preferences are revisited below. 
 
 We begin by examining the equilibrium strategies, and the likelihood of surprise, 
when a sender is perceived to be non-threatening. Recall from the discussion above, that 




without. It is important to be clear about this story at the outset. It does not simply assert 
that decision-makers will not act when they do not perceive a threat; instead, it focuses on 
the marginal propensity to take action. Targets with entrenched beliefs are assumed to 
ignore or trivialize an opponent’s signals, particularly when preexisting beliefs suggest 
that the sender is non-threatening. Ignoring signals leads to inaccurate threat assessment, 
and this inaccurate assessment is hypothesized to increase the likelihood that the target is 
surprised. However, this proposition is not supported here. The model assumes that 
entrenched beliefs do impair learning, but the likelihood of surprise given a non-
threatening sender is unaltered by entrenched beliefs. Under these conditions, the 
likelihood of surprise is determined by the strategic context, meaning that the 
conventional explanation overemphasizes the causal impact of psychological bias. This 
leads to the first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: When the Bayesian prior beliefs indicate that the sender is likely to be 
docile (Pr(S|z>0)=Pr(S|z=0)∀ p<p*), a target with potentially entrenched beliefs is no 
more or less likely to be surprised than a Bayesian rational target. 
  
 The rationale behind this proposition actually stems from the competitive context, 
rather than the assumption that inaccurate beliefs cause bad decisions. When a sender is 
perceived as non-threatening, it is in the sender’s interest to reinforce this belief whether 
or not they pose a threat. The sender pools on the ambiguous signal, where the aggressive 
type challenges with surprise and the docile type does not challenge. The aggressive 




and docile senders appear to behave similarly, the sender’s behavior carries no 
information value. The sender adopts a pooling signaling strategy that provides no 
additional clues about the threat level, because the target always has incentive to wait. 
Entrenched beliefs have no impact on decisions when the opponent’s behavior provides 
no new information, since entrenchment involves ignoring or marginalizing new 
information. Therefore, decision-makers with and without entrenched beliefs will have 
the same threat perceptions, and are equally likely to be surprised when the opponent is 
initially perceived as non-threatening. It is also worth noting that entrenched beliefs have 
no impact on the sender’s decision to adopt a pooling strategy in the first place. This also 
implies that deception matters most when the target suspects the sender of malign intent. 
 The nature of signaling in the model plays an important role in the derivation of 
Proposition 1. The model assumes that the sender’s decisions to preserve the status quo 
and attempt surprise are equally ambiguous. The proposition is contingent upon the 
sender’s decision to pool on ambiguous signals. To get a better understanding of 
information transmission, it is important to look at the sender’s mixed strategy outcomes. 
When the sender chooses to mix signals, the target can use the ambiguous signals to 
refine the threat assessment. For example,  an aggressive sender might choose a strategy 
where they attempt deception 50% of the time. If the sender is aggressive with 
probability 40%, and never attempts deception when docile, a Bayesian target believes 
they are facing an aggressive opponent 25% of the time they observe the ambiguous 
signal. The target was able to use the signal to revise their belief it was facing a hostile 




never provides useful information. Ambiguous signals can be useful in revising beliefs 
and estimates. 
The lack of new information in the signal that drives the result in Proposition 1 
does not stem from the existence of an ambiguous signal, which might make the model 
appear as though there is no warning mechanism. Nor is it true that the ambiguous signal 
never imparts useful information for the target, as demonstrated above. The lack of 
information in the signal that drives Proposition 1 is an emergent property of the sender’s 
optimal strategy. Anytime the sender chooses to pool on a single signal, the sender’s 
behavior cannot be used to refine the target’s preexisting beliefs. When the sender mixes 
their strategy, the ambiguous signal provides information that the target can use to revise 
their threat estimates. The aggressive sender type will publicly challenge with some 
probability when playing a mixed strategy. The target can use the probability of a public 
challenge to refine the likelihood that the sender is aggressive when observing the 
ambiguous signal. We will examine the impact of additional warning mechanisms below, 
however, the result above is a product of incentives and competition not simply limited 
signals. 
 The sender mixes signals, as illustrated above, when they pose a threat to the 
target. Technically, the sender adopts a mixed strategy when the likelihood of being 
aggressive is above a threshold value.  In a standard Bayesian game, the sender adopts 
the mixed strategy that makes the target indifferent between acting and waiting. 
However, the possibility of entrenched beliefs complicates the sender’s strategy selection. 
The sender can adopt two possible strategies; one aimed at making the Bayesian or 




type indifferent (Yb). Neither strategy is ever capable of making both target types 
indifferent simultaneously. 
 Since a target with entrenched beliefs undervalues the new signal relative to 
previous information, the sender actually compensates for this difference. Signals 
satisfying entrenched targets should have a lower probability of attempted deception, and 
signals satisfying Bayesian targets are perceived as provocative by entrenched types. 
Here it is important to recall the discussion about signals in extensive form games. The 
sender’s signal is not merely a single event or observation; it is representative of an entire 
distribution of signals. Since the entrenched type perceives the signal distribution that 
makes the Bayesian type indifferent as hostile, the sender should alter the distribution of 
attempted surprise to make the entrenched type indifferent. If an entrenched target 
ignores information suggesting that the sender is docile, the target will overestimate the 
likelihood that the sender is aggressive. The sender’s best course of action is to 
compensate by attempting surprise less often. Analysis shows that the likelihood of 
attempted deception is strictly lower for the strategy aimed at the entrenched type (Yb<Ye) 
in mixed strategy space. The sender must attempt surprise less often than they would if 
facing a Bayesian target to make an entrenched target indifferent. 
 A simple numerical example helps to illustrate the impact of entrenched beliefs. 
In this example, we will call the sender Egypt and the target Israel in 1967. We begin 
with assumption that there is a high probability that Egypt will act aggressively towards 
Israel. An aggressive Egypt then decides whether to challenge publicly or attempt 
surprise to achieve its goal of reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula. A Bayesian rational Israel 




attempts surprise just often enough. If Egypt’s optimal strategy that makes a rational 
Israel indifferent is to attempt surprise 50% of the time, then a rational Israel will mix 
between acting and waiting in response to that strategy. If Israel has entrenched beliefs, 
on the other hand, the Israelis will perceive Egypt’s strategy of attempting surprise 50% 
of the time as hostile. Under these circumstances Israel will prefer to act whenever they 
get an ambiguous signal. Alternatively, Egypt can reduce the probability with which it 
attempts surprise in order to make Israel indifferent when they have entrenched beliefs. 
By attempting surprise 40% of the time, Egypt can ensure that an entrenched Israel is 
indifferent and plays a mixed strategy, while a rational Israel always prefers to wait. This 
illustrates the way that Egypt might alter its challenge strategy in response to the 
possibility of Israeli entrenched beliefs. Egypt needs to select the strategy that yields the 
highest payoff, which we address next. 
 The aggressive sender must choose between these entrenched-aimed (Yb) and 
efficient-aimed (Ye) strategies, and chooses the strategy that yields the highest utility. 
Despite less attempted surprise, the sender should always take the possibility of the 
target’s entrenchment into account and the optimal strategy requires making the 
entrenched type indifferent. The reason that the biased-aimed strategy is always optimal 
for the sender lies in the target’s response when they are not indifferent. The target is 
indifferent between strategies when the entrenched type observes the entrenched-aimed 
signal and when the efficient type observes the efficient-aimed signal. The target only 
selects a mixed strategy at these indifference points. When the entrenched target observes 
the efficient-aimed strategy, it is always optimal for the target to take action. This is what 




observe the entrenched-aimed strategy. If the sender uses the efficient-aimed strategy, 
they attempt deception more often but always trigger action from the entrenched type. 
The sender is better off attempting deception less often, and makes up for it by 
occasionally encountering the efficient target type that always waits. This leads to the 
second proposition. 
 
Propositions 2: In mixed strategy space, senders should attempt less surprise if they know 
that there is a possibility that the target has an entrenched belief that the sender is 
aggressive (Pr(C~M|z>0)<Pr(C~M|z=0)∀ p>p*). 
 
 Finally, we examine the impact of entrenched beliefs on the target’s utility and 
find that a positive strategic bias may exist under certain conditions. Less attempted 
deception should be beneficial to the target, and it is in most cases. However, false alarms 
can negate this benefit. The target’s mixed strategy that makes the sender indifferent does 
not change, despite less deception.  When the target almost always has entrenched 
beliefs, and plays their mixed strategy in response to the sender’s strategy, less deception 
translates into more false alarms. The target acts too often when the docile sender is 
attempting to preserve the status quo. Therefore, the target can only achieve increased 
utility from entrenched beliefs when the expected cost of false alarms is sufficiently low. 
It is also worth noting that false alarms end the competition in this model, which does not 
take repeated interaction into account. It is possible that false alarms can increase the 
tension in a relationship over repeated interaction, what is often called an escalatory 




the sender’s anxiety about target intentions. A sender that starts out as docile might be 
frightened into a more aggressive stance after observing repeated false alarms, making 
the relationship unstable and dangerous. 
 It is also important to recognize that entrenched beliefs are more likely to be 
neutral or beneficial for the target only when entrenchment is probabilistic (0<z<1). If a 
target always has entrenched beliefs, they run the risk of suffering too many false alarms 
even when the sender adopts the entrenched-aimed strategy. Together, these insights 
yield Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: Potentially entrenched beliefs can increase the target’s utility as long as the 
expected costs of false alarms are not too high, and entrenchment remains probabilistic. 
 
Before revisiting some of the preference assumptions, it is worth pointing out a 
corollary to Proposition 3. The possibility of entrenched beliefs does involve one serious 
drawback; the likelihood of being surprised may be higher relative to Bayesian 
equilibrium outcomes in mixed strategy space. Recall that entrenched types mix strategy 
when the entrenched-aimed signal is sent, but the efficient type always waits. Therefore, 
efficient types will always be surprised when the sender attempts surprise. This reaction 
increases the target’s likelihood of surprise, but not enough to offset the benefit to its 
utility. The entrenched type is less likely to be surprised, but suffers too many false 
alarms. The Bayesian type derives a higher expected utility, but suffers surprise more 
often. This is displayed graphically in the three panes of Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3a shows 




differential in the likelihood of surprise in the semi-separating equilibrium. Figure 4.3b 
shows the change in the sender’s strategy given the possibility of target bias, specifically 
the reduced likelihood of attempted deception. Finally, Figure 4.3c shows the target’s net 
benefit from potential bias, and the conditions where this benefit is erased. 
 
Figure 4.3: Comparative Statics 
Note: Figure 4.3a shows that the pooling and semi-separating equilibria are a condition of the prior belief p 
and the critical belief p*. It also shows that bias has no impact on the probability that targets are surprised 
when p<p* (under-suspicion), and the probability the target is surprised increases when targets are 
potentially entrenched and p>p* (over-suspicion). Figure 4.3b shows that the aggressive sender’s strategy 
is unchanged when p<p*, but the aggressive sender is less likely to attempt surprise in equilibrium when 
p>p*. Figure 4.3a showed that targets were more likely to suffer surprise when p>p* and Figure 4.3b 
showed that senders were less likely to attempt surprise when p>p*. Figure 4.3c shows that targets have a 
higher expected utility when potentially entrenched than they would if Bayesian rational as long as the 
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Note: n=Target’s Mixed Strategy, UT(Q)=1, UT(R)=0.6, UT(W)=0.4, UT(F)=0.3, UT(S)=0, b=0.1. In Figure 2.1 and 2.2 z=0.5.
Figure 4.3a: Equilibrium Type and Surprise
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 The equilibrium deduced above involved a few assumptions about the sender’s 
behavior. First, the analysis assumed that the aggressive sender always chooses to 
challenge the status quo, X=1, where X represented the probability that the aggressive 
sender challenged in the first place. This is true whenever the sender prefers the sure 
outcome of public standoff to the status quo, US(W)>US(Q). When this preference 
assumption is violated and the status quo is preferred to a public standoff, the sender 
never challenges publicly. The aggressive sender still mixes strategy, but they mix 
between challenging with attempted surprise and preserving the status quo. In this case, 
the possibility of attempted surprise given a challenge (Y) is one, and the sender mixes 
between challenging and preserving the status quo, X. The results for this mixed strategy 
mirror those above. The possibility of bias reduces the likelihood of attempted surprise, 
and the aggressive sender is more likely to maintain the status quo. The target’s utility 
given the possibility of bias remains higher than the standard Bayesian equilibrium as 
long as the target does not suffer too many false alarms. The target still faces a higher 
likelihood of experiencing surprise than they would in a standard Bayesian model. Here, 
the aggressive sender opts to challenge less often, which is beneficial to the target. The 
target, however, still waits when the efficient type is selected, suffers surprise more often 
as a result, but may be better off anyway. The impact of bias on outcomes is unchanged, 
and the only change is to the aggressive sender’s decision to mix between preserving the 
status quo and challenging with surprise. 
 We also assumed that the docile sender always chooses to preserve the status quo, 
x=0, where x represents the probability that the docile sender challenges the status quo. A 




acts, however, they may want to attempt surprise if they believe it will be successful. The 
sender, however, is not doing themselves a favor by adopting a strategy where x>0 and 
p>p*. If docile types attempt surprise sometimes in the semi-separating equilibrium, 
aggressive types have to reduce the likelihood of attempting surprise to maintain the 
target’s belief p=p*. The target, in this case, is no longer concerned with likelihood that 
the sender is aggressive given the ambiguous signal, but instead interested in the 
conditional probability that the sender is attempting surprise given the ambiguous signal. 
This conditional probability must be equal to the critical belief if the target is to remain 
indifferent. This means that the likelihood of attempted surprise given an ambiguous 
signal remains unchanged in the semi-separating equilibrium when p>p*, and the docile 
sender never attempts surprise as long as US(S)>US(s), where US(S) is the aggressive 
sender’s value for surprise and US(s) is the docile sender’s value for surprise. 
 The revision of the pooling equilibrium, which was expected when p<p*, is 
slightly more complicated. In the pooling equilibrium the aggressive sender always 
carries out successful surprises since the target’s posterior belief is equal to the prior 
belief and below the critical belief value. In this case, the docile sender can attempt 
surprise with some probability ensuring that the target’s posterior belief equals the critical 
value. The target, when indifferent, can respond with a strategy that makes the docile 
sender indifferent between attempting surprise and preserving the status quo. If the target 
ever takes defensive action in this mixed strategy, which occurs when US(s)>US(Q), the 
sender is better off playing the initial pooling strategy where the docile type always waits. 
The sender can attempt surprise more often, but they pay a cost for doing so. The target 




sender is aggressive and docile, and the sender is better off avoiding this outcome. There 
is one refinement to this result, which is important when entrenched beliefs are added in. 
The docile sender can attempt surprise rarely, just often enough such that the target’s 
posterior belief remains below the critical value. This allows the sender to optimize 
attempted surprise while ensuring that the target waits. Since this is a razor edge solution 
whereby the sender adopts a strategy x*=xindifferent-ε, ε being some very small number, we 
only look at the substantive effects given the possibility of entrenched beliefs. 
 The effects of entrenched beliefs in this instance run counter to some of those 
deduced in the restricted model above. When p<p*, entrenched beliefs did not play a role 
since there was no new information available. When p>p*, the target anchored on the 
belief that the sender was threatening. In order to make a biased target indifferent, the 
sender adopted a mixes strategy where attempted surprise, Yb, given a biased type was 
less than it would be for the Bayesian type Ye (Yb<Ye). This effect reverses when a docile 
sender will attempt surprise and p<p*. In this instance, the target anchors on the belief 
that the sender is non-threatening, so the (docile) sender can attempt more surprise while 
ensuring the biased type remains indifferent (xb>xe). There is a catch. The sender cannot 
extract any benefits from the target’s biased belief that the sender is non-threatening. If 
the target plays the strategy with more surprise, xb, any time the target is actually 
Bayesian they will always act and thwart the surprise since, xb>xe=x(Bayes indifferent)-ε. Just 
as the sender was better off adopting the strategy with less surprise in the restricted case 
above (for fear of provoking the biased type), the sender finds themselves in a similar 
situation (for fear of provoking the Bayesian type). With the unrestricted preference, the 




best off adopting the strategy with less deception that keeps the Bayesian indifferent 
(x*=x(Bayes indifferent)-ε<xb). 
 This raises one final question about the target assumptions, specifically the 
target’s willingness to act against a public threat. When the target is willing to acquiesce, 
UT(E)>UT(W), then the sender always challenges publicly with the knowledge that the 
target will not act. Under these conditions, the docile sender may posture as aggressive 
whenever US(e)>US(Q). The signals become irrelevant and bias plays no role in altering 
expected payoffs when the target will not act against a public challenge. 
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter carefully walked through a series of models that were designed to 
examine the impact of irrationally entrenched beliefs in competitive and uncertain 
contexts. Beginning with a basic strategic model of surprise with imperfect information, 
we showed that surprise could occur in the absence of psychological bias or 
organizational constraints. Whenever the initiating actor had an incentive to send 
ambiguous signals, successful surprise was possible. In short, surprise is a perfectly 
reasonable, even expected, outcome of a simple model with perfectly rational actors. This 
framework suggests that many instances of policy failure and surprise that are blamed on 
psychological or organizational mistakes may overlook basic rational explanations. 
Simple information constraints and differing interests are necessary and sufficient to 
cause surprise. This is not to say that psychological and bureaucratic studies of policy 
failure are not useful. Often, these studies help to identify ways to improve information 




important, however, to recognize that perfectly rational actors operating in a world much 
simpler than that confronting analysts and policymakers still suffer surprise and policy 
failures without additional complicating psychological or organizational issues. 
 More complicated models showed that the causal effects of entrenched beliefs 
seem to be misunderstood. Conventionally, entrenched beliefs and other psychological 
biases impede accurate assessment thereby leaving actors with biases worse off. Instead, 
we argued that there are many situations where entrenched beliefs are irrelevant to 
outcomes and other cases where they can actually be beneficial. When actors begin with 
the belief that their opponent is non-threatening, there is nothing the initiating state can 
do to evoke a response even when players are perfectly rational. There is simply no 
strategic justification for action, and entrenched beliefs that result in irrational under-
suspicion do not change that result. Entrenched beliefs are supposed to make these actors 
more susceptible to surprise, but they are already susceptible so entrenched beliefs have 
no marginal effect. 
Alternatively, states facing opponents perceived to be threatening could actually 
benefit from entrenched beliefs as long as an initiating state recognizes the possibility 
that the target may be entrenched. The initiating state has a greater chance of pulling off 
surprise when adopting more conservative strategies, specifically strategies that involve 
attempting surprise less often. The initiating state realizes they are perceived to be 
threatening, and knows that the target is predisposed to maintaining this belief. So, the 
only way an initiating state can change this belief is by being less provocative. The 
deductive results showed that potentially entrenched over-suspicious targets were more 




often offset by the benefits of less attempted deception. It is possible, and even probable, 
that actors benefit from entrenched beliefs resulting in over-suspicion. It is also 
interesting to note that rational actors are more likely to be surprised when initiating 
states adopt these more conservative strategies. Perfectly rational actors are the first to be 
fooled, whereby entrenched actors see through the attempted deception. 
The chapter ended by looking at alternative preference assumptions showing that 
the primary deductive conclusions were reasonably robust. The plausible alternate 
preference assumptions did not change the results pertaining to entrenched beliefs in any 














Empirical Analysis Part 1: 
Quantitatively Assessing Entrenched Beliefs 
 
The previous chapter offered a number of mathematically derived propositions 
about the relationship between entrenched beliefs and strategic outcomes that challenge 
conventional logic about psychological biases and decision-making. Since most studies 
have emphasized the way that biases negatively impact assessment, it is assumed that 
decisions based upon these inaccurate estimates produce suboptimal outcomes (Jervis 
1976). While this is true in decision-theoretic contexts focusing on the quality of an 
individual decision, these arguments do not necessarily hold up in competitive 
environments. The deductive logic in the previous chapter provided conditions whereby 
the conventional story should break down and entrenched beliefs can actually be 
beneficial. These assertions about the potential optimality of psychological biases deviate 
sufficiently from the usual causal relationship between biases and outcomes, that 
empirical testing of these propositions becomes crucially important. The next two 
chapters are devoted to empirical tests of these counterintuitive ideas. 
This chapter, the first of the two empirical sections, uses a large dataset and 
statistical methodology to seek support of the theoretical propositions. Not all of the 
propositions lend themselves to statistical tests with the available data, and tests of the 
other propositions require an innovative approach to variable coding. When this 




under- or over-suspicion in any systemic fashion is difficult, a concept covered in chapter 
3, more detailed study of individual cases helps to overcome these issues. The next 
chapter will address two case studies in greater detail by walking through the causal 
mechanisms of interest and using more detailed history to trace the impact of these 
mechanisms. Before getting to the cases, we offer a statistical examination of one 
proposition in this chapter. 
The prominence of statistical inference in political science is a cause of concern 
for those who advocate psychological explanations (Tetlock 1999). As we will discuss 
below at greater length, problems like this are particularly difficult to address with 
statistical studies. First, entrenched beliefs are not necessarily observable, and to date, 
none of the mainstream datasets common in international politics research includes 
variables relevant to psychology and information processing. This is also coupled with 
the fact that most datasets do not easily lend themselves to the study of strategic surprise, 
which was the substantive area in the deductive model and one where entrenched beliefs 
are supposed to have a significant causal effect. Here, we attempt to overcome some of 
these constraints and use a readily available dataset of international crises from 1918-
2002, International Crisis Behavior (ICB). The statistical analysis here is not able to 
provide confirmation of the propositions deduced in chapter 4, but its does illustrate some 
of the core theoretical deductions. 
The quantitative empirical section begins by discussing the propositions from 
chapter 4. This focuses on the operational specification of the propositions and the 
testability of each given the available data. The next section discusses the 




underlying logic for the proxy. The third section addresses the rest of the variables used 
in the analyses. Then we present the results from the empirical test and discuss the 
implications. 
 
Quantitatively Testable Propositions 
 In this section, we quantitatively evaluate Propositions 2 and 3 from chapter 4. 
Testing both Propositions 1 and 3 is particularly difficult given the data available. 
Proposition 1 stated that targets with entrenched beliefs were no more likely to be 
surprised than targets without entrenched beliefs when the potential opponent was 
perceived as non-threatening. Entrenched beliefs, in this instance, results in irrational 
under-suspicion where a target views the sender as less threatening then they are. In this 
deductive statement, the likelihood of being surprised is the dependent variable, 
entrenched beliefs the independent variable, and the relationship is subject to the 
condition that there is a high likelihood that the sender is docile. Unfortunately, there are 
no datasets that capture the target’s level of surprise when a crisis is initiated. Even if the 
data can be manipulated to capture a sender’s attempted surprise, which we discuss 
below, there is no way to clearly distinguish between cases where the target expected the 
surprise or not. Barton Whaley’s (1969) unpublished study of surprise attack does try to 
identify instances where one side surprised the other. While the cases show that 
attempted surprise attacks almost always successfully catch the target off guard, Whaley 
notes that the data is not suited for statistical analysis since there is no way to clearly 
identify aborted surprise attacks. The most visible instances of surprise are successful 




selects on the dependant variable. While Whaley finds that surprise is often successful in 
his dataset, simply assuming that the target was surprised whenever the sender attempts 
surprise eliminates the key distinction between attempted surprise, aborted surprise, 
successful surprise and thwarted surprise. For this reason, examination of Proposition 1 is 
not suitable for statistical testing given the available data. 
The empirical analysis of Proposition 2 is the only quantitative test in the project. 
Proposition 2 stated that senders were less likely to attempt surprise against a target with 
irrational over-suspicion when the sender was perceived to be threatening. The 
independent variable, the sender’s method of triggering a crisis, is observable. The ICB 
dataset distinguishes between crises triggered with military action and those triggered in 
other ways. Triggering a crisis by military action may be an imperfect characterization of 
surprise, but it is adequate to test the proposition. The dependent variable of interest is the 
possibility that the target has entrenched beliefs. Entrenched beliefs are not directly 
observable, and as noted above, not included in standard international politics datasets. 
This problem is more difficult to solve, but not insurmountable. The next section 
introduces a potential proxy variable, or rather combination of variables, that helps 
distinguish between states that are more likely to have entrenched beliefs from those that 
are less likely to have such bias. 
Finally, the chapter does not test Proposition 3, because any test would be tenuous 
at best and possibly unreliable. Proposition 3 argued that targets can actually benefit from 
the possibility of entrenched beliefs, specifically irrational over-suspicion. That is to say, 
entrenched beliefs can be welfare enhancing relative to perfect rationality. The target’s 




independent variable. Unfortunately, utility in this context does not directly equate with 
crisis outcomes. Recall that the benefits from irrational over-suspicion stemmed from the 
sender’s decision to attempt surprise less often (Proposition 2) since the target’s irrational 
suspicion reduced the likelihood of successful surprise. The benefits or utility 
encapsulated in the model addresses the target’s ability to deter surprise, thwart surprise 
and maintain the status quo. The model did not address the final crisis outcome. For 
example, a target may successfully thwart a surprise attack, then subsequently suffer 
setbacks that lead to defeat. Alternatively, a target may reverse the initial losses suffered 
in a successful surprise and end up victorious. Since the crisis outcome does not equate 
with welfare increases as defined by the model, crisis outcome is not an appropriate 
measure. Unfortunately, there is no variable that directly maps to welfare increases as 
specified in the model. 
 
Operationalizing Entrenched Beliefs for Statistical Analysis 
 Entrenched beliefs, the tendency to irrationally anchor on prior beliefs, are not 
directly observable like war casualties or victories. Social scientists, however, have made 
efforts to create measures to quantify unobservable variables like intelligence quotient 
and international norms (Gelpi 2002). Since entrenched beliefs are not directly 
observable, we have to identify observables that indicate the presence of, or are 
associated with, entrenched beliefs. This section discusses the way that the notion of 
protracted rivalry can actually be used as a variable representative of entrenched beliefs. 




important to think through each concept in order to devise a proxy variable that captures 
the causal mechanism of interest. 
Enduring or protracted rivalries, covered briefly in chapter 2, refers to dyads or 
sets of states that are locked into a pattern of poor relations. Protracted rivalries often 
stem from disputes over territory, minority rights, societal values or any number of other 
issues. These rivalries have drawn significant attention, because states trapped in these 
long running disputes tend to be more conflict prone than other sets of states (Goertz and 
Diehl 1993). The early work on this topic identified a number of factors that could 
contribute to protracted rivalry and the related violence. Protracted rivalries could be the 
product of strategic, economic, cultural or social issues. One explanation for the violent 
and protracted nature of these rivalries is partisan bias that develops on each side. This 
explanation, which is particularly useful for this analysis, was cast aside in the next 
iteration of protracted rivalry literature. This second iteration of work argued that 
protracted rivalries could be reduced to territorial conflicts (Vasquez 1993, Thies 2001). 
While recognizing the importance of issues like national identity, this work showed that 
the statistical relationship between protracted rivalries and violent conflict was essentially 
identical to the relationship between territorial disputes and violent conflict. This finding 
led Vasquez (1993) to argue that scholars should focus on the more concrete territorial 
disputes than the more abstract concept of protracted rivalry. 
More recent work on rivalry and conflict resolution has eschewed the notion that 
protracted rivalries are simply territorial conflicts (Bar-Tal 2000; Thies 2001). Instead, 
research has focused on the psychological and social aspects associated with protracted 




competition, play a key role in protracted rivalries. Perceptions of oneself and one’s rival 
might not be the same as the rival’s perceptions since these beliefs are often the product 
of social processes. Since conceptions of national identity help to dictate the nature or 
terms of interstate relations, firmly held conceptions of national identity may imbue 
policymakers with inaccurate beliefs about the intentions or capabilities of another state. 
In this context, beliefs about the opposing state’s interests or intentions may be 
entrenched because of the entrenched notions of national identity. It has also been argued 
that entrenched beliefs play a significant role in the formation and continuation of 
rivalries (Mor 2004). Conflicts and threatening events early on in interstate relations can 
interact with national security conceptions facilitating rapid lock-in into protracted rivalry 
(Mor 2004). Hassner (2007) examines the relationship between time and protracted 
rivalries, arguing that these rivalries usually grow more acute with time. Tangible aspects 
such as investment in territory or the discrimination of minority groups, as well as 
intangibles aspects such as threat perceptions or national pride, grow more accurate with 
time. Once entangled in a protracted rivalry, beliefs and conceptions become increasingly 
entrenched. 
If these psychological explanations have some validity, then decision-makers 
involved in protracted rivalries should exhibit higher levels of irrational over-suspicion 
when dealing with their rival.
10
 Protracted rivals are usually perceived as particularly 
aggressive or expansionist, and part of the difficulty associated with ending these 
rivalries involves overcoming entrenched beliefs (Bar-Tal 2000). If this is true, then some 
existing datasets might prove useful in testing carefully specified psychological 
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 Mutual entrenched beliefs will be dealt with explicitly in future projects. Note that one state with 
entrenched beliefs may help to deter the aggressive urges of their rival (Proposition 2), so it is possible that 




explanations. In this case, Proposition 2 specifically contrasts the expected outcomes 
when targets have irrational over-suspicion with cases absent entrenched beliefs. If states 
in a protracted conflict believe that their opponent is aggressive, and fixate on that belief, 
then protracted rivalry may act as a suitable alternate variable. There are, however, some 
additional issues that need to be addressed before substituting protracted rivalry for 
entrenched beliefs. 
First, the analysis that follows is predicated on the auxiliary assumption that states 
in protracted rivalries are more likely to exhibit higher levels of entrenchment than they 
otherwise would. It is worth pointing out that the use of protracted rivalry for entrenched 
beliefs is not based upon causation but correlation. In other words, it does not matter 
whether the protracted rivalry caused the entrenched beliefs, or whether the entrenched 
beliefs led to rivalry. The psychological explanations on enduring rivalries posited 
different relationships between entrenched beliefs and protracted rivalry. Thies (2001) 
and Mor (2004), for example, argued that entrenched beliefs play a central role in 
creating a protracted rivalry. In addition, Bar-Tal (2000) and Hassner (2007) argue that 
entrenched beliefs cultivate existing rivalries and make them difficult to terminate. There 
is no clear agreement on the causal relationship. Entrenched beliefs may cause protracted 
rivalries, or protracted rivalries may promote entrenched beliefs. The empirical test here 
does not focus on the relationship between entrenched beliefs and protracted rivalry, but 
the relationship between entrenched beliefs and crisis behavior. There is, therefore, no 
need to make causal assumptions about entrenched beliefs and protracted rivalry. All that 
matters for this analysis is that protracted rivalries are positively correlated with the 




Second, it is important to take a closer look at rivalries, beliefs, and information 
before proceeding. We argued above that states in protracted rivalries are more likely to 
be irrationally over-suspicious, but they are also very likely to have been involved in 
prior crises with their rival. These crises provide first hand experiences that the state can 
learn from, which is important since prior work on state learning suggests that states are 
much more likely to learn from their own experience than the experience of others (Reiter 
1996). Rivals, therefore, may use the information garnered in prior crises that would be 
unused by states outside of such rivalries. When actors have more crisis experience or 
information about an opponent, their prior belief is stronger, and that leads to perfectly 
rational information discounting. Bayesian rational actors should apply greater weight to 
information derived from the third crisis than the seventh crisis.
11
 In other words, states 
involved in protracted rivalries should update beliefs modestly, even when completely 
rational. Protracted rivalry, therefore, captures both rationally strong priors and 
entrenched beliefs. In order to use the protracted rivalry as a proxy variable, it is 
necessary that we separate rational beliefs from the effect of entrenched beliefs. 
The most straightforward method of separating rational from biased beliefs is by 
controlling for rational prior beliefs. If protracted rivalry captures both rational and 
irrational beliefs, and we include a variable that captures the rational beliefs, then 
protracted rivalry becomes proxy variable for entrenched beliefs. Any explanatory effect 
of protracted rivalry, when controlling for rational prior beliefs, is capturing variance 
unexplained by the rational prior. This does not mean that protracted rivalry is only 
capturing irrational over-suspicion. It may capture other aspects of decision-making such 
as shifting notions of value or national identity. By controlling for rational prior beliefs, 
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however, any effect of protracted rivalry explains some unobservable quality associated 
with the rivalry that is not addressed by the control variables. This process is displayed in 
Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Protracted Rivalry, Strong Priors and Entrenched Beliefs 
 
Summary: By adding in the Bayesian rational belief about violence in prior crises, any regression results 
are capturing forces that go beyond the protracted rivals experience and captures irrational beliefs about 
their opponent’s aggression. 
 
Since there is no rational prior belief variable in the ICB data, controlling for 
rational beliefs requires construction of a suitable variable. The variable needs to 
represent the actors’ beliefs that they are facing an aggressive opponent, and a rational 
prior belief should reflect the information available from previous crises. Since we are 
interested in the actors’ beliefs about opponent intentions, an appropriate metric is the 
historical likelihood of violence between the two states. A rational belief variable should 
reflect the probability that previous crises turned violent. As the proportion of violent 
crises increases, a rational actor should believe that likelihood of facing an aggressive 
opponent increases. Violent crises are defined as those that are either initiated violently, 
what we call a “hostile trigger” or “surprise,” or triggered diplomatically and involve 



















The “rational prior” variable developed here to control for rational beliefs is 
derived using Bayesian logic since the order of events, international crises, matters. The 
variable itself represents a simple proportion that captures the frequency of violent and 
nonviolent crises. For any observation within the dataset, the control variable is simply a 
snapshot of past events. In aggregate, the order of events does not matter in Bayes’ Rule 
and it is tempting to think about the variable as simple proposition rather than a Bayesian 
learning process. If we are interested in the belief change over time, however, order does 
matter in Bayesian processes. If two states are involved in four crises and two are violent, 
the likelihood of violence is 50%, but after two crises, it does matter whether the first two 
crises or the last two were violent. Order only matters since the series of interest are 
cropped into time periods, whereas it would be irrelevant in a typical distribution with 
priors. Since each crisis in the dataset is a single observation that gets aggregated over 
time, the order does matter. So, the relevant measure at each observation is based on 
frequency, but that frequency is determined by the updating over individual successive 
crises making the Bayesian learning process contingent on the sequence over time. 
 The rational prior variable is computed by taking subsets of prior cases where the 
sender and the target are the same across the subset. Then the proportion of prior violent 
cases is calculated during the next crisis observation in the dataset with the relevant 




Aggression =Pr . 
This assumes the actors know about their previous crisis history and use this 
information when making decisions. The formulation includes two important aspects of a 




rational discounting of new information based on the strength of the prior. An example 
helps to illustrate the calculation. At the initiation of a fourth crisis, if two of the three 
previous crises turned violent, the states estimate the probability of violence based upon 
prior information is 67%. If the fourth crisis is not violent, at the outset of the fifth crisis, 
the states know that 50% of prior crises turned violent. As discussed above, the 
information from the fourth crisis will have less effect than the third crisis on how much 
an actor’s beliefs change, and so on. The actors use all previous information on the 
likelihood of violence when making decisions, but it is weighted based upon the total 
sum of past experience. 
 Unfortunately, the coding of rational prior variable is slightly more complicated 
than the initial calculation might suggest. The major coding difficulty rests with the 
treatment of the initial instances of crises between any two states. If we could observe 
prior beliefs about aggression, and the strength of these beliefs, these values could be 
added to the data. Unfortunately there is no good way to estimate these values. To 
compensate for this difficulty, we introduce three different measures of rational prior 
beliefs. The difficulties, and the different ways of dealing with them, will become clearer 
as we walk through the coding process. 
 In the initial coding of the rational prior variable, the first crisis between each set 
of states was coded as such, the first crisis. Each state started with the belief that the 
history of prior violence between the two states is zero. Both the numerator and 
denominator are undefined until the first case. After the first crisis, the total number of 
crises increases to one. If the crisis is resolved without violence, the numerator remains 




that starts or turns violent increases the numerator to one, and the posterior belief about 
the likelihood of violence (the prior for the next crisis) is one or 100%.
12
 There are a 
number of obvious problems with this coding scheme. First, prior beliefs about the 
likelihood of violence the first time any two states have a crisis are undefined. This is an 
unrealistic assumption, but we will see below that it is not as damaging as it seems. The 
second problem with the coding is that the variable is subject to large swings in initial 
instances of crisis. States beliefs about the likelihood of violence can easily swing from 
zero to one after a single crisis. The swing in beliefs is equally difficult to justify. While 
these problems do smooth themselves over repeated crises, they are significant enough to 
warrant alternate specifications of the belief variable. 
 There are two additional specifications used to test the theory, which will be 
creatively labeled rational prior adjustment 1 and rational prior adjustment 2. Rational 
prior adjustment 1 addresses the starting belief. Above, we suggested that zero might not 
be an appropriate initial or starting belief. This can be fixed by choosing an alternate 
starting value for the belief about violence, but there should some justification for the 
selected value. Analysis of the ICB data used here shows that the probability a crisis 
historically turns violent is around 40%. Of the crises included, 40% have military action 
at some point in the crisis and 60% do not. This would appear to serve as a reasonable 
baseline for prior beliefs. We assume, therefore, that all sets of states start with the belief 
that the likelihood of violence in any crisis is 40% (0.4/1.0).
13
 This helps to avoid the 
                                                 
12
 Technically, one could argue that this initial coding method is not Bayesian since there are no prior 
beliefs until the actors experience a crisis. Alternate coding of the variable with different strength prior 
beliefs is discussed below. 
13
 Any subsequent crisis increases the denominator by one and the numerator by zero or one contingent on 




unrealistic assumption that the initial belief is zero, and also has the effect of minimizing 
swings in belief. 
 Rational prior adjustment 1, however, includes the implicit assumption that the 
communal history is weighed the same as one’s own experience in a single crisis. 
Technically, it assumed that past history was weighted as single instance or observation 
of crisis. The numerator was 0.4 and the denominator was 1.0 (reflecting a single case). 
Work on beliefs and learning in international politics suggests that states are much more 
likely to learn from their own experience than that of others (Reiter 1996). Deterrence 
research has reported similar findings about direct experience (Huth 1998). The implicit 
assumption, that communal experience is valued as much as direct experience, does not 
appear empirically valid. The third specification of rational prior beliefs tries to account 
for the difference between communal and direct experience. Rational prior adjustment 2 
weighs the communal belief less than direct experience. The prior communal belief is 
weighted as a half of a case (mathematically equivalent to 0.2/0.5).
14
 The initial belief 
still reflects a 40% likelihood of violence in the crisis, but subsequent personal 
experience has greater leverage over posterior beliefs after each crisis. 
 There are two additional rational adjustments calculated that represent relatively 
strong reliance on priors rather than recent experience. In rational prior adjustment 3, the 
initial prior is equivalent to five crises, and remains set at the dataset average 40% 
(2.0/5.0). Finally, rational adjustment 4 considers an even stronger prior whereby the 
prior is based upon 10 crises (4.0/10.0), reflecting the possibility that there is more 
information needed to alter this belief. 
                                                 
14




 None of these specifications is perfect, but use of all three counters the 
weaknesses of each. If the empirical results are similar across each of the three 
specifications, then the analysis is robust to the variable specification problems. 
Drastically different results, changes in coefficient signs or significance, would imply 
that the variable is not a robust measure of rational beliefs. The results section will show 
that rational prior beliefs play an important explanatory role, and equally as important, 
the results are robust across specifications. 
 In essence, the regressions assume that the actors know the prior history reflected 
by the rational prior variable. Any variance explained by the rational prior belief reflects 
knowledge that the players have about their past history. Under these conditions, 
protracted rivalry captures any additional variance. The sender, for example, knows the 
target’s rational prior belief about the likelihood of violence and can adjust their strategy 
accordingly. Proposition 2 predicted that initiators would be less likely to use hostile 
crisis triggers when there was a possibility the target had entrenched beliefs that made 
them irrationally suspicious. According to method of operationalizing entrenched beliefs 
used here, this means that the predicted effect of protracted rivalry on hostile crisis 
triggers should be negative. Initiators should be less likely to use hostile triggers against a 
protracted rival, controlling for the past knowledge or experience of the two states. It 
seems perfectly rational to assume that initiators would be more likely to initiate crises 
violently as the likelihood of violence in previous crises increases, meaning there would 
be a positive correlation between violent crisis triggers and rational beliefs about prior 






The previous section introduced the method used to specify the primary 
independent variable of interest, entrenched beliefs. This section discusses the other 
variables used in the two statistical models presented below. We begin by discussing the 
two dependent variables and then address the independent variables. A summary of the 
variables and coding are found in Table 5.1. 
Proposition 2 specifically addressed the sender’s propensity to use surprise. The 
ICB data does not specifically code the use of surprise, as discussed above, but it does 
code the crisis trigger. A crisis can be triggered in any number ways ranging from public 
statement to large-scale attack. If a surprise is akin to a large-scale military action, 
specifically a violent military action, then the ICB data is useful for testing the 
proposition. ICB codes crisis triggers on a scale from 1-9. Lower numbers represent less 
aggressive trigger mechanisms, and higher numbers are associated with military action 
and violence. This creates a natural split whereby military activity is similar to the notion 
of surprise used in the model. Crises triggered violently or by large-scale military actions 
are coded as “crisis begun by military action.” Such crises are considered surprises, and 
less aggressive crisis triggers are coded as public challenges. Barton Whaley’s (1969) 
finding that states are almost always surprised by major military action at the outset of a 
crisis, suggests that the crisis trigger variable relying on military action may well be 
representative of surprise. Militarily triggered crises are coded one, and non-militarily 
triggered crises are coded zero. Not all crises involve violence or military action. A 
number of crises are initiated non-violently and resolved without either party resorting to 




initiates the crisis. Since the underlying logic of Proposition 2 was that senders were 
more likely to trigger crises using public challenges when targets had entrenched beliefs, 
this variable captures the relationship of interest, the likelihood of triggering a crisis by 




Table 5.1: Summary of Variables 
Variable Description 
TRIGGER Sender’s decision to initiate the crisis with military action 
0=Diplomatic 
1=Military action 
POWDIF The power differential between the target and sender (scaled 
discretely -3- to 3) 
-3=Large power advantage for sender 
3=Large power advantage for target 
GRAVITY The gravity of threat in the crisis (scaled discretely 1 to 6) 
0=Economic threat 
1=Limited military threat 
2=Political threat 
3=Territorial threat 
4=Threat to influence 
5=Threat of grave damage 
6=Threat to existence 
RATPRIOR The probability that historical dyadic crises turned violent 
(scaled continuously 0 to 1) 
0=No prior crises turned violent 
1=All prior crises turned violent 
Note that there 4 adjustments that alter the strength of the 
prior belief while maintaining a frequency of 40% 
PROTRACTED Whether the states involved in the crisis were protracted rivals 
0=Not protracted rivals 
1=Protracted rivals 
 
There are also a couple of additional independent variables incorporated into the 
analysis to control for conventional explanations about the use of force. First, we include 
a control variable for the power differential. The imperfect information model presented 
suggested that power status could play a role in surprise decisions. It was deduced that 
states with higher values for the status quo and lower costs associated with suffering 
surprise made more attractive surprise targets. We logically argued that large or great 
powers were more likely to be in that position. However, it is important to recognize 




great power may suffer high costs from surprise. In this case, the target will be more 
likely to act, reducing the likelihood that any attempted surprise is successful and 
reducing the incentive for the sender to utilize the tactic. The ICB dataset includes the 
power status for the crisis target and sender. The power status is coded 1 to 4, with one 
representing the weakest states and four representing great powers. The power 
differential variable was constructed by subtracting the senders’ power status from the 
targets’ power status. For example, if a greater power were to initiate against a weak 
state, the power differential would be -3 (1-4=-3). Conversely, if a weak state were to 
challenge a great power, the power differential would be 3 (4-1=-3). The range of the 
variable is –3 to 3, where positive numbers reflect a power advantage for the target, 
negative numbers represent a power advantage to the sender, and values close to zero 
represent parity. 
The second independent variable added to the regression as a control looks at the 
nature of the threat or good in dispute. When the good in dispute is highly valued, public 
challenge and negotiation are less likely to overturn the status quo. Senders should be 
more likely to escalate to violence or use surprise when they believe that the good in 
dispute is highly coveted by the target, which is another way of saying that the target has 
high value for the status quo. Less important disputes should be less likely to trigger 
military reaction, thereby reducing the need to use surprise in order to gain an advantage. 
The ICB dataset includes a variable called gravity of threat, which codes the nature of the 
threat to the target. The variable is coded 1 to 6, where lower values cover issue areas 




threats to territory, international influence or survival. When there are multiple issues at 
stake, the data was coded to reflect the highest threat level. 
We use these four variables, as well as the two variables discussed in the previous 
section to test the formally deduced propositions below. 
 
Empirical Results 
 The first statistical test examines the likelihood that the sender initiates a crisis 
with military action, Proposition 2. The proposition stated in chapter 4 is not directly 
testable. As discussed above, there are no actual observations of surprise in the data, only 
crisis triggers. Crises triggered with military action and violence is the closest variable to 
surprise. Second, entrenched beliefs are not directly observable, and instead we are using 
the combination of protracted rivalry and rational prior historical beliefs. The proposition 
is restated here as a hypothesis in an operational form that is testable with ICB data. 
 
H1: When initiating a crisis, senders will trigger crises militarily less often given a target 
state with entrenched beliefs from involvement in a protracted rivalry. 
 
This specifies the causal relationship where the trigger is the dependent variable and the 
entrenched beliefs tied to protracted rivalry is the independent variable of interest. Since 
the dependent variable is binary, indicating whether the sender triggered the crisis 
militarily, this hypothesis is tested with a logit model. The regression results from 
generalized linear models like logit are not interpreted the same way as one would 




variable coefficient represents the change in dependent variable given a one unit increase 
in the value of the independent variable, holding the other independent variables constant 
(Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1990). Since there is a natural normalization in the maximum 
likelihood estimating procedure used for logit models, the coefficients on the independent 
variables do not directly correspond to the substantive effects. Instead, the substantive 
effects must be calculated, and are often done so by calculating the predicted using a 
difference method for an independent variable, holding the other variables constant 
(Kennedy 2003). The results from a few different specifications are presented below, but 
the full model takes the functional form, 










The regressions results for five different specifications are found in Table 5.2. 
 The results presented in Table 5.2 provide strong support for the hypothesis that 
senders are less likely to use military triggers against protracted rivals controlling for 
rational prior beliefs. Model 1 limited inquiry to the two strategic variables that are 
recurrent in surprise literature: power differential and gravity of threat. Neither variable 
has much explanatory power over the sender’s use of military triggers. This is 
particularly interesting when one considers that many theories of surprise suggest that it 
is used by weaker states (Handel 1987), meaning that the coefficient on power 
differential should be positive and significant. The coefficient is actually negative, but not 
significant. When one takes a closer look at the data, one finds that the correlation 
between power differential and military trigger is highest at the mid level of the power 
differential range. If we were to break the power differential into three discrete groups, 




relatively strong (POWDIF: 2,3). The relationship between power differential and crisis 
triggers is shown in Figure 5.2. Military triggers or surprises are actually employed most 
against relative equals rather than stronger states. In fact, senders rarely used military 
triggers to challenge a significantly stronger state. The inverse “U” pattern helps to 
explain why the power differential is not significant and challenges the idea that only 
weak parties use surprise against stronger ones. There is no clear pattern between gravity 
of threat and surprise despite the belief that surprise can be used to secure highly disputed 
goods as effectively as possible. 
 
Figure 5.2: Militarily Triggered Crises and Power Differential 
Note: Shows that states use military triggers against weaker powers approximately 20% of the time, against 
similar strength powers approximately 74% of the time, and against stronger powers approximately 6% of 
the time. States use military triggers most often when there is parity with its opponent. 
 
Model 2 keeps the traditional explanations of surprise used in Model 1 and adds 
the rational prior belief variable. The rational belief of prior violence within a dyad 
provides an estimate on the probability that a crisis turns violent based upon the past 










































with the use of military trigger in future conflicts. This positive coefficient (1.560) is 
highly significant (p<0.001). The higher the probability of violence in previous crises, the 
more likely states are to trigger crises militarily. This would seem to be a perfectly 
rational response by the sender. If crises usually result in military confrontation, the 
sender has an incentive to take the initiative and trigger the crisis militarily. Despite the 
large size of the coefficient, the marginal impacts are relatively modest. The marginal 
effects at sample means are shown below in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.2: Log Likelihood of Triggering a Crisis Militarily (Proxy for Surprise) 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.584 0.134 0.243 
 Significance 0.003 0.523 0.262 
Power Differential -0.070 -0.106 -0.108 
 Significance 0.280 0.119 0.113 
Gravity of Threat -0.022 -0.031 -0.011 
 Significance 0.691 0.583 0.856 
Rational Prior Likelihood of Violence  1.560 1.718 
 Significance  0.000 0.000 
Protracted Rivalry   -0.420 
  Significance     0.027 
Note: 611 observations. Significant coefficients (p<0.05) are bold. 
Summary: A history of protracted rivalry lowers the likelihood of attempted surprise, controlling for the 
power differential, the gravity of threat, and the rational prior belief. 
 
Model 3 includes the three previous variables, and adds protracted rivalry as a 
proxy variable for irrational over-suspicion. Recall from the section on entrenched beliefs 
that since the model includes the rational prior control variable, any explanatory power 
for protracted rivalry addresses something beyond rational expectations based upon past 
experience and strong priors. The rational prior variable should control for past 




entrenched beliefs about the aggressive intentions of the opponent. The coefficient on 
protracted rivalry is negative (-0.420) and statistically significant (p=0.027). This is 
strongly supportive of H1, which predicted that senders were less likely to use military 
triggers against protracted rivals, controlling for rational updating over previous 
experience. 
Table 5.3: Log Likelihood of Triggering a Crisis Militarily (Proxy for Surprise) 
With Alternate Coding for Rational Priors 













Constant 0.243 -2.024 -1.629 -4.557 -7.352 
 Significance 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Power Differential -0.108 -0.130 -0.132 -0.120 -0.115 
 Significance 0.113 0.065 0.062 0.082 0.093 
Gravity of Threat -0.011 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009 
 Significance 0.856 0.961 0.977 0.904 0.883 
Rational Prior Likelihood of Violence 1.718     
 Significance 0.000     
Protracted Rivalry -0.420 -0.427 -0.420 -0.406 -0.386 
  Significance  0.027 0.026 0.030 0.031 0.038 
Rational Prior Adjustment 1  5.796    
 Significance  0.000    
Rational Prior Adjustment 2   4.787   
 Significance   0.000   
Rational Prior Adjustment 3    12.228  
 Significance    0.000  
Rational Prior Adjustment 4     19.263 
  Significance        0.000 
Note: 611 observations. Significant coefficients (p<0.05) are bold. 
Summary: A history of protracted rivalry lowers the likelihood of attempted surprise, controlling for the 
power differential, the gravity of threat, and the rational prior belief. 
 
One way to articulate the conclusion from this analysis above is that crises among 
protracted rivals are less likely to be initiated by surprise military action. Triggering 




diplomatic means. Analysis of the marginal of effect of protracted rivalry at the sample 
means in Model 3 shows that senders in protracted rivalries are 9.5% less likely to 
attempt surprise to trigger a crisis.
15
 Given some of problems of the rational prior belief 
variable highlighted above, it worth trying the adjusted measures of rational prior beliefs 
before discussing the results further. 
Models 4, 5, 6 and 7 use alternative specifications for the rational prior variable, 
labeled rational prior adjustment 1, rational prior adjustment 2, rational prior adjustment 
3, and rational prior adjustment 4. The output from these two regressions demonstrates 
that the results are very robust to the alternate specifications, and therefore the coding 
method in general. The coefficient on the rational prior adjustment 1 variable in Model 4 
is positive (5.796) and statistically significant (p<0.001). According to this coding, the 
likelihood of militarily triggered crisis remains positively correlated with the rational 
belief on likelihood of prior violence, which is distinct from protracted rivalry as the 
proxy variable for entrenched beliefs. The proxy protracted rivalry variable remained 
negative (-0.427) and is still statistically significant at conventional levels (p=0.026). A 
similar story holds for the final rational prior variable tested in Model 5. The coefficient 
on rational prior adjustment 2 is strongly positive (4.787) and statistically significant. 
Once again, protracted rivalry remained negatively correlated with the use of military 
triggers (-0.420) and was statistically significant (p=0.030). These alternate models 
increase our confidence that the results are robust and provide support for the assertion in 
H1. 
                                                 
15





The coefficients on Models 6 and 7, with strong prior beliefs, tell a similar story. 
The coefficient on rational prior adjustments 3 and 4 remained positive (12.228 and 
19.263, respectively) and were statistically significant (both had p<0.000). The 
coefficient capturing the effects of protracted rivalry on militarily triggered crises 
remained negative across the specifications (-0.406 in Model 6 and -0.386 in Model 7), 
and significant below the 5% level. 
 
Table 5.4: Marginal Effects on the Likelihood Crises are Triggered Violently 













Protracted Rivalry (0 to 1) -9.5 -9.4% -9.3% -9.0% -8.5%
Rational Prior Beliefs     
    First Crisis Turns Violent (1/1) 31.7% 30.7% 32.4% 24.2% 21.5%
    Second of Three Crises (2/3) 24.0% 23.5% 22.5% 24.2% 23.5%
Summary: The marginal effects of protracted rivalry are very robust to rational prior belief variable 
specification. Calculated at sample means. 
 
It is important to compare the marginal effects across the different specifications 
to ensure substantive confidence in the results and check the robustness of the variables. 
The coefficient value on protracted rivalry was similar across the specifications, but the 
rational prior coefficient did fluctuate as one might expect. The marginal impacts of the 
key variables are displayed in Table 5.4. The marginal effects on the rational prior 
variable are very robust to specification across different historical patterns. The first 
marginal effect looks at the expected change when the first crisis (1 of 1) turns violent, 
and the second measure calculates the marginal effects when the second of three crises 




when we show that the results are robust by comparing the predicted results at sample 
means for the first three rational prior variables. 
The effects of protracted rivalry are particularly robust across the different 
specifications for rational prior beliefs. Since the primary variable of interest is the effect 
of protracted rivalry controlling for rational prior beliefs, this helps to provide support for 
the hypothesized effects of entrenched beliefs. The marginal effects of protracted rivalry 
are displayed in Table 5.4. The consistency across the different models suggests that the 
effects of protracted rivalry are not the product of the coding method, but reflective of 
important empirical patterns within the data. If protracted rivalry and entrenched beliefs 
are positively correlated, which is to say that protracted rivals are more likely to rely on 
preconceived notions about their rival, then the analysis supports Proposition 2. This is 
also supported by Figure 5.2, which calculates the likelihood of violent military trigger, 
using sample means, across the specifications. The results show that the models are very 
robust to the different methods of coding rational prior beliefs. 
Since the use of proxy or alternate variables risks capturing effects other then 
those desired, it is important to think about alternative explanations for the observed 
behavior. The pattern shows that states are less likely to use military triggers against 
protracted rivals controlling for rational prior beliefs. One alternative explanation is that 
the coefficient on protracted rivalry is negative because these rivalries peter out over 
time. This alternate hypothesis would deviate from recent work suggesting that these 
crises become increasingly entrenched and difficult to resolve over time (Hassner 2007). 
This explanation must be ruled out if we are to have confidence in the results, and two 





Figure 5.3: Likelihood of Military Trigger Contingent on Specification 
Note: Sample Means for POWDIF=-0.303, GRAVTY=3.262, RATPRIOR=0.352, ADJ1 
RATPRIOR=0.501, ADJ2 RATPRIOR=0.524. 
Summary: Graph shows that the marginal effects of protracted rivalry, the substitute variable for 
entrenched beliefs, are almost identical across the specifications. Protracted rivalry decreases the likelihood 
of military trigger by 9%-10%. 
 
The first of these analyses is a regression that looks at the likelihood of Bayesian 
violence, the rational prior belief, over historical cases. Recall that the rational prior 
variable captured all of the crises between a specific sender and target before a given 
crisis observation in the dataset. If rivalries were to peter out over time, then one would 
expect that Bayesian likelihood of violence would decrease as the number of historical 
crises within a dyad increased. A simple ordinary least squares regression, with the 
rational prior likelihood of violence as the dependent variable, and the number of prior 
crises between the two states as the independent variable, does not support the idea that 
rivalries become less violent over repeated interaction. The regression results actually 
provide strong support for the contradictory argument. The results show that the number 






















coefficient 0.173 with a standard error 0.010, making the effect statistically significant. 
This provides support for Hassner’s (2007) argument that rivalries can grow increasingly 
entrenched and dangerous with time, since the predicted results of the model show that 
there is a 17.3% increase in the possibility of violence between a specific sender and 
target with each additional crisis. A second analysis looked separately at all the protracted 
rival dyads with six or more crises, and suggests that there is no clear pattern between the 
duration of the rivalry and the likelihood of violence. Some dyads experience increasing 
levels of violence, and others experience decreasing levels of violence. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter provided some quantitative evidence using protracted rivalry as a 
proxy variable for entrenched suspicion, which seemed to support proposition 2 stating 
that the possibility of irrational over-suspicion should reduce the incentive for initiators to 
use surprise. Before presenting the statistical analysis, we had to walk though the 
empirical approach to testing a theory based upon psychological bias and surprise. The 
absence of clearly observed psychological bias makes testing its effects difficult. This 
problem was circumvented by careful thought about the types of states that are most 
likely to be irrationally over-suspicious and the variables that might capture those effects. 
The methodological approach used to study these effects relied on the hypothesized 
correlation between entrenched beliefs among protracted rivals and the information 
available to those rivals. By controlling for prior experience, which was done by using a 
Bayesian calculation to look at the rational prior likelihood of prior violence between two 




provided an innovative way to isolate unobservable effects of rivalry and psychological 
biases. 
 Using the proxy variables to control for rational priors and extract an 
approximation for entrenched beliefs, the statistical analyses provide support for the 
restated hypothesis. The hypothesis addressed sender’s use of military action to trigger 
crises. The theory suggested that senders facing a possibility of irrational over-suspicion 
should be less likely to use military triggers for fear of an overly aggressive response 
from the target. The statistical results provide strong confirmation. Controlling for the 
rational prior beliefs, senders are approximately 9.5% less likely to use military triggers 
when the target is a protracted rival. This result was very robust to the coding of the 
rational prior variable. This does suggest that initiators are more careful when triggering 
against states that may have entrenched beliefs associated with their rivalry. In short, 
entrenched beliefs may alter the behavior of an opponent and have the strategic benefits 
suggested in the theoretical model. 
While the statistical approach to measuring or approximating entrenched beliefs is 
innovative, its limitations are evident. The next chapter tries to balance out these 
constraints by examining cases in detail. A detailed analysis of two cases permits us to 
make assertions about bias and its effects that are easier to empirically justify than the 

















Empirical Analysis Part 2: 
Qualitative Case Analysis 
 
This chapter presents two case studies of crisis decision-making to evaluate the 
deductive propositions from chapter 4. There are three primary deductive conclusions: 1) 
irrational under-suspicion
16
 does not increase the probability that a target is surprised
17
 
(or its expected utility) since the initiator will attempt surprise as much as possible 
anyway; 2) the possibility of irrational over-suspicion
18
 should deter an initiator from 
attempting surprise since target over-suspicion reduces the likelihood that the attempted 
surprise is effective; and 3) targets can derive utility benefits from their own irrational 
over-suspicion when the likelihood of unnecessary defensive action (false alarms) is 
sufficiently small. The cases presented here provide support for and illustrate the 
theoretical relationship between entrenched beliefs
19
 and strategic behavior.  
The two cases examined, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
were selected because they illustrate how the expected outcomes of the model with a 
potentially biased target
20
 (biased model) and the Bayesian model can converge under 
                                                 
16
 Recall that this refers to situations where a target irrationally believes the sender is less threatening than 
they are. 
17
 Recall that surprise is an outcome in the model that results when a sender challenges privately (attempts 
surprise), and the target chooses to wait rather than take defensive action. 
18
 Recall that this refers to situations where a target irrationally believes the sender is more threatening than 
they are. 
19
 Entrenched beliefs referred to the tendency to anchor or irrationally overweigh prior beliefs relative to 
new information. 
20
 In the bias model created in chapter 4, there are two types of targets where some possibility that a target 




certain conditions and diverge given others. The theoretical models showed that the 
biased and Bayesian deductive results converge when targets perceive senders as non-
threatening, where non-threatening refers to conditions where the prior likelihood the 
sender is aggressive is below the target’s critical belief.
21
 The critical belief was 
endogenously determined by the target’s preferences. Even if the target might suffer from 
entrenched beliefs, their bias results in irrational under-suspicion, and the sender is best 
off adopting the standard Bayesian strategy where aggressive types attempt surprise all of 
the time. Conversely, the sender should adopt less provocative strategies when there is 
some possibility that the target has entrenched beliefs and they perceive the sender to be 
threatening.
22
 These targets suffer from irrational over-suspicion making it more difficult 
for senders to surprise targets than if the targets were perfect Bayesians. The case studies 
in this chapter provide illustrative support for these theoretical deductions. 
Prior to the outset of the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. decision-makers and 
intelligence estimates reflected the belief that Soviet aid to Cuba in 1962 was defensive 
and not particularly threatening (Special National Intelligence Estimate: The Military 
Buildup in Cuba 1962). The theoretical deductions predict convergence between biased 
and Bayesian models because the sender’s endogenously selected strategy dictates that 
they use surprise irrespective of target biases. Later in the crisis, when the U.S. clearly 
knows about the missiles, expected outcomes of the biased and Bayesian models should 
diverge such that the Soviets feel pressured to adopt less provocative strategies. By 
contrast, Israeli assessments in 1966-67 clearly reflect concern over Egyptian intentions 
                                                                                                                                                 
probability. The possibility that a target may be biased or rational in the biased model is significant in the 
case analysis. 
21
 Technically, this refers to situations were p<p*. 
22




before the crisis. The Israelis did not think that Egypt would start a full-scale war before 
1970, but they did believe that Nasser might move to close the Straits of Tiran or attack 
the Dimona nuclear facility. Egypt posed a sufficiently large threat to Israel that the 
expected results from the biased and Bayesian models should diverge throughout most of 
the case analysis. The biased model predicts that Egypt should be more likely to escalate 
the crisis in public fashion than the Bayesian model expects, and an unbiased Israel 
should wait while an entrenched Israel will adopt a mixed strategy of waiting and 
defensive action. 
 The case studies in this chapter suggest that the causal mechanisms that drove 
convergent and divergent results in the theoretical model have the same effect when 
traced through the decision-making processes in the two crises. Each crisis is broken into 
stages, the relevant causal conditions are explored, and then the impact of those 
conditions on outcomes is discussed. The results of this analysis are summarized in tables 
that explicitly compare the Bayesian and biased models, using statistical analysis to 
identify whether the one model had better explanatory power than its competitor. In the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, where certain conditions favored convergence in expected 
outcomes, the comparable analysis shows some convergence and some divergence, as the 
pertinent conditions would suggest. The conditions in the Arab-Israeli War case favor 
divergent results, and the explanatory power of the biased model statistically outperforms 
the rival Bayesian explanation. 
 Before examining the actual two case studies, the chapter considers some of the 
scientific issues associated with quantitative and qualitative empirical methodology. First 




applied to international politics and theories of decision-making that involve 
psychological bias. Then the chapter examines case study methodology in more detail, 
stressing a method called process-tracing, which is the historical evaluation of a causal 
process of interest by identifying a set of initial conditions and translating them into 
outcomes. The chapter then reviews the key elements of the theory laid out above to 
emphasize the conditions and results of interest. After a brief section on case selection, 
the chapter proceeds to the two cases starting with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Each case 
analysis starts by offering relevant background, an analysis of the relevant case history, a 
discussion of entrenched beliefs, a summary table comparing the Bayesian and biased 
models, and a discussion of the coding and results. The chapter ends with some brief 
concluding thoughts. 
 
Psychology and Research Method in International Politics 
The previous chapter identified one, if the not the greatest, difficulty to testing 
psychological explanations of events in international politics: the unobservable nature of 
psychological bias and consistent coding for this unobservable variable across cases. We 
tried to overcome this constraint by introducing an instrumental variable for entrenched 
beliefs that allowed for consistent coding across a large dataset of crises. This method 
was based on the idea that entrenched beliefs were more common when states were 
protracted rivals than when they were not. The statistical research across the large set of 
cases shows that protracted rivalry is negatively correlated with hostile triggers, the proxy 




All statistical research, in the absence of deductive models, is inductive reasoning, 
using results to infer relationships, among variables (Steinberg 2007). The relationships 
are best when they reflect causality. The problem, which is magnified by the use of a 
proxy variable, is that it is difficult to know whether the entrenched beliefs associated 
with protracted rivalry actually influenced the decisions. We know that there is 
correlation between the dependent and independent variables of interest, but it is difficult 
to know whether the independent variable is really causing changes in the dependent 
variable. Case studies provide a method to trace causation in more detail than possible in 
statistical studies. 
Technically, there are three interrelated problems that dictate the necessity of 
further causal and case analysis: validity, multiple explanations and a lack of repetition 
(Tetlock 1998a). Validity generally refers to the confidence that researchers have in their 
causal results. There are two types of validity, external and internal, which are usually 
perceived as a tradeoff (Campbell and Stanley 1963). The statistical research across the 
large set of cases was crucial to developing external validity, confidence that the findings 
are generalizable across a variety of conditions or situations. The use of many cases in 
this statistical study provides a high degree of external validity since the results are 
statistically significant across 600 crises over 80 years. We can have confidence that a 
correlation exists between the instrumental independent variable and the dependent 
variable. 
In contrast, internal validity addresses the likelihood that changes in the 
dependent variable were caused by changes in the independent variable. In the social 




1998b). Researchers using these experimental techniques can manipulate the independent 
variable of interest, while attempting to hold all other conditions constant, improving the 
confidence that changes in the independent variable caused changes in the dependent 
variable. One advantage of high internal validity is that the researchers can be reasonably 
sure that differences in behavior or beliefs are the result of psychological dynamics when 
they can be isolated or identified. As internal validity increases, it is easier to connect 
cause and effect, but it is more difficult to generalize the results beyond the controlled 
environment set up by the researchers. 
International politics, by its nature, is a field of inquiry where internal validity is 
very rare, because it is difficult to run controlled experiments. Researchers have no 
control over their subjects, whose behavior or beliefs are altered by numerous stimuli at 
any one time, rather than the single treatment possible in laboratory settings. We know 
that the events of interest in international politics will apply or function in the real world, 
since cases are drawn from that world. Establishing internal validity to prove that our 
variable of interest is a pertinent causal driver becomes much more difficult. 
The conflict between internal and external validity alerts us to a second, but 
related, issue. Internal validity would not be a cause for concern if there were agreement 
on causal processes. The lack of internal validity becomes a problem in international 
politics, because there are many plausible theoretical explanations for many observed 
phenomena. While the study of international politics may suffer from a lack of causal 
agreement, it does not suffer from a lack of causal theories. The early theories stressed 
interests and power (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), but there are large bodies of work 




(Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984), and social construction (Wendt 1992; Ruggie 1998). 
Scholars differ on the relative merits assigned to each explanation, and in rare cases the 
validity of some altogether. Just as it is difficult to rule out potential causes, it is also 
possible that many causes operate at the same time. Philip Tetlock (1998b) refers to this 
as the interrelatedness of cases. These debates, combined with the difficulty of 
establishing internal validity, make it difficult to ascertain causality in a convincing 
fashion. 
The final issue noted above was the problem of repetition, which is also tied to the 
problems of validity and multiple explanations. A central tenant of the scientific process 
is that results should be replicable (Keohane, King and Verba 1994). Ideally, social 
scientists should be able to recreate the conditions of a controlled experiment and get 
similar results. A problem in international politics, and in fact any field relying on 
historical evidence, is that the tape of history runs once. There are no opportunities to 
rerun international crises with different triggers, decision-makers or power differentials. 
Empirical examinations might try to look at two cases within the same state or political 
administration, thereby holding some variables constant while allowing others to vary. 
Statistical study helps to overcome this issue by offering a mathematical method to 
control for variance across many instances of similar phenomena like crises, but it is not 
perfect repetition and lacks internal validity (Steinberg 2007). The lack of repetition also 
motivates the use of counterfactuals to identify what could or would have happened if the 
case were rerun under different conditions (Tetlock 1998b). Needless to say, this type of 




Before moving on to the case method and studies themselves, there are two 
further issues worth discussing, in large part because they are a recurrent theme of this 
project. First, analysis of psychological bias in decision-making, or decision-theoretic 
contexts, often stresses the detrimental effects of bias on decision quality. There is a 
tendency, therefore, to assume that biases are detrimental in competitive or strategic 
decision-making contexts. The analysis here showed that this assumption might be 
inaccurate. Observing a poor decision-making process does not mean that the actual 
decision produces a poor strategic result. Much of the work in chapter 4 stressed this 
idea, and showed conditions whereby biased decisions may actually be irrelevant or 
beneficial in strategic decision-making. 
The second point is tightly tied to this idea of placing causation within the proper 
context (i.e. decision quality versus competitive interaction). The tendency with case 
study analysis and retrospective studies of policy failure is to observe the poor outcome 
and reverse engineer a reason for failure. To that effect, we constantly link poor policy 
outcomes to poor decision-making or assessment, when in fact, that relationship may not 
exist or may be spurious. In the competitive complex environments that get 
policymaker’s attention, decision-making quality might not necessarily correlate to 
outcome quality. This chapter challenges this idea in the hopes of improving the rigor 






Case Study Methodology 
 Political scientists debate the relative merits of qualitative approaches, and there is 
no consensus. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (KKV) (1994) use a 
quantitative framework as a guide to best practice in qualitative analysis. They identify 
five rules of causal interference that apply to both quantitative and qualitative research.  
The rules are as follows: 1) construct falsifiable theories, 2) build theories that are 
internally consistent, 3) select dependent variables carefully, 4) maximize concreteness, 
and 5) state theories in as encompassing ways as feasible. Some of the lessons gleaned 
from this approach include careful specification of theory and variables, the use of more 
cases, risks of selection bias, and concern about measurement bias.  
 The empirical sections of this paper have sought to meet these requirements as 
best as possible. The use of formal theory or game theoretic analysis helps in the creation 
of theories that are internally consistent. This is one of the primary benefits of rigorous 
rational choice analysis. The dependent variables, which will be discussed at greater 
length below, and were already addressed in the previous chapter, are specified to ensure 
that there can be variation in the primary variables of interest. Finally, the theory is stated 
as encompassing as possible, relying on variables like entrenched beliefs and surprise. 
This helps to capture as wide an array of phenomena as possible. 
Two of the five criteria that KKV identify may be problematic for this research, 
and it is important to discuss these shortcomings. First, and perhaps most important, is 
the creation of a falsifiable theory. Logically, a falsifiable theory is one that is specified 
or worded such that causal propositions can be deemed true or false. This requires 




causal relationship between them. The purpose of this design is to empirically test the 
hypothesized relationship to establish whether it is in fact true or false. The theory 
constructed in this project is logically falsifiable. There are clearly specified dependent 
and independent variables along with causal linkages. In that sense, the theory is 
perfectly falsifiable and satisfies with KKV’s first criteria. 
The core empirical problem with this project is the observation of variables such 
as entrenched beliefs and surprise. This is further complicated by the requirement to 
establish a causal link such that entrenched beliefs played a role in certain decisions. To 
the extent that there is agreement on the presence or absence of causal variables, and their 
causal relationship, the theory is perfectly falsifiable. This suggests that the problem is 
actually one of concreteness rather than falsifiability. If these variables were clearly 
observable, we would be able to rely exclusively on the large-n or statistical methodology 
that KKV believe to be the ideal research design. Causal factors like entrenched beliefs, 
and their relation to subsequent decisions, are not necessarily concrete variables that are 
easily discernable. The difficulty of establishing the existence and causal linkages 
associated with concreteness is one of the reasons that we also rely on a set of case 
studies to empirically examine the deductive propositions. 
In response to KKV’s approach to empirical analysis, some researchers have 
argued that qualitative analysis is not an inferior substitute for quantitative work but a 
valuable pursuit in itself. These researchers have suggested that KKV’s quantitative 
approach to empirical study need not be applied universally and is too restrictive (Gerring 
2001; Steinberg 2007). The purpose of this qualitative study is to help identify the 




relationships, avoid the use of instrumental variables that were necessary in the statistical 
chapter and provide further support for the theoretically deduced propositions. 
Process-tracing is a qualitative research method recommended by KKV, and 
advocated by many qualitative analysts. It is a particularly strong tool for within case 
analysis (Bennett and Elman 2006). Simply put, process-tracing is the historical 
evaluation of a causal process of interest, often something like a complicated decision or 
the evolution of an institution, that identifies a set of initial conditions and translates them 
into outcomes (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). This has the effect of tracing or identifying 
the causal impact of the conditions, what we might think of as the independent variables, 
on the outcome or dependent variable. By looking at the details of the causal process this 
analysis moves beyond mathematical covariance. Statistical analysis is based on 
establishing a mathematical pattern between variables, but does not clearly distinguish 
cause and effect from mathematical correlation. By looking at the way that initial 
conditions contribute to outcomes in detail, we may be able to get a better sense of 
causation and test a wider range of hypotheses. This makes the purpose of process-tracing 
something different from statistical approaches of inference or empirical assessment. 
There are two key elements involved in process tracing. First is distinguishing 
between process induction and process verification (Bennett and George 1997). Process 
induction is the use of process-tracing to identify the relevant causal variables. Process 
verification involves testing theories from theories developed prior to the empirical 
examination of the case. This analysis focuses on process verification rather than process 




Second, it is important to offer a distinction between historical analysis and 
process-tracing, since some suggest that process-tracing is nothing more than good 
historical analysis. There is certainly overlap between the two. The primary distinction is 
that process-tracing seeks to convert a purely historical analysis or narrative into a causal 
assessment based upon a carefully specified theory and relevant variables (Bennett and 
George 1997). The process of converting historical analysis into causal assessment 
almost always requires that researchers strip away some of the detail, thereby drawing 
criticism that process-tracing requires simplification. While this almost certainly true, it 
also speaks to the fundamental difference between historians and political scientists, 
where the latter focuses on the development and testing of causal theories. Process-
tracing is often best accomplished by focusing on micro-level decisions and details, to 
understand how the variables work in sequence or congruence to influence outcomes. To 
the extent that analysis focuses on micro rather than macro-level detail, the risks of 
oversimplification are minimized, though not eliminated. 
The final element discussed here is the importance of generating different 
plausible hypotheses in order to arrive at the most accurate assessment of the causal 
theory and the underlying mechanism. Two problems arise from this practice. First, any 
probabilistic theory runs the risk of being an outlier. That is to say, deterministic theories 
are ideal for case analysis since certain conditions need to be necessary or sufficient to 
produce an outcome over repeated trials. Much of social science today, evidenced by the 
prominence of statistics and statistical solutions of game theoretic models, is most 
correctly treated as probabilistic. This makes it difficult to know whether the 




that different outcomes are expected based upon a probabilistic draw. The second issue, 
related to the first, is the problem of indiscriminate pluralism. Indiscriminate pluralism 
refers to the inability to eliminate possible explanations. There is no clear solution for this 
recurrent, and perhaps even naturally embedded, problem. Since process-tracing is 
usually used to assess complicated decisions and processes, it is difficult to boil down 
decisions or institutional evolution to a specific factor while eliminating other plausible 
hypotheses. The best analysts can do is consider a mix of causal drivers and try to rank 
their importance (Steinberg 2007).  
 
Tracing Entrenched Beliefs and Strategic Behavior 
 Before actually presenting the two case studies, it is important to clearly layout 
the analytical method, hypotheses and variables of interest. This guarantees that each case 
study actually captures the issues and relationships of interest, and helps to ensure that 
the empirical analysis is consistent across cases. This section briefly reviews the relevant 
variables and the relationships between them. 
Entrenched beliefs are a crucial component of the theory. It is important, 
therefore, to handle this issue carefully in the empirical section and case studies. 
Entrenched beliefs, or anchoring bias, have been defined as the tendency to irrationally 
ignore or marginalize new information in order to maintain initial beliefs. Evaluating 
beliefs and biases retrospectively is a very difficult endeavor, one that was discussed in 
chapter 3, because perfect Bayesian actors may discount new information for rational 
purposes based on the strength of their prior beliefs. Distinguishing between rational and 




bias, but it difficult to do in a rigorous fashion. This analysis tries to go beyond merely 
identifying a belief, accurate or faulty, and declaring it rational or biased. An entrenched 
belief arises over time as new information becomes available and is subsequently 
marginalized. Entrenchment, therefore, is a process that can be traced empirically like 
other decision-making processes. Like tracing decisions, entrenchment might not always 
be straightforward, but using the sequencing and process oriented approach provides a 
higher level of confidence that entrenchment is going on over time rather than declaring it 
retrospectively. In each case analysis, the information known to the actors will be 
presented and then assessed to establish the effect on the pertinent belief set over time. 
There are three outcomes of interest given the theory specified above: 1) the 
sender’s decision to use public challenges or surprise, 2) the target’s response to the 
sender’s challenge, and 3) the outcome of the interaction.
23
 To be precise, the target’s 
response can actually be disaggregated further. The target’s response refers to the sense 
of surprise given a challenge, as well as target response. The way the strategic problem is 
designed or specified, these two elements are tied together. The target was effectively 
surprised when they did not take preventative action while the sender was attempting 
surprise. This problem is not particularly acute in the case analyses that follow, but we 
are interested in the relationship between the belief and the observed challenge. 
In fact, we can push this point a little further since we are particularly interested in 
the way that beliefs influence subsequent decisions for both actors. The primary causal 
mechanisms are the beliefs, and potential biases, of each actor. The resulting actions, and 
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the combination of actions producing the outcome, are the dependent variables of 
interest. This means that the three outcomes specified in the paragraph above are the 
primary causal outcomes or dependent variables associated with each hypothesis. Given 
the interrelationship between the hypotheses, it seems logical to present them in a form 
that clarifies each part of the theory while improving the applicability of the theory to the 
case studies. 
The first proposition deduced in chapter 4 argued that target’s entrenched beliefs 
had no impact on the likelihood of suffering surprise. This result was conditional on the 
assumption that the sender had a high likelihood of being docile. The primary mechanism 
driving the result was that the sender’s behavior was unchanged by the possibility of 
target bias as aggressive types attempted surprise and docile types tried to maintain the 
status quo. The strategic dynamic dictated that targets did not take defensive action, and 
always received an ambiguous signal. The sender, in this instance had no incentive to 
take the target’s entrenched beliefs into account, and played the same strategy 
irrespective of whether the target was rational or potentially biased. 
The second proposition focused the sender’s strategy when the initial likelihood 
that the sender was the aggressive type was above the target’s critical belief, making the 
sender threatening to the target. When the sender had a higher likelihood of being 
aggressive, entrenched beliefs actually had a stabilizing effect. A sender facing a 
potentially irrationally over-suspicious target was better off attempting surprise less often 
since the target was more sensitive to the sender’s signals. A signal that made a rational 
target indifferent compels the entrenched target to take defensive action, thereby 




given the possibility of an entrenched target, therefore, is to adopt a less provocative 
strategy by using public challenges more often than they would if they were facing 
rational Bayesian opponent. 
These two propositions talk about two sides of the same coin. The first 
proposition is valid when the sender is initially perceived to be non-threatening. The 
second proposition is relevant when the sender is initially perceived to be threatening. 
This means that the first step requires identifying the prior conditions, specifically the 
initial likelihood that the sender is perceived to be aggressive. When the sender is 
perceived to be non-threatening, there is no reason for the sender to take the target’s 
entrenched beliefs into account. Even if they did consider the possibility that the target 
had entrenched beliefs, it would not alter the sender’s optimal strategy. Conversely, 
senders perceived to be threatening should be concerned with the target’s potential 
entrenchment. Sender’s perceived to be aggressive should adopt more conservative 
challenge strategies when they believe that the target may be irrationally over-suspicious. 
Note they need not believe that the target has entrenched beliefs, they only need to 
consider it a possibility. Senders perceived to be threatening, who believe they are facing 
perfectly rational targets, should be more prone to adopt surprise strategies or attempt fait 
accompli. 
While the first and second propositions addressed the sender’s behavior 
contingent upon a set of conditions, the first and third propositions speak to the target’s 
behavior. Both propositions, explicitly (as in proposition 1) or implicitly (as in 
proposition 3), address the target’s likelihood of being surprised and taking action. The 




beliefs or not, if the sender was perceived to be non-threatening. In other words, if the 
target started with the belief that the sender was non-threatening, there is no possible 
information or signal that would drive the target to take action whether they were rational 
or entrenched. 
The impact of entrenched beliefs on the likelihood of target action is more 
complicated in proposition 3. This proposition applies when the sender is perceived to be 
sufficiently threatening. The proposition directly referenced the target’s expected utility, 
but the expected utility is related to the target’s susceptibility for surprise. Recall that a 
potentially biased target may or may not actually exhibit entrenched beliefs. Potentially 
biased targets that act rationally are more likely to be surprised than a Bayesian rational 
actor, whereas the entrenched target is less likely to suffer surprise and more likely to act. 
This means that an entrenched target with the belief that the sender is threatening is more 
likely to make defensive preparations that foil attempted surprise than the perfectly 
rational actor given the same signaling strategy from the sender. 
It is important to clarify a nuance of the deductive theory. The paragraph 
immediately above noted that a potentially biased actor could actually be either biased or 
perfectly rational during any one play of the game. Recall from chapter 4 that the target 
had two possible types, where type referred to their information updating or learning 
quality. In the game, the type was decided by a move by nature, which means it is drawn 
from a probability distribution known to the sender. During any play of the potentially 
biased game, the target could actually be a perfectly rational type updating their beliefs 
according Bayes’ Rule, or be a biased type that irrationally anchored when updating. In 




is selected in crisis sub-case. The target’s belief updating is analyzed in each sub-case, 
where the default is to code the target as rational unless there appears to be some 
reasonably good evidence to the contrary. This means it is necessary identify which is the 
relevant target type in the potentially biased model for each sub-case comparison to the 
perfect Bayesian model. Throughout the analysis we use terms like “biased model with 
the Bayesian type” and “biased model with the biased type” to distinguish between the 
rational target type and irrational target type, respectively, since there is possibility of 
both in the biased model. 
The final outcome is a combination of the sender’s strategy and the target’s 
response. The quality of the outcome is not simply the target’s decision to act. In reality, 
strategic interactions, and particularly outcomes, are rarely as simple as an initiation and 
response. While the case analysis will focus first on the initiation and then the response, it 
is difficult to limit any discussion of outcomes to the initial stages. To overcome this 
problem, we evaluate the crisis result and the impact of entrenched beliefs. 
 
Case Selection 
 Before proceeding to the case studies, a short word on case selection is in order. 
The section on case methodology above noted the importance of variable selection, 
specifically the dependent variable. KKV point out that case studies with no variation in 
the dependent variable are problematic for proving or disproving hypotheses. 
Comparative case analysis where the outcomes of interest are the same may help to 
establish necessary or sufficient conditions, but cannot be used to test a causal statement 




will examine one case study where surprise was essential to the initiator’s strategy, and a 
crisis that was triggered in public fashion. 
Variation in the dependent variable of interest is one requirement. A second 
requirement, which is particularly important here, is that there be sufficient primary and 
secondary source material to address the actors’ beliefs and biases in a convincing 
fashion. The purpose of using case studies, particularly in support of the quantitative 
study, is the ability to trace the causal impact of beliefs and biases. An inability to capture 
or identify these variables in a convincing way would obviously offset the benefits of the 
case analysis. The best way to overcome this constraint is by selecting cases where there 
is a good deal of information available, both primary and secondary sources. The irony, 
however, is that cases with significant secondary source material are likely to be 
controversial, making consensus among the experts less likely. Despite this constraint, it 
is easier to address beliefs and biases in cases with a large body of literature. 
The two cases addressed below are the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Both of these cases have been written about extensively, and 
there is some degree of consensus among experts on some features of each case. The 
Cuban Missile Crisis is an ideal case for this study due to the rich archive of primary 
source material including transcripts and declassified memos from the U.S. side. The 
source material from the Soviet side is weaker, but some recent historical works on 
Khrushchev provide more insight into Soviet decision-making. The 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War has received a good deal of attention from scholars. There is sufficient secondary 
source material and there are also memoirs from many involved. Again, decision-making 




biographers that had access to Egyptian leadership before and after the war. Together, 
these cases offer variation in the variables of interest, and sufficient source material to 
examine the causal impact of beliefs and biases. 
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 
 There are numerous points of departure that one could use for the study of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, owning in part to the voluminous literature on the subject. The 
most well known and cited of these works remains Graham Allison’s (1971, 1999) 
Essence of Decision.
24
 Allison applied three different models of decision-making to 
explain both Soviet and U.S. behavior, and stressed that a model of bureaucratic 
bargaining offered insights into the crisis that were missed by the more common rational 
actor and organizational behavior models. One of the book’s strengths, however, is its 
attempt to analyze and identify relevant decision processes and drivers for both crisis 
actors. We follow this approach here. The theory, as laid out in prior chapters, is 
inherently strategic. The actors condition their behavior on the beliefs and likely 
responses of the adversary. We begin by studying U.S. beliefs prior to the crisis, and then 
examine how that may have influenced Soviet behavior. 
 The U.S. decision-making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis has been 
studied extensively, and is often treated as a prototypical case of successful decision-
making (Neustadt and May 1986; Herek, Janis and Huth 1987). In an unstructured and 
egalitarian fashion, President John F. Kennedy and members of the Executive Committee 
(often referred to as the ExComm) examined Soviet motivations, possible U.S. responses, 
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and likely Soviet counters (May and Zelikow 2001). Opinions and options were raised, 
debated, researched further, and often debated again. The debate was unstructured but 
thorough, sought out positions from all sides and worked towards a consensus solution. 
In the end, the Excomm chose to blockade Cuba, which provided a window for 
diplomacy if the Soviets were willing to stand down. While in retrospect the blockade 
was an optimal decision, it was also a gamble that was partly justified by assumptions 
and beliefs that turned out to be inaccurate. A detailed examination of the actors’ beliefs 
during the crisis reveals tendencies towards both flexibility and anchoring
25
 on different 
issues. The Cuban Missile Crisis shows how the biased and Bayesian models can 
converge to common expectations of behavior given certain contextual conditions while 
diverging under others. 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis was technically triggered for U.S. policymakers on the 
morning of October 16 when they were shown photos of medium and intermediate range 
missiles in Cuba. The roots of the crisis, however, had been growing beneath the surface 
for sometime (Beschloss 1991, p. 362). The revolution in Cuba and the rise of Fidel 
Castro’s government presented obvious problems, or at least uncertainty, for U.S. 
policymakers. At first, U.S. policymakers could not tell whether Castro and Cuba would 
become an ally or adversary (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, p. 16), but Castro’s attack on 
U.S. business interests signaled the inevitability of movement toward the Soviet sphere. 
The presence of a communist government so close to home was a source of 
embarrassment and concern for U.S. policymakers. No sooner did Castro become 
entrenched in his leadership role than the U.S. began to look for ways to undermine his 
regime (Khrushchev 1974, p. 510). 
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 Concerned that direct action against Cuba would embolden the Soviets, possibly 
setting the two countries on a collision course, the U.S. resorted to covert action (Blight, 
Allyn and Welch 1993, p. 17). The most visible of these actions was the Bay of Pigs 
invasion, a covert operation run by the CIA that relied on an invasion force of Cuban 
exiles. The 1961 invasion, carried out with the help of U.S. forces, was a failure. The 
invasion became a source of embarrassment for the Kennedy administration despite the 
fact that many of the details were arranged before they took office. After the Bay of Pigs 
debacle, the administration softened its position on Castro and Cuba (Freedman 2000, p. 
147). Many still wanted to remove the Castro regime from power, particularly Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy, but they were forced to rely on a sabotage and espionage 
program that was codenamed Operation Mongoose. The operation did not have the type 
of success that policymakers hoped for, having little direct impact on the stability of 
Castro’s government. 
 In early 1962, it looked as though the U.S. would have to live with a communist 
neighbor. While maintaining its covert efforts to undermine or assassinate Castro, U.S. 
policymakers also considered the role that Cuba would play in Cold War strategy 
(Freedman 2000, p. 148). Cuba had relied on the Soviet bloc for weapons supply since 
the late 1950s. Some of the weapons used during the revolution were funneled through a 
company in Costa Rica that acted as front for the Czechoslovakian government (Fursenko 
and Naftali 1997, p. 12). During Castro’s 1959 visit to the U.S., his brother Raul was 
secretly negotiating with the Czech and Polish governments for additional military 
supplies. Cuba also requested Soviet military and intelligence advisors to help train its 




these actions would bring the U.S. into direct conflict with the Soviet Union (Taubman 
2003, p. 533). 
 The Soviet position towards Cuba changed in 1960. KGB agent Aleksandr 
Alekseev, who arrived in 1959, had formed a strong relationship with Castro. This 
allowed him to provide Moscow with more information pertaining to Castro’s leanings 
and offered Moscow direct contact with Cuban leadership (Khrushchev 1970 p. 492). 
That same year, Castro also welcomed a visit from a member of the Soviet Presidium, 
Anatas Mikoyan. Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to offer Soviet aid was influenced by two 
other events. The first was Castro’s challenge to U.S. business interests. Castro had 
negotiated a deal to import Soviet oil at prices cheaper than U.S. suppliers, meaning that 
Soviet oil would be refined in facilities owned by U.S. companies. Should the companies 
refuse to refine the oil, as Castro expected, he would have justification for seizing the 
refineries (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, p. 48). The second, perhaps more pressing issue, 
were persistent rumors about the possibility of U.S. military action to remove Castro 
from power (Khrushchev 2000, p. 482). 
 Khrushchev responded to concerns about U.S. intervention in Cuba by extending 
the Soviet nuclear umbrella into the western hemisphere and offering significant military 
aid to Cuba (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 305). The former was done in a speech in 
June 1960, in response to rumors that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent 
(Khrushchev 2000, p. 482; Taubman 2003, p. 534). The U.S. took little notice of these 
statements since no invasion was planned and any possible invasion was months off 
(Fursenko and Naftali 1997, p. 52). The arms package, which was negotiated while Raul 




491). By April 15, 1961, the first day of the Bay of Pigs operation, the Cubans had 
received 125 of 205 expected tanks, 167,000 rifles, 7,250 machine guns, and much of the 
promised anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, p. 92). The 
Cubans had not received promised artillery and MiG aircraft, but the T-33 jets inherited 
from the Batista regime were sufficient to repel the invading force. 
The persistent rumors of invasion in 1960, in retrospect, were probably related to 
the covert operations approved by the Eisenhower administration (Freedman 2000, pp. 
123-26). Soon after Mikoyan’s visit to Havana, U.S. policymakers recognized that they 
were losing Cuba to the Soviet sphere. Eisenhower approved a number of CIA initiatives 
that involved the training and supplying of Cuban dissidents, the largest of which was a 
training facility in Guatemala. The CIA also devised a plan in which Cuban dissidents 
trained and supplied by the U.S. would invade Cuba and remove the communists from 
power. The training and preparation would take a number of months, and there were no 
plans for any imminent invasion. This plan did mature into the Bay of Pigs invasion in 
1961, which helped set the stage for the missile crisis (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, p. 92). 
Prior to the 1961 invasion, Soviet support of Cuba had been defensive. The 
Soviets had expressed their willingness to secure Cuba against U.S. aggression, and 
provided materials to help protect the island (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, p. 87). 
Intelligence activities showed that the Soviets were still supplying military aid to Cuba, 
and the U.S. was suspicious of the military buildup (Stern 2005, p. 20). Despite these 
suspicions, the consensus opinion reflected the belief that this aid was defensive in 
nature. This position was expressed in a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) produced in 




hope to deter any such [U.S. invasion] attempt by enhancing Castro’s defensive 
capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation” (Special National Intelligence 
Estimate: The Military Buildup in Cuba 1962; May and Zelikow 2001 p. 128). 
This sentiment was echoed in a policy paper drafted by Walter Rostow then 
Director of Policy Planning at the State Department. Rostow’s memorandum, dated 
September 3, 1962, noted that “On the basis of existing intelligence the Soviet military 
deliveries to Cuba do not constitute a substantial threat to U.S. security” (Rostow 1962). 
He did warn that the buildup may “constitute a deterrent to certain types of surveillance 
and a means for improving certain types of Soviet intelligence” (Rostow 1962). 
Despite the apparent consensus there was some recognition that the Soviet 
buildup might extend beyond defensive capabilities. The NIE of September warned “The 
USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet 
medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a 
Soviet submarine base there.” While “the establishment of a submarine base would be the 
more likely,” it concluded that such moves “would be incompatible with Soviet practice 
to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it” (Special National Intelligence 
Estimate: The Military Buildup in Cuba 1962). The intelligence community believed the 
Soviets would not take such big risks in the Caribbean. 
By August, CIA Director John McCone had become a dissenting voice. After 
observing advanced surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites (SA-2s) capable of destroying a 
U2 reconnaissance plane, McCone believed that the advanced missile units were intended 
to deter over flights of nuclear weapon facilities (Freedman 2000, pp. 163-64). He 




U.S. missile facilities in Turkey and Italy. Despite his conviction, the intelligence 
community concurred with senior policymakers in their belief that Soviets would not take 
such risks. This is evidenced by the content of the September NIE. 
Policymakers wanted to ensure that the Soviets would not attempt placing 
offensive weapons in Cuba. Rostow, in his September memo, advocated drawing a line to 
clarify acceptable Soviet behavior in Cuba and specified unacceptable action. “In general, 
that line should be drawn at the installation in Cuba or in Cuban waters of nuclear 
weapons or delivery systems, sea or land based. There may be other types of aggressive 
instruments that we would wish to include in this definition” (Rostow 1962). The military 
buildup, he reasoned, did not represent a new threat to the U.S. so much as the movement 
of Cuba towards communism, but offensive weapons could not be tolerated (May and 
Zelikow 2001, pp. 4-8). Days after Rostow’s memo circulated, this became the official 
position. On September 11, Kennedy warned that the U.S. would not tolerate offensive 
weapons in Cuba or the use of Cuba for aggressive purposes.  
Transcript evidence suggests that policymakers abandoned this prior consensus 
assessment quickly on October 16, 1962. Upon seeing the photos, and listening to the 
explanations provided by the aerial reconnaissance analysts, the ExComm immediately 
changed their minds (May and Zelikow 2001 pp. 32-41; Stern 2005, p. 46). After getting 
past the initial shock that the Soviets had placed offensive weapons in Cuba, the 
ExComm discussions focused on possible Soviet motives. Why the Soviets chose to 
challenge the status quo and take the risk of putting nuclear weapons in Cuba has plagued 
historians and political scientists for some time (Allison 1971, 1999; Blight, Allyn and 




which is also the title of a book documenting Soviet events leading up to and after the 
missile crisis (Fursenko and Naftali 1997). At first glance, the Soviet action seems 
needlessly dangerous and possibly irrational, however, a number of explanations now 
exist for the missile placement. 
Allison (1971, 1999) identifies four possible justifications, or hypotheses, for the 
Soviets’ placement of missiles in Cuba: 1) Cuban defense, 2) Cold War politics, 3) 
missile power, and 4) Berlin. To this list, more recent scholarship suggests that 
Khrushchev was concerned about divisions within Cuban leadership and the possibility 
that Cuba might ideologically or strategically align with the Chinese (Fursenko and 
Naftali 1997, p. 167; Taubman 2003, p. 534). The Cuban defense explanation, perhaps 
the most straightforward, explained Soviet action as a product of concerns that the U.S. 
would seek to remove Castro from power militarily (Khrushchev 1974, p. 512; Taubman 
2003, p. 537). The missiles, in this explanation, helped ensure that the island would not 
be an attractive invasion target. By Cold War politics, Allison was referring to the limited 
military or diplomatic probes that both the U.S. and the Soviets used to test their 
opponents’ resolve and signal discontent with the status quo in a given arena (Allison 
1999, pp. 88-89). Missile power, which is related to Cold War politics, addressed the 
relative weakness in Soviet strategic forces. The Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) program had developed slower than expected and the Soviets found themselves 
falling behind the U.S. in strategic capability (Khrushchev 2000, p. 484, p. 484; Taubman 
2003, p. 537; Scott 2007, p. 28). Placing medium and intermediate range missiles 
(MRBMs and IRBMs, respectively) in Cuba would vastly improve Soviet strategic 




explained the missile placement as an attempt to trade or extort concessions in Berlin for 
some in Cuba (Allison 1999, p. 99). 
Given these five plausible explanations, what drove the Soviets to place the 
missiles in Cuba? Complex decisions are usually motivated or justified by a complex set 
of reasons (Vaughan 1996). It would be wrong to eliminate any of these altogether, or 
focus on any single explanation for the missile placement. Instead, careful analysis helps 
to distinguish or rank some of these explanations as more crucial than others. After 
which, we will address how U.S. beliefs may have impacted the Soviet decision. 
Initial reports on Soviet decision-making, drawn from Khrushchev’s own 
memoirs, suggested that Khrushchev made the decision on his own during a trip to 
Bulgaria in March 1962 (Khrushchev 1970, p. 493; Fursenko and Naftali 1997, pp. 177-
78). More recent archival work suggests that the decision, and the decision-making 
process, was more complicated than the initial reports (Khrushchev 2000, p. 487). 
Khrushchev first considered the possibility of adding nuclear weapons to the Cuban arms 
package in April 1962 during a conversation with Rodion Malinovsky, the Soviet 
Defense Minister. Khrushchev wanted to explore the possibility of putting “hedgehogs 
down the Americans’ trousers” (Volkogonov 1998, p. 236). By hedgehogs, Khrushchev 
meant nuclear weapons, and trousers referred to the Caribbean. He instructed Malinovsky 
to form a small group to explore the feasibility (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 431). This 
account is supported by the Defense Ministry’s official history, which claims that some 





Khrushchev’s decision to investigate the possibility of nuclear weapons in Cuba 
seems to have been motivated by a number of factors. In April 1962, the U.S. deployed 
the first 18 of 54 Titan missiles in Colorado. By contrast, the Soviets were not in a 
position to counter. The Soviet R-9 and R-16 rockets had a number of problems 
(Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 429). The fuel used for the R-16 rocket was volatile and 
highly corrosive, meaning that it had to be fueled immediately prior to use and drained if 
not used. The R-9 did not fair much better as flight tests revealed a host of flaws 
(Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 430). The weaknesses of the Soviet rockets were not for 
lack of effort or resources. The Soviets had invested heavily in their rocket programs, and 
they were supposed to be a key element in Khrushchev’s strategy. This poor state of 
affairs probably made a nuclear base in Cuba seem like a low cost solution to the Soviet’s 
strategic inferiority. 
The rocket problems, and U.S. Titan deployment, were not the only issues 
weighing on Khrushchev in April and May. Events in Asia also weighed on the Soviet 
leader (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, pp. 433-435). Khrushchev had hoped that Asia would 
present opportunities, particularly after his inability to force changes in the Berlin 
situation in 1961. In May 1962, the Pathet Lao, the Chinese and the Vietnamese routed 
pro-U.S. forces in Nam Tha, Laos (Freedman 2000, p. 347; Beschloss 199, p. 231). To 
limit the losses and discourage the forces from advancing further, Kennedy decided to 
send a military force to Thailand. The force comprised 1,800 marines and two air 
squadrons. Kennedy wished to avoid conflict in Laos and hoped that the presence of the 
military force would be sufficient to deter Communist rivals. The show of strength was 




431-434; Khrushchev 1970, p. 493). Khrushchev was concerned that the U.S. show of 
strength was only the first step in a larger intervention, which would once again show that 
the Soviets suffered from an unfavorable balance of power. To deter possible U.S. 
involvement, he sent a private message to Kennedy reaffirming Soviet commitment to a 
neutral Laos ensuring that Communist forces would not advance further (Fursenko and 
Naftali 2006, p. 434). 
While rocket problems and Asia were of immediate concern, there were 
additional issues motivating Khrushchev. Perhaps the most important was Cuban defense 
(Khrushchev 1970, p. 492; Khrushchev 1974, p. 511; Khrushchev 2000, p. 482; Taubman 
2003, p. 534). Just prior to the Bulgarian trip, Khrushchev had signed a letter to Castro 
that outlined the terms of the Soviet military aid. The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion caught 
the Soviets by surprise. All Khrushchev could do at the time was wait and hope that the 
Cuban forces would repel the invaders. While Khrushchev had rebuffed earlier Cuban aid 
requests, he was now prepared to offer Soviet assistance (Khrushchev 1970, p. 493). 
Castro had been pushing hard for Soviet aid since he had been warned that the 
U.S. might try to dislodge his regime again. Khrushchev claims to have received 
intelligence suggesting an upcoming U.S. operation (Khrushchev 1974, p. 510), but it has 
also been suggested that there was no intelligence suggesting that a U.S. operation was 
imminent and actually believed that Cuba was safe for the time being (Fursenko and 
Naftali 2006, pp. 159-160). He doubted that the U.S. would take any overt action against 
Cuba in 1962, but he was concerned that Kennedy might be motivated to try again ahead 
of the 1964 presidential election. Given that Khrushchev was planning to supply Castro 




early in order to assuage Castro’s concerns (Taubman 2003, p. 534; Fursenko and Naftali 
2006, 427). 
Recent events in Cuba’s domestic politics also seem to have influenced 
Khrushchev. In 1962, Castro purged longtime communist Anibal Esclante from the 
government (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, p. 136). Escalante, unlike Castro and many of 
the other revolutionaries, was well acquainted with Moscow and a known entity within 
the Kremlin (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, p. 59; Taubman 2003, p. 534). The purging of 
Escalante meant that Castro’s inner circle was almost exclusively revolutionaries rather 
than communists, and this fueled concerns that the young revolutionaries may find China 
a more attractive ideological partner than the Soviet Union (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, 
9. 167). While the Chinese lacked the resources to provide comparable aid, Mao Zedong, 
the Chinese leader and admirer of Stalin, felt that the Soviets had left the revolutionary 
path. The Sino-Soviet relationship had become strained ever since Khrushchev publicly 
denounced Joseph Stalin and his brutal methods (Gaddis 2006, p. 141). Khrushchev, 
therefore, believed it important to deepen his relationship with Cuba in the hopes of 
ensuring that the Soviet Union, rather than China, would be the Cuban’s strategic partner. 
A final issue, one that bothered Khrushchev considerably, was the existence of 
U.S. nuclear missile bases in Italy and Turkey (Khrushchev 1974, p. 512; Khrushchev 
2000, p. 484). The Turkish missile deal was negotiated by the Eisenhower Administration 
and was part of a public defense pact. Eisenhower expected that the deal would upset the 
Soviets, but he, and Kennedy, chose to go ahead despite concerns that the Soviets might 
respond aggressively (Stern 2005, p. 14). During the trip to Bulgaria, Khrushchev came 




he wanted to give them “a little of their own medicine” (Khrushchev 2000, p. 484). 
Nuclear weapons in Cuba was a tit-for-tat strategy according to Khrushchev’s logic. 
Khrushchev may have decided to put nuclear weapons in Cuba during his trip to 
Bulgaria, but he still needed to present the idea to and get approval from the Presidium in 
Moscow. Khrushchev presented the plan to the Presidium on May 21, less than 24 hours 
after his return from Bulgaria. He did not get the response he had hoped for. There was a 
good deal of dissension, particularly from Mikoyan, and a note taker at the meeting 
reported that debate went on for quite some time (Khrushchev 2000, p. 487; Taubman 
2003, p. 541). Foreign Minister Gromyko joined Mikoyan in his reservations about the 
plan (Taubman 2003, p. 543). Those that spoke against the plan worried that such a 
provocation would incite U.S. action and all but ensure that the U.S. would use force to 
remove Castro (Khrushchev 2000, p. 485). Fearing that his plan would not get sufficient 
support, Khrushchev ended the meeting before there was a resolution or vote. 
There were two strategies available to the Soviets should they attempt to put a 
missile base in Cuba. They could adopt a strategy similar to the one that the U.S. used 
when placing missiles in Turkey. The U.S. publicly announced a defense pact in 
conjunction with their decision to place nuclear missiles there (Beschloss 1991 p. 65; 
Scott 2007, p. 35). Khrushchev, and Soviet leadership more broadly, feared that the U.S. 
would try to prevent such a deployment. Given U.S. superiority in the Caribbean, the 
U.S. would almost certainly be able to block the Soviet move. Khrushchev was confident 
that the Soviets could get the missiles into Cuba without being detected by the U.S., and 
believed that secrecy was crucial (Khrushchev 2000, p. 484; Taubman 2003, p. 535). He 




again on May 24. This time, no one voiced opposition and the plan passed unanimously 
(Taubman 2003, p. 544). 
The dissention in the Presidium showed that Khrushchev’s vision of Cuba, and 
his attempt to unsettle the U.S., did not necessarily share unanimous support (Taubman 
2003, p. 541). This tells a very different story then accounts of Khrushchev’s unilateral 
decision-making, or the possibility that Khrushchev was motivated by military leaders, a 
possibility discussed at length during the ensuing ExComm meetings (May and Zelikow 
2001 p. 67). Instead, this tells the story of deliberative leadership concerned with U.S. 
response and the beliefs that might motivate different responses (Khrushchev 2000, p. 
485; Taubman 2003, p. 535). Khrushchev’s belief that surprise would be effective, relied 
on the assumption that the U.S. believed that Soviet assistance to Cuba was defensive in 
nature. Had consensus opinion in the U.S. formed around the belief that the Soviets aid to 
Cuba was offensive or expansionist, any attempt to surprise the U.S. would have a 
reduced possibility of success. 
The missile deployment was accompanied by an active deception plan. In 
repeated diplomatic exchanges, the Soviets signaled that they had no intention of putting 
offensive or nuclear weapons in Cuba. In early September, Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko told Robert Kennedy that all weapons shipments to Cuba were 
defensive in nature. On September 4, in part due to Senator Keatings’ charge that there 
were nuclear weapons in Cuba, Kennedy publicly stressed that offensive weapons in 
Cuba would not be tolerated (Stern 2005, p. 20). The Soviet news agency TASS reported 
that all the weapons in Cuba were defensive on September 9, echoing earlier signals 




signaling an immediate threat, the first shipment of nuclear weapons, unbeknownst to 
U.S. policymakers, was on its way to Cuba and arrived on October 4, 1962 (Scott and 
Smith 1994, p. 674, Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 461). 
Back in Washington on October 16, the ExComm was trying to figure out why 
the Soviets had chosen to challenge the status quo. They discussed many of the issues 
raised by Allison (1971, 1999; May and Zelikow, 2001, pp. 54-71) including Cuban 
defense, Cold War politics, missile power and Soviet attempts to make aggressive moves 
elsewhere. There was little concern that the Soviets had any intention of using these 
weapons in offensive fashion against the U.S. Instead, there was widespread concern that 
missiles could be offensively leveraged to buttress Soviet expansionism in Berlin or Latin 
America (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 42; Leaming 2006, p. 401). Leveraging the missiles 
became synonymous with offensive, expansionist, or aggressive intentions. While the 
ExComm considered possible Soviet motivations, they were not weighted equal. Content 
analysis of the discussion on October 16 (May and Zelikow 2001, pp. 32-72) reveals that 
Berlin was mentioned 18 times, U.S. missiles in Turkey were mentioned 7 times and 
Cuban defense only mentioned 4 times. Policymakers were clearly concerned that the 
missiles could be used to challenge the U.S. on other fronts. 
After seeing the pictures of the missiles sites and discussing possible Soviet 
strategic intentions, the ExComm spent subsequent days discussing the appropriate policy 
response (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 75). Broadly speaking, there were four alternatives: 
do nothing, diplomatic confrontation, an air strike against Cuba, or an invasion of Cuba. 
Either air strikes or invasion would be accompanied by a blockade to ensure that the 




straightforward, but the air strike option was more complicated. Air strikes could be 
limited to the missile sites or expanded to include anti-aircraft weapons, planes and other 
military sites (May and Zelikow 2001 p. 47; O’Brien 2005, p. 659). This meant that air 
strikes could be comprehensive or targeted. The Joint Chiefs continually advocated for 
the comprehensive strike, which had the best chance of removing the immediate threat 
and weakened the Cuban forces such that future air strikes were low risk for U.S. pilots. 
The Joint Chiefs also suggested following the comprehensive air strikes with an invasion 
of the island in the following weeks (Freedman 2000, p. 175; May and Zelikow 2001 pp. 
47-49). 
After the initial meeting, Kennedy was never comfortable with the comprehensive 
strike solution (May and Zelikow 2001; Stern 2005; O’Brien 2005, p. 661). For one, the 
strike went way beyond the immediate threat to the U.S. A second concern was that 
Soviet casualties would be relatively high in the comprehensive strike (May and Zelikow 
2001, p. 86). He was also concerned that such overwhelming force against a weaker 
adversary would send the wrong message to the European allies that had been living with 
risks of Soviet nuclear forces for years (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 100). The Joint Chiefs 
further undermined their cause by constantly expanding the scope of the air strikes and 
the number of sorties that the pilots would fly to cover all of the targets (Freedman 2000, 
pp. 191-192). 
Given the mix of problems associated with the comprehensive air strike, it is not 
surprising that Kennedy was not enthusiastic about that strategy. Early on in the 
meetings, Kennedy and many of the ExComm members favored a limited air strike (May 




missiles, while inflicting as little damage on Soviet and Cuban forces as possible. After a 
thorough assessment, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Maxwell Taylor told 
Kennedy that an air strike would probably remove 90% of the threat (Stern 2005, p. 46, 
56). This meant that 10% of the known offensive weapons in Cuba could be fired at the 
U.S. after the strike. This was hardly reassuring. The primary opponent to this plan was 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk who favored diplomatic confrontation to military options 
(May and Zelikow 2001, p. 36, 88). The problem, however, was that any confrontation 
would eliminate the possibility of catching the Cubans by surprise and would provide 
motivation to speed up work on the missiles sites. 
Over the next few days, a consensus formed against any air strike. McNamara 
cited some of the disadvantages in his October 20 brief (May and Zelikow 2001). The 
ExComm members were concerned that an air strike would be analogous to the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, which was the biggest surprise in U.S. history (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 
79; Stern 2005, p. 53). They were loath to set a precedent that such attacks were 
acceptable, and concerned about a Soviet response against U.S. interests, particularly 
Berlin (Freedman 2000, pp. 188-190). As air strikes and invasion lost appeal, the 
ExComm slowly settled on a blockade of Cuba. 
A blockade of Cuba, technically an act of war, had both positive and negative 
aspects (Freedman 2000, pp. 182-192). The blockade would be clear response to Soviet 
activity, and was preferable to doing nothing. It had the advantage of minimizing the 
likelihood that Soviet and U.S. forces ended up in a hostile engagement, kept the Soviets 
from adding any further offensive weapons to the island, would keep the Soviets from 




making accompanying diplomacy possible. The blockade would not, however, neutralize 
or remove the current missiles from Cuba (Stern 2005, p. 64). McNamara’s biggest 
concern on October 20 was that the blockade would “take a long time to achieve the 
objective of eliminating strategic missiles from Cuba” (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 128).” 
In a televised speech on October 22, Kennedy told America of the offensive 
weapons in Cuba, announced the blockade of the island, and warned the Soviets that the 
offensive weapons would not be tolerated (May and Zelikow 2001, pp. 183-189). About 
four hours before the speech, Soviet intelligence reported an unusual flurry of activity 
around the White House (Khrushchev 2000, p. 553; Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 467). 
Khrushchev quickly connected the dots fearing that the U.S. had discovered the covert 
Cuban arms operation and called for a Presidium meeting late that night. These concerns 
were aggravated further when the U.S. Embassy warned the Kremlin that Kennedy would 
make a speech, and informed them that they would get an advance copy an hour before it 
aired. Khrushchev feared that the U.S. had discovered the missiles and would use them as 
a pretext to invade Cuba (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 470). Malinovsky was more 
optimistic (Khrushchev 2000, p. 553). He believed that the U.S. position did not reflect 
the operational capability to carry out the operation, but believed that the U.S. would take 
some action (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 468). The conversation focused on the worst-
case scenario: what to do if the U.S. chose to invade Cuba. 
The fears of an imminent invasion were slightly allayed when they received a 
copy of Kennedy’s speech (Khrushchev 2000, p. 559), but they wanted a strategy to 
ensure Cuba’s continuing safety. The Presidium discussed turning nuclear weapons 




and pointed out that Cuban control of nuclear weapons was likely to magnify U.S. fears 
(Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 472). The Presidium agreed and also chose to maintain 
authority over the strategic weapons, but gave authorization for tactical nuclear weapons 
to the field commander (Taubman 2003, p. 562). The order was sent on to the field 
commanders just before Kennedy addressed America. Cuba appeared safe for the 
moment, and the Presidium adjourned. 
When the Soviets met at the Kremlin on the morning of October 23, the 
conversation had a different tone. The Soviets still wanted to ensure Cuba’s safety, but 
they also wanted to keep the crisis from escalating (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 477). 
Any provocative act at this delicate juncture, particularly against U.S. forces in the 
Caribbean, risked starting nuclear war. The Soviets immediately recalled weapons supply 
ships in the Mediterranean and advised ships in the Atlantic to stop (Fursenko and Naftali 
2006, p. 477). Only a few ships close to Cuba were instructed to continue on in the hopes 
of arriving in Cuba before the blockade. They drafted a public statement denying the 
existence of the missiles and appealed to the U.N. on Cuba’s behalf (Fursenko and 
Naftali 2006, p. 477). Khrushchev decided to take a different tone in his personal 
correspondence to Kennedy stressing that the weapons had solely defensive purposes 
(May and Zelikow 2001, p. 203). The Soviets also deliberated the fate of four Foxtrot 
class diesel submarines in route to Cuba (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 478). Malinovsky 
argued that the submarines could arrive in Cuba undetected, against the recommendation 
of Mikoyan. Eventually, the Presidium sided with Mikoyan, agreeing that the submarines 
would not be able to reach Cuba undetected given U.S. anti-submarine capabilities in the 




issued orders to stop, setting the stage for a tense standoff during the blockade (Fursenko 
and Naftali 2006, p. 480). 
Curiously, or perhaps conspicuously, missing from these Soviet debates was any 
serious discussion about action against Berlin. Sergei Khrushchev (2000, p. 560) notes 
that Vasily Vasilyevich Kuznetsov proposed exerting pressure on Berlin, and Khrushchev 
reportedly responded with surprising sharpness, “Keep that kind of advice to yourself… 
We don’t know how to get out of one predicament and you drag us into another.” Fears 
of Soviet retaliation against Berlin, for blockade or strike, had dominated U.S. 
deliberations from October 16 to 22. Between October 23 and 24, the Soviets never 
discuss retaliating with a blockade of Berlin, focusing on ensuring Cuba’s defense while 
deescalating the crisis (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 473). The Soviets believed that the 
U.S. would look for any reason to invade Cuba, and believed the best hope of keeping 
Cuba safe and avoiding war was caution and prudence rather than retaliation. 
Before examining the Bayesian and biased models as applied to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, it is important trace the beliefs of the target, the U.S., at key junctures in 
the crisis. The analysis focuses on the prior beliefs, the evidence that becomes available 
over time, the impact of that evidence on beliefs in the hopes of identifying the existence 
of entrenched beliefs, the issues on which beliefs become entrenched, and the strength of 
the evidence used to identify entrenched beliefs. Tracing beliefs as a process helps to 
identify instances where new evidence should have been sufficient to alter beliefs, 
potentially isolating situations where the decision-makers may have exhibited bias. 
It is difficult to argue that U.S. policymakers suffered from any type of 




degrees in an hour. Prior to October 16, we have argued that U.S. decision-makers 
believed that Soviet aid to Cuba was defensive in nature. The aerial reconnaissance 
photos showing Soviet medium range missiles in Cuba was sufficient to cause a major 
change in U.S. beliefs. After seeing the photos, the ExComm came to believe that Soviet 
military aid was offensive or expansionist in nature aimed at gaining leverage to alter the 
status quo in Berlin and South America (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 67-68). There is no 
evidence to suggest that U.S. decision-makers clung to their prior belief that the aid was 
defensive, and no evidence of entrenched beliefs during this initial stage of the crisis. 
After the initial crisis stage, where the decision-makers first learn of the missiles, 
there is some evidence that they anchor on a couple of beliefs throughout the crisis. The 
strongest evidence of entrenched beliefs comes from the assessment of Soviet capabilities 
already in Cuba. The initial intelligence assessment on October 16 revealed the existence 
of four missile MRBM missile launchers at three sites (Freedman 2000, p. 1999). 
Analysts were unable to find any nuclear storage facilities or any evidence of nuclear 
warheads at these sites, but they did warn that the missiles would have little use without 
nuclear warheads (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 34). The assessment that there were no 
nuclear ordinances in Cuba becomes a vital component of the early ExComm discussion. 
On October 17, McNamara articulates support for two of five military options: an air 
strike aimed at all the offensive weapons and an invasion. He also warns that “All of 
these plans are based on one very important assumption: That we would attack with 
conventional weapons, against and enemy who is not equipped with operational nuclear 
weapons. If there’s any possibility that the enemy is equipped with operational nuclear 




Over the next few days, the intelligence assessments of Soviet missile capability 
continued to change (Freedman 2000, p. 1999). On October 17, the assessment was 
increased to eight MRBM launchers, in two to three sites, with 16-32 missiles operational 
in one week’s time. The assessment was refined on October 18, maintaining the existence 
of eight MRBM launchers in two sites with 16 missiles. On October 19, the assessment 
of capability was expanded to include two IRBM launchers in two sites in addition to the 
MRBM sites. The hardened IRBM sites would not be ready until December, but the 
discovery of IRBMs was a source of tension for the ExComm. The assessment was 
expanded again on October 20: 16 MRBM launchers with 32 missiles in four sites, along 
with the eight IRBM launchers with 16 missiles in two sites. The other addition to the 
October 20 assessment was the possible sighting of a nuclear storage facility under 
construction at an IRBM site (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 126). The assessment indicated 
that the facility would not be completed until December along with IRBM site. The 
October 22 assessment expanded the MRBM force to 23 launchers with 33 missiles in six 
sites (Freedman 2000, p. 199), and also indicated that there could be one to three nuclear 
storage facilities, probably under construction (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 166). The 
assessment also warned that aerial reconnaissance might never be able to identify storage 
facilities or warheads with certainty. 
Taken together, this means that the October 16 and 17 assessments were changed 
incrementally to reflect almost four times as many MRBM launchers, almost eight times 
as many MRBM missiles in twice as many sites, along with a previously unobserved 
sizeable IRBM force, and increase in possible nuclear storage facilities from zero to 




in estimates over six days might have triggered a major reassessment of Soviet 
commitment to Cuba. While the ExComm did consider the Soviet intentions, the military 
planning seemed static in light of the new evidence. The Joint Chiefs continued to 
advocate an invasion without considering the possibility that U.S. forces might face 
tactical nuclear weapons (Gaddis 2005, p. 77). They did revise the air strike option, 
increasing the number of sorties as the number of weapons and sites increased, but never 
assumed that the revised assessments were indicative of a larger error. This could reflect 
a difference of opinion between McNamara, who suggested that military options be 
reevaluated if assessment of nuclear capabilities changed, and the Joint Chiefs, but it 
reflects a fundamental inconsistency since neither actor ever explicitly revisited this core 
assumption about Soviet capabilities later in the crisis. 
McNamara and the Joint Chiefs were not the only parties to fall prey to this bias. 
On October 20, the ExComm met to discuss the latest intelligence assessment and policy 
recommendations. There is no transcript of the meeting since it took place in the White 
House residence under the auspicious of Kennedy’s false illness that brought him back 
from Chicago early (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 125). During that meeting, each 
participant discussed their position and offered a brief justification. Both Director 
McCone, the skeptic, and Undersecretary of State George Ball offered policy assessments 
relying on the assumption that there were no nuclear weapons in Cuba. Ball argued that 
“if an effective blockade was established, it was possible that our photographic 
intelligence would reveal that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba” (May and 
Zelikow 2001, p. 129). McCone reinforced the prevailing view later in the discussion 




deployed had actually arrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of 
storage places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not yet have been sent to Cuba” 
(May and Zelikow 2001, p. 133). 
McCone’s statement is telling because it is indicative of the prevailing attitude 
across the national security policymakers: in the absence of clear evidence, they should 
operate under the assumption that there might be a limited nuclear capability in Cuba. 
This perspective seemed to have solidified despite mounting evidence that the U.S. had 
fundamentally miscalculated and perhaps even underestimated the Soviet investment in 
Cuba. 
The assessment turned out to be horribly wrong. At the time of the US blockade, 
there were at least 36 nuclear warheads for the MRBMs, 12 Luna tactical nuclear 
weapons (Scott 2007, p. 41) and 42 FKR cruise missiles with nuclear warheads 
(Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 469). The Luna missiles had a range of 31 miles and a 2-
kiliton yield, which would irradiate everything within 1000 yards of detonation. The FKR 
cruise missiles had a 100-mile range and a yield that varied from five to 12 kilotons. Both 
weapons, particularly the cruise missiles pointed out to sea, were intended to destroy 
naval vessels (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, p. 473). The largest estimate of nuclear 
armament at the time of the blockade have put the number of nuclear weapons as high as 
162: 60 for MRBM and IRBM missiles, 12 FROG-7 warheads, 80 tactical warheads for 
cruise missiles, 6 gravity bombs, and 4 naval mines (Scott and Smith 1994, p. 674). 
McNamara had initially supported air strikes and invasion early on under the 
assumption that there were no nuclear weapons in Cuba (May and Zelikow 2001, p 84). 




have been hard to justify taking military action. The presence of nuclear weapons on the 
island diminished value of all military options including the invasion, air strike and 
blockade. The utility of the blockade, since it was executed at some distance from the 
island, would have been negatively impacted the least. At a radius of 500 miles, the ships 
should have been just out of the reach of the FKR cruise missiles. None of the publicly 
available discussions between Kennedy and the military leadership reflect concern about 
Soviet tactical nuclear weapons (May and Zelikow 2001). Had the military leadership 
seriously considered the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, it would have 
been much more difficult to justify an invasion. 
The value of the blockade relative to other options was also bolstered by the 
inaccurate assumption that there were probably no nuclear weapons on the island. If there 
were no nuclear weapons for the missiles, a blockade would keep the offensive weapons 
from becoming fully operational. The most the Soviets could do, under these 
assumptions, was fire conventional rockets. If there were no weapons, the blockade was 
both a signal of resolve and defensive tactical measure. If the nuclear warheads were 
already in Cuba, its value as a tactical defensive measure dropped since it would only 
keep the Soviets from building up the arsenal further or restocking it if the existing 
nuclear weapons were used or destroyed. An accurate assessment would have made the 
blockade seem more valuable than the other military options, but it would not have 
prevented nuclear warheads from entering Cuba and would have been viewed as a risk 
given the tactical nuclear weapon stockpile. The inaccurate U.S. belief helped to justify 
the blockade in the hopes that it was the lower risk option that might keep nuclear 




When one examines the drastic changes in the intelligence assessment of Soviet 
strategic capability over six days, it is hard to imagine not revisiting the basic 
assumptions that the ExComm formed on October 16. Even if the U.S. was operating 
under the belief that there were MRBM warheads (Scott and Smith 1994, p. 674), the 
Soviets weapon shipments to Cuba far exceeded the initial estimates. Despite this 
obvious fact, no one clearly revisited the assumptions on the disposition of strategic 
nuclear warheads or tactical nuclear weapons. This belief was both convenient, and 
probably helped facilitate decision-making, but it was at odds with new information and 
inaccurate. Tracing the beliefs and available information reveals that the decision-makers 
probably exhibited some sort of anchoring or entrenchment on their initial beliefs 
developed on October 16. While it appears that there were no entrenched beliefs prior to 
October 16, it is more difficult to argue that the decision-makers displayed rationality 
thereafter. 
There is one other area where U.S. decision-makers may have displayed 
entrenched beliefs, but this argument is not as strong as the one above. After the U.S. 
decision-makers viewed the missile photos on October 16, they quickly abandoned their 
view that the missiles were defensive for the belief that the missiles were offensive or 
expansionist in nature (Leaming 2006, p. 401). Even though the ExComm did not believe 
that the missiles were going to be used against the U.S. in the immediate future, they 
assumed that missile would probably be used as leverage to expand Soviet influence in 
Berlin or Latin America (May and Zelikow 2001, pp. 90-91). Lawrence Freedman (2000, 
p. 171) writes that U.S. decision-makers suffered from a common bias “to think that with 




weapons are often used in defensive campaigns, just as defensive weapons are crucial in 
offensive campaigns. The bias Freedman is talking about is somewhat different from 
entrenched beliefs in that entrenched beliefs develop over time. The belief that the 
missiles are intended for offensive or expansionists purposes only represents an 
entrenched belief if it hardens over time in the absence of any new evidence or the 
presence of new conflicting information. 
The weakness of this second claim stems, in large part, from fewer incremental 
signals during the crisis. Fewer incremental signals or cues make it more difficult to 
establish that a belief was irrationally entrenched. The best, and perhaps only, way to 
establish this claim is tracing the sentiments offered during the ExComm deliberations. 
The index of Kennedy transcripts edited by Ernest May and Philip Zelikow (2001, p. 
506) notes six instances where the ExComm discuss the “offensive vs. defensive” nature 
of the Cuban missiles. In the first instance, on October 16, the participants discuss a range 
of possibilities including Cuba’s defense, U.S. missiles in Turkey, and particularly Soviet 
desires in Berlin (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 61). The next two indexed conversations 
take place on October 18. In the first instance, the U.S. discusses the possibility that 
Soviets might want to trade to get U.S. missiles out of Turkey (May and Zelikow 2001, 
p.100). Soviet desires in Berlin then dominated the second conversation on October 18 
(May and Zelikow 2001, p. 106). There are also two conversations indexed on October 
19. The first focused on attempted Soviet blackmail in Berlin and Latin America, the 
second focused on Berlin ((May and Zelikow 2001, p. 117). There is a brief discussion of 
defensive rationale, but Kennedy negates this responding, “Of course, that’s how they 




instance is on October 22, which again focuses on Berlin (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 
159). 
The raw count reveals that Berlin, and thereby offensive or expansionist 
intentions, dominated the discussions. During these six conversations, blackmail over 
Berlin is cited five times, Turkish missiles and strategic capability twice, blackmail in 
Latin America once, and the defense of Cuba once. What is more telling is the trend over 
time. On the first day, they consider Berlin, Turkish missiles and defense of Cuba. On the 
second day they focus on Berlin and Turkish missiles. On the third day they focus on 
Berlin and blackmail in Latin America. Then three days later they only discuss Berlin. 
The trend over time shows that the participants found themselves leaning increasingly 
toward offensive rather than defensive rationales, despite the fact there was no clear or 
new evidence of Soviet intentions over this time. The belief becomes entrenched despite 
the lack of tangible intelligence on Soviet motivation visa vie Cuba. 
The entrenchment seems based on two common decision-making phenomena. 
First, U.S. policymakers seemed to engage in mirror imaging, which is the tendency to 
assume that others know what you do or think the same way about the same set of facts 
(Jervis 1976, p. 354). They knew there were no plans to invade Cuba and assumed that 
the Soviets had the same information. Policymakers never seriously considered that the 
aggressive U.S. stance toward Cuba was responsible for Soviet concerns about Cuban 
defense (O’Brien 2005, p. 658). The Soviet reaction to Kennedy’s speech tells a different 
story. Their first priority was avoiding war, followed by defending Cuba. There were no 
discussions about retaliating against Berlin. The second effect that seems present is a 




another and amplify over time (Vertzberger 1997, p. 303). This process often leads 
groups toward taking larger risks than they would if making individual decisions. It is 
worth noting that the tangible intelligence available during the crisis was the actual force 
size in Cuba, and the estimate changes showing a larger and larger force almost certainly 
fueled increased concern about Soviet motives. This might justify the U.S. position, but it 
is important to recognize that the U.S. position about Soviet motives hardened over time. 
There is a reasonably strong argument that U.S. beliefs regarding nuclear 
ordinances in Cuba reflected entrenchment as evidence mounted that the Soviet aid 
package was much more substantial than initially believed. The belief that the Soviet 
missiles had offensive or expansionist purpose could be rationally justified by the 
intelligence changes, but could also reflect entrenchment over the course of the crisis. 
The final step in the case analysis is the comparison of Bayesian and biased 
models based upon the sub-cases. Table 6.1 summarizes the performance of the models 
side by side. The coding on model success, 0 and 1, is based on the capability of model to 
explain the outcome and which model better explains the outcome. For example, if the 
Soviet Union attempted to surprise the U.S. and model A predicts that the Soviets would 
mix their strategy and model B predicts they always surprise, then model B is coded a 1 
and model A gets a 0. If both models predict a deterministic result, both theories are 
scored 1 if the case behavior matches the deterministic results, or coded 0 otherwise. If 
both models predict mixed outcomes, the analysis focuses on the differential between the 
deductive results. If model A predicted a mixed strategy where public challenge was 
more likely than it was in model B, model B would coded 1 and model A 0 if the Soviets 




predicts a 50% chance of surprise and model B predicts a 50% chance of surprise, there is 
no way to evaluate the models relative to one another in a meaningful way so both are 
coded zero. 
The top part of Table 6.1 shows conditions where we expect the predictions of the 
Bayesian and biased models to converge. Given prior U.S. beliefs, both models indicate 
that the Soviets were better off attempting surprise than making a public announcement. 
Both model predictions are pure rather than mixed strategies. Both models, therefore, 
explain the crisis initiation equally well. This does not mean that Khrushchev’s decision 
to secretly deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba was necessarily rational, but it does show 
that the behavior was consistent with the deductive results of a Bayesian rational model. 
Kennedy actually voiced his opinion that the missile deployment was a reasonable move 
for Khrushchev (May and Zelikow 2001, p. 111; Leaming 2006, p. 403). The two models 
also converge on the target’s optimal strategy, which is waiting. Since the Soviet 
intentions in Cuba are perceived to be defensive, evidenced by the intelligence 
assessment prior to October 16, the target always waits whether biased or Bayesian. The 
U.S. did not take any action to impede the Soviet arms shipments prior to October 22. 
There is convergence between the Bayesian and biased models, and since both accurately 




Table 6.1: Cuban Missile Crisis Model Comparison 












Prior to October 16:      
 Target's Belief   Aid Was Defensive   
 Evidence of Entrenched Beliefs   No   
 Details of Entrenched Beliefs   Rapid Belief Change   
 Sender Concern About Target Beliefs   Yes; Deception Effort   
Proposition 1 (p<p*):      











Always Waits Always Waits Target Unprepared 1 1 
Note: The table shows that both models score well in instances where they have identical or convergent predictions. In instances where they diverge, the biased 
appears to have better explanatory power. See the footnotes or text for details on coding explanations. 
1. Both models predict that the sender will always attempt surprise, and the Soviets did attempt surprise, so both models receive a score of 1. 
2. Both models predict that the target will always wait, and the U.S. did not take any action to prevent the arms shipments when they believed them to be 




Table 6.1 (cont’d): Cuban Missile Crisis Model Comparison 












US Secretly Debates, October 16-22:      
 Target's Belief   Aid Was Offensive   
 Evidence of Entrenched Beliefs   Yes   
 Details of Entrenched Beliefs   Offensive Nature of 
Missiles; No Nuclear 
Warheads in Cuba 
  
 Sender Concern About Target Beliefs   Unaware of Target 
Knowledge 
  
Proposition 2 (U.S.: p>p*; Soviets: p<p*):      
 Sender Use of Surprise
3 
Surprise or Violent 
Act Likely 





Proposition 3 (p>p*):      
 Target Response when Bayesian
4 
Mix Mix Blockade 0 - 
 Target Response when Biased
4 
- Always Act Blockade - 1 
3. Since the Soviets are operating under the belief that the U.S. is still unaware of the missiles and allowing the defensive arms shipments (p<p*), both models 
predict that the sender will always attempt surprise. The Soviets continue their attempted surprise, so both models receive a score of 1. 
4. The U.S. knows of the missiles and changes their beliefs about Soviet intentions (p>p*). If the Soviets continue to play the Bayesian strategy (as they should 
since they do not know that the U.S. knows), the target in the Bayesian model will adopt a mixed strategy, the Bayesian type in the biased model will adopt a 
mixed strategy, and the biased type in the biased model will always act (since the sender adopts too aggressive of a signaling or surprise strategy). The analysis 
above argued that the U.S. starts exhibiting entrenched beliefs at this time, so the biased type in the biased model is the relevant comparison to the Bayesian 




Table 6.1 (cont’d): Cuban Missile Crisis Model Comparison 












Post October 22:      
 Target's Belief   Aid Was Offensive   
 Evidence of Entrenched Beliefs   Yes   
 Details of Entrenched Beliefs   Offensive Nature of 
Missiles; No Nuclear 
Warheads in Cuba 
  
 Sender Concern About Target Beliefs   Sender Aware That 
Target Knows 
  
Proposition 2 (p>p*):      
 Sender Use of Surprise
5 
Surprise or Violent 
Act Likely 




Proposition 3 (p>p*):      
 Target Response when Bayesian
6 
Mix Wait Blockade 0 - 
 Target Response when Biased
6 
- Mix Blockade - 0 
       
Total     3 5 
       
Statistical Analysis on All 6 Observations  Statistical Analysis on 3 (Divergent) Observations  
 t-Statistic -1.581  t-Statistic  -2.000 
 P(T<=t): Two-Tail 0.175  P(T<=t): Two-Tail  0.184 
  t Critical Value: Two-Tail 2.571   t Critical Value: Two-Tail 4.303 
5. The Soviets learn the U.S. knows about the attempted surprise (p>p*), and if they believe there is some possibility that the U.S. is irrationally over-suspicious, 
they should adopt a less provocative strategy. They do not take any action (against Berlin) in response to the blockade, and they try to deescalate the crisis. The 
biased model predicts more conservative strategies than the Bayesian model, meaning it better captures Soviet behavior, and receives score of 1. 
6. Neither model receives any points. The Bayesian model predicts a mixed strategy, while the biased model with the biased type (since the U.S. is still exhibiting signs of 






The final convergent prediction in the case extends into the second stage of crisis 
wherein the U.S. knew of the missiles, but the Soviets were functioning under the belief 
that the deployment was still secret. The biased model shows that there is no reason to 
take a target’s anchoring into account if the sender is perceived to be non-threatening.
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Since the Soviets were still operating under the assumption that U.S. did not know of the 
missiles, both models predict that aggressive Soviets should always attempt surprise. This 
result to similar the one discussed immediately above. Once again, both models offer the 
same prediction, the case actually matches the deductive conclusions, and both models 
function equally well. It is interesting to note that in the three instances where the two 
model predictions converge, both offer predictions that are in line with the case events. 
The Bayesian and biased models diverge after October 16 when the U.S. knows 
about the Soviet missiles in Cuba, but it is uncertain about Soviet intentions or next steps. 
The models accurately predict that Soviet behavior should remain unchanged since they 
believed the missiles were still a secret. The U.S., however, had additional information 
and now believed that the Soviets had expansionist or aggressive intentions associated 
with Cuban military aid. Given this revised belief, both the Bayesian model, and the 
biased model where the target is actually Bayesian, predict that the U.S. would adopt a 
mixed strategy. Contrastingly, the biased model predicts that a biased type of target 
would always act. Above, there seemed to be some evidence to support the assertion that 
the U.S. had entrenched beliefs about the weapons in Cuba and the Soviet rationale for 
placing them. If this were true, the biased model with a biased actor is the pertinent 
comparison to the Bayesian model, and the biased model appears to be a better fit. The 
                                                 
26
 Note that the technical definition of non-threatening is p<p*. 
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ExComm discussed the possibility of doing nothing or taking diplomatic measures, but 
there was a strong conviction that some military steps were required to signal resolve. 
Since there was strong consensus for some sort of action throughout the crisis, the biased 
model seems to have better explanatory performance than the Bayesian model. 
There is also divergence in the results for the third stage of the crisis after October 
22. The ExComm discussions show that the U.S. decision-makers worried that action 
against Cuba would trigger Soviet retaliation, and were particularly concerned about 
Berlin. They repeatedly reasoned that a blockade of Cuba would lead to a Soviet 
blockade of Berlin. The Soviets’ reaction differed from the ExComm’s expectations. The 
Soviets never considered escalating the crisis by acting against Berlin and focused on 
how to deescalate the crisis while ensuring that Cuba was safe from U.S. action. When 
the biased and Bayesian models are compared, the Bayesian model predicts that 
aggressive strategies such as surprise are more likely than more benign crisis strategies 
like public statements. The deductive models highlight that in uncertain situations where 
opponents are potentially over-suspicious, the only way to avoid antagonizing the 
opponent into overreaction is by being more conservative. Since the game is a “one-shot” 
interaction, which is to say it does not explicitly consider future interactions beyond the 
exogenous payoffs, its logic can apply to any single crisis stage or interaction (initiation, 
escalation, ongoing war) where there is uncertainty and preparing military action or 
surprise is possible. Thus, the Bayesian model predicts that the Soviets would be more 
likely to adopt a provocative escalatory strategy, whereas the biased model predicts that 
there is a higher relative likelihood of adopting more conservative strategies. Given the 
Soviet deliberations and final strategy, the biased model, predicting that the Soviets were 
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likely to adopt a less provocative strategy, outperforms the Bayesian model predicting a 
relatively more provocative approach. 
The final proposition tested in the table addresses the target’s strategy after 
October 22. The U.S. maintained the blockade and relied on diplomacy to deescalate the 
crisis. The Bayesian model predicts that the target would mix its strategy, the biased 
model with the Bayesian type predicts that the target would always wait, and the biased 
model with biased type predicts that the target would adopt the same mixed strategy as 
the Bayesian. If the U.S. had some degree of entrenched beliefs as argued above, it is 
appropriate to compare the Bayesian model to the biased model with the biased type. 
Since both predict that the target mixes their strategy, and the probability with which both 
mix their strategy is identical, neither one outperforms the other or wholly captures the 
U.S. behavior after October 22. 
A raw count reveals that the Bayesian model offered accurate deterministic 
predictions in three cases, yielding a total score of three. The biased model offered 
accurate deterministic predictions in the same three cases and outperformed that Bayesian 
model in two cases, yielding a total score of five. It is not clear that the results suggest 
that one model is superior to the other statistically since there is a random chance that the 
biased outperformed the Bayesian model. The way to eliminate, or at least minimize, the 
possibility that the biased model was randomly superior is a statistical analysis comparing 
the two models. The studentized t-statistic is an appropriate test for small samples such as 
this. A studentized t-statistic analysis of the two groups shows that the probability that the 
results of biased model are statistically different from the Bayesian is 82.5% on a two-
tailed test. This does not meet the normal level of statistical significance of 95%. 
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However, an analysis looking at differences between the models should not include the 
three explanations where the models have convergent predictions. Given that the three 
predictions are the same, and both models score highly in these instances, it would be 
surprising if the model results were found to be statistically distinct. To evaluate the 
relative quality of the models, it makes sense to focus on instances with divergent 
predictions. There are three divergent cases in which the Bayesian model scores zero and 
biased model scores two. The statistical analysis on the three cases shows that the 
probability that the results of the biased model are statistically different from the 
Bayesian is 81.6% on a two-tailed test. Once again, we find that the test does not meet the 
standard 95% level for significance, but the scores are still reasonably high. One major 
constraint to getting a statistically significant result is that there are so few cases that it is 
difficult to distinguish the two models. If there were two additional observations coded at 
the sample means (0 for the Bayesian model and 0.666 for the biased model), the 
statistical analysis would reveal that the models were different with a 97.5% chance with 
a two-tailed test. These results meet the standard requirement for significance. The model 
comparison, therefore, is slightly hamstrung by the fact that there are convergent results 
and only a few divergent predictions. 
Broadly speaking, the biased model of decision-making developed here seems to 
perform relatively well. It is successful in instances were its predictions converge with 
the Bayesian model, and seems to outperform the Bayesian model given divergent 
predictions, but we cannot eliminate the possibility that the superior performance was 
random. The analysis suggests that the biased model performs at least as well as the 
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Bayesian model, and it may have greater explanatory power than the Bayesian 
benchmark. 
 
The Arab-Israeli War, 1967 
 Historians and political scientists have also extensively studied the Arab-Israeli 
conflict that played out between April and June 1967. Scholars have used it as 
prototypical case of escalatory spirals and psychologically motivated conflict (Stein and 
Tanter 1980; Lebow 1981; Jervis, Lebow and Stein 1985; Stein 1988), group decision-
making and rational decision-making (Laqueur 1969; Bar-Zohar 1970; Mor 1991). 
Others have focused on the personalities of the key leaders, particularly Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdul Nasser (Nutting 1972; Lacouture 1973), as well as Israeli 
leadership (Segev 2005). While there is a good deal of information available about the 
events leading up to the war, and a number of secondary sources that have used this data 
to make causal arguments, there is no single explanation that generates strong consensus. 
There are two reasons why scholars may not have settled on a dominant explanation. 
First, there is tendency to use the 1967 case to argue in favor of a favorite causal 
mechanism, psychological failure, escalatory brinkmanship or rational behavior (Mor 
1991). Second, and perhaps more importantly, very few of the explanations offer a 
strategic assessment that details decision-making on both sides and the way that decisions 
interrelate. 
We attempt to overcome these shortcomings in this case analysis by following the 
same format used in the Cuban Missile case. The study will start by providing some 
background information on the case that speaks to Israeli beliefs about its neighbors and 
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their intentions. Then we will cover the case details, including Egyptian actions along 
with Israeli responses to these Egyptian signals. We will also discuss the impact of 
external actors, particularly the U.S., on both sets of the decision-makers. The role of 
these third parties is a key component of the case and yields information that helps to 
explain why actors did or believed certain things at certain junctures. The case will then 
turn to an assessment of Israeli beliefs and biases, and Egypt’s beliefs about Israel. 
Finally, we will compare the Bayesian and biased models as we did in the Cuban case, 
justify the coding, and evaluate the results. 
Relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors had been turbulent since the 
state’s founding by United Nations Charter in 1948. Israel’s statehood immediately 
triggered an attack by neighboring Arab states, and Israel found itself surrounded by 
hostile forces on three sides. Israel was victorious, but that did not bring an end to small 
scuffles or major violent acts. Borders scuffles with Syria, Egypt and Jordan were regular 
occurrences, however, there was no further full-scale conflict until 1956 (Mor 2004, p. 
315). 
In 1956, Nasser announced the intention to nationalize the Suez Canal, and would 
likely close the Red Sea to Israeli shipping. Nasser’s actions also concerned Britain and 
France, both of whom relied on open access to the canal for trade and supply. Egypt’s 
attempt to nationalize the canal, therefore, motivated a marriage of convenience between 
the Israelis, British and French (Kissinger 1994, p. 540). With backing from the British 
and French, the Israelis attacked Egypt, and the combined force successfully captured the 
Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower was not pleased, 
in part because he had not been given advanced warning, and in part because the U.S. 
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was also dealing with the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising (Gaddis 2005, p. 70). The 
U.S. imposed a cease-fire whereby Britain and France withdrew from Egypt in 1956 and 
were replaced by troops from the United Nations Emergency Force (Oren 2002, p. 12). 
The Israelis withdrew from the Sinai in 1957. 
From 1957 through 1967, there were few instances of violence between Israeli 
and Egyptian forces, owed in part to the UN troops stationed in the Sinai. Borders with 
Jordan and Syria, however, were not equally quiet. Palestinian forces regularly entered 
Israel through the Jordanian, and occasionally the Syrian, borders to carry out terrorist 
attacks (Segev 2005, p. 144). The Israelis responded with raids against Jordanian towns 
suspected of harboring or supporting Palestinian terrorists. The Israelis were convinced 
that a new Palestinian group Fatah, whether entering Israel from Jordan or Syria, were 
trained and supported by the Syrians (Segev 2005, p. 143). 
Relations with Syria were particularly poor since the 1948 war. The Israelis and 
Syrians had fallen into a pattern of provocation and retaliation (Rabin 1979, p. 51). The 
1948 war created de-militarized zones along the border that were off limits to both 
Syrians and Israelis. Both sides tried to extend their lands piecemeal. The Israelis would 
send tractors, often with bulletproof armor, to plow disputed territory and the Syrians 
would respond by firing on the tractor and the associated kibbutz. Likewise, the Syrians 
would bring flocks to graze in disputed territory and face Israeli retaliation. One 
particularly contentious issue for the Israelis was Syria’s attempt to divert the Jordan 
River, thereby eliminating an important water supply (Segev 2005, p. 192). Israel often 
responded by bombing the construction equipment tasked with the river diversion. These 
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small border scuffles always had the possibility of escalating into war as both sides 
constantly tested each other’s will. 
There were 120 terrorist attacks in Israel in the 18 months leading up to the 1967 
War, and during the first few months of 1967 there were 270 incidents along the 
Jordanian border (Oren 2002, p. 45). Two attacks in October 1966 were particularly 
important. The first was the bombing of an apartment building in Romema, a suburb of 
Jerusalem, on October 7 (Segev 2005, p. 147). The next major attack was on October 25, 
where a landmine derailed two engines of a cargo train traveling from Jerusalem to Tel 
Aviv (Segev 2005, p. 149). Finally, on November 11, a military car carrying three 
paratroopers struck a roadside landmine killing all three soldiers (Segev 2005, p. 149). 
Israeli policymakers, particularly Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, had exercised patience up 
until this point. The death of the soldiers, however, brought mounting pressure for 
military reprisal (Segev 2005, p. 152). King Hussein of Jordan tried to contain the 
situation by issuing an apologetic message to Eshkol on November 13, but the Prime 
Minister had already approved a raid on the town of Samau (Segev 2005, p. 154). The 
operation expanded beyond its original scope, destroying somewhere between 40 and 100 
houses and brought Israeli troops into contact with Jordanian troops. The operation 
triggered riots in Jordan (Oren 2002, p. 36; Segev 2005, p. 182). 
The regularity of the terror attacks coupled with the possibility of destabilizing 
Jordan with a military response, motivated Israeli policymakers to undertake major 
reviews of the significant threats from Jordan and Egypt (Segev 2005). A less formal 
review on Syria was conducted later. Since the Israelis believed that the terrorists were 
trained by neighboring states, they focused their assessments on state-level threats. 
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From November 1966 to January 1967, the Israelis set up two working groups, 
one focused on Jordan and the other focused on Egypt (Segev 2005, pp. 183-84). The 
assessment teams were staffed with personnel from Mossad, Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
intelligence, and the Foreign Ministry. The threat assessment on Jordan noted its 
weakness, and largely focused on possible solutions to Palestinian sabotage (Segev 2005, 
p. 185). One possible approach was that the Israelis assemble saboteur teams, similar to 
those used by the Palestinians, and reciprocate violent acts. One problem with this 
approach, and any others that involved hostility against Jordan, was the possibility of 
destabilizing the regime (Segev 2005, p. 185). There was some debate whether the 
regime should be destabilized given the riots following the Samua operation. The group 
concluded that Egypt and Syria would intervene should King Hussein’s government fall, 
and this might give Israel pretext to occupy the West Bank (Ha’aretz 1966). The problem, 
then, was what to do with the West Bank. The territory could be annexed, but the Israelis 
believed that the international community would reject such a move. Alternatively, 
setting up a weak state or protectorate with handpicked leaders and policed by the IDF 
was deemed as not viable. The assessment process concluded that a weak Jordan was the 
best possible scenario for Israel, in part to ensure that the IDF could operate in Jordan if 
necessary, and in part because King Hussein’s policies had been beneficial for Israel 
(Segev 2005, pp. 186-86). King Hussein had encouraged Palestinians to migrate from the 
West Bank of the Jordan River to the East Bank, and roughly 100,000 had chosen to 
move. Since the Israelis were concerned about Palestinian population growth, particularly 
in the West Bank, King Hussein’s policies matched Israeli interests. The group concluded 
that a continuation of the status quo was in Israel’s best interests. 
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The assessment on Egypt, not surprisingly, had a different tone. There was no talk 
of undermining Nasser’s rule or destabilizing Egypt, which would have been impractical. 
Instead, the discussions focused on Nasser’s intentions and the possibility for improved 
diplomatic relations. The IDF assessment concluded that Egypt aspired to destroy Israel 
and there was no possibility for rapprochement (Segev 2005, p. 187). Mossad agreed that 
Egypt was interested in destroying Israel, but noted two possible avenues for diplomatic 
inroads. The first required dismantling Jordan and establishing a Palestinian state in its 
place (Segev 2005, pp. 187-88). They concluded, however, that this would indirectly 
strengthen Egypt and was counter to Israel’s interest. The second option was the 
termination of the nuclear weapons project at the Dimona (Segev 2005, p. 188). The 
assessment reasoned that the Israeli nuclear program was far ahead of the Egyptian 
program. Coupled with IDF conventional military superiority, the Egyptians might find 
the concession sufficiently attractive. 
The Foreign Ministry countered that nuclear weapons represented the best hope of 
ensuring Israel’s safety, and in the absence of such weapons, it could not be content with 
the current security environment. The question was one of deterrence. Israel, for some 
time, believed that its greatest hope of survival lied in deterrence: first through the IDF 
and conventional military superiority and then through nuclear weapons (Segev 2005, p. 
189). The deterrence strategy had been used to justify many previous operations in Jordan 
and Syria. Deterrence advocates argued that Israel must appear strong and resolved if it 
was to maintain the reputation necessary to deter future attacks (Rabin 1979, p. 81). This 
meant reciprocating acts of violence. The perceived deterrent benefits of nuclear weapons 
were difficult to abandon. The assessment concluded that Egypt wanted to destroy Israel 
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and there was very little the Israelis could do to alter that position or improve diplomatic 
relations (Segev 2005, p. 189). 
This 1966-67 assessment, however, did not encapsulate the full range of beliefs 
about Egyptian intentions. There was consensus that Egypt wanted to destroy Israel, but 
IDF intelligence and senior decision-makers believed that a large-scale Egyptian attack 
was unlikely in the near term (Nutting 1972, p. 408). The IDF was superior to the 
Egyptian military, and Egypt was likely to lose a full-scale war. Senior Israeli decision-
makers believed that Egypt shared this perspective, making large-scale Egyptian action 
unlikely until at least 1970. Though the Israelis believed that the Egyptians would not 
look to start a war, they thought it very possible that Egypt would mount an attack on the 
nuclear facility at Dimona or close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping (Oren 2002, p. 
63; Segev 2005, p. 229). These fears were sufficient to instill suspicion and justified 
careful monitoring of Egyptian forces. There were two examples in November 1966. The 
first was a confrontation with an Egyptian plane entering Israeli airspace. The Egyptian 
MiG was shot down. In the same month, Israeli intelligence also learned that Egypt was 
reinforcing its troop deployment in the Sinai. The Israelis called up reservists, but 
released them quickly. Israel was certainly concerned about their neighbor whom they 
believed harbored aggressive feelings and objectives. 
The third major threat facing Israel, though not assessed formally in 1966, was 
Syria. The Israelis probably saw little reason for a formal review, since they believed that 
Syria would be the spearhead in any attack on Israel (Segev 2005, p. 203). The Israeli 
General Staff discussed the Syrian threat in January 1967, focusing on a few key issues. 
The first was the inability to contain Fatah, perceived to be a Syrian agent (Segev 2005, 
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p. 203). The reciprocal fighting along the border also caused concern. The regular border 
clashes led to the belief that Syria might drag Israel into an undesired war (Segev 2005, p. 
203). Eshkol tried to focus discussions on defensive steps, but the military felt that there 
were no defensive steps sufficient to prevent attacks and kept raising the possibility of 
offensive action (Segev 2005, p. 206). The military proposed three plans for retaliating 
against Syrian provocations: an operation along the border, an operation that pushed 
further north, and an operation aimed at Damascus (Segev 2005, p. 206-7). The 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Syria also fueled concern. Should the Soviets 
wish to take action against Israel, the Syrians would be their proxy, and any Israeli action 
against Syria risked provoking a Soviet response (Segev 2005, p. 201). 
The Israelis were just as suspicious of Syria as they were Egypt, if not more so. 
These suspicions, and the need to show resolve, helped trigger a crisis on April 7, 1967 
(Segev 2005, p. 210). Eshkol, at Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin’s suggestion, approved a 
plan to plow part of the demilitarized zone in the North. The Syrians opened fire on the 
armored tractor and the IDF returned fire. The conflict escalated and by the end of the 
day, the Israelis had shot down six Syrian MiG jets. Egypt took no action in support of 
Syria, which drew condemnation from the Arab world since Egypt and Syria had a 
defense pact since 1966 (Oren 2002, p. 47). Egypt had repeatedly asked Syria to 
moderate the border violence and terminate its support of Fatah lest they find themselves 
in a war with Israel before they were ready. 
The Syrians disregarded the Egyptian request, and tensions escalated along the 
Israel-Syrian border. Between April 7 and Israeli Independence Day on May 15, Fatah 
carried out 14 attacks, and Syria regularly shelled Israeli settlements (Oren 2002, p. 48). 
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It was common for the Prime Minister and Military Chief of Staff to offer their thoughts 
about domestic and security policy in the month proceeding Independence Day. Chief of 
Staff Rabin was particularly bellicose in his statements, and the Israeli leadership tried to 
moderate them (Eban 1991, p. 353). Eshkol himself, however, suggested that the Syrians 
would be mistaken if they believed that there would be quiet on only one side of the 
border (Segev 2005, p. 215). Israeli statements, and possibly leaked military plans, began 
to turn some heads, particularly in Moscow (Oren 2002, p. 54). The Syrians had been 
concerned that Israel might attack for some time, but the Egyptians continued to ignore 
these warnings. The latest warnings of impending Israeli aggression were now coming 
from the Kremlin. The Soviets estimated that the Israelis had moved the bulk of their 
force, 14 divisions, up North (Oren 2002, p. 55). The Soviet ambassador made such 
charges, only to have them refuted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The Israelis offered to 
take the Soviet ambassador up north three times, but he chose against making the trip. 
The warning from Moscow alarmed Nasser, since Egypt could not afford to ignore 
further Israeli attacks against Syria without essentially destroying the defense pact 
(Draper 1968, p. 44). 
Evidence leading up to the 1967 War suggests, however, that Nasser wanted to 
avoid war with Israel in the near-term (Dawn 1968, p. 202; Khouri 1968, p. 245; 
Stephens 1971, p. 466; James 2006, p. 105). Nasser believed that Egypt was not prepared 
for war, and was concerned that Egypt would lose territory and pride in such an 
encounter (Mor 1991, p. 364). This sentiment was echoed during January 1967 meetings 
of United Arab Command (UAC). Not all of the Egyptian leadership wholly agreed with 
this position. The head of the armed forces, Field Marshal ‘Ali ‘Ali ‘Amer, had filed a 
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report with UAC indicating that while they lacked the resources to liberate Palestine he 
believed that Egyptian numerical superiority could make up for Israel’s technical 
superiority (Oren 2002, p. 20). ‘Amer advocated expelling the UN force in advance of 
any operation (James 2006, p. 105). Nasser also wanted the UN force out of the Sinai, but 
did not think it was worth pushing until the military was better prepared to deal with 
Israel. There were, therefore, different perspectives among the Egyptian leaders. Nasser 
wished to avoid war with Israel in the near future (Dawn 1968, p. 202; Stephens 1971, p. 
477), while others pressed for war sooner rather than later. 
Irrespective of Nasser’s desire to avoid war, he was unwilling to sit back if Israel 
was preparing a large-scale attack on Syria (Draper 1968, p. 44; Stephens 1971, p. 466). 
The Israelis had no immediate plans for such an attack, but the Soviet warnings and 
escalating tensions along the border worried Nasser. He took action on May 14, the day 
before Israeli Independence Day. The military called up a large force, marched them 
through Cairo and towards the Suez Canal. The mobilization was a public event intended 
to signal the Israelis that Egypt would not tolerate an attack on Syria. Many commanders 
and troops felt as though the mobilization was poorly organized, and many troops had no 
clear idea where they were going or why (Oren 2002, p. 65-66). The Egyptians mobilized 
according to a defensive plan called Operation Conqueror calling for troops to enter the 
Sinai and take position along three lines (James 2006, p. 105). While offensive operations 
were not ruled out, there were no orders issued for offensive action, and there was no 
discussion of offensive action until later in the crisis. This suggests that the Egyptians had 
no intention of attacking Israel with the initial mobilization, and he may have believed 
that the mobilization was unlikely to trigger war (Safran 1969, p. 268). Those close to 
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Nasser believed that he was trying to show support for Syria, bolster Egyptian pride, 
reaffirm his standing in the Arab world, and send a warning to Israel (Mor 1991, p. 365). 
Whether Nasser overestimated Egyptian military power and desired war (Nutting 1972, 
p. 410), or whether he was trying to bolster Egyptian position without firing a shot, the 
public and disorganized nature of mobilization would have hindered any attempt to 
successfully surprise Israel, making surprise a less attractive strategy at this point in the 
crisis. 
The Israelis noticed the mobilization almost immediately (Rabin 1979, p. 68). The 
IDF intelligence chief contacted the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister with details of 
the Egyptian troop movements through Cairo before the Independence Day festivities 
started on the evening of May 14. Neither Eshkol or Rabin were immediately concerned 
by the mobilization which may have been intended to counter Israel’s annual 
Independence Day military display (Rabin 1979, p. 69). As the day wore on, and the 
troops continued moving towards the Suez, some Israeli decision-makers grew 
increasingly concerned. Rabin instructed the Chief of Central Command, seated a few 
rows behind him at the Independence Day festivities, to return to headquarters and 
monitor the Egyptian advance (Rabin 1979, p. 68). Both Eshkol and Rabin, however, 
clung to the belief that this Egyptian reinforcement was similar to the previous stillborn 
1964 and 1966 mobilizations (Rabin 1979, p. 69; Segev 2005, p. 187). 
Sentiment changed between May 15 and 16. On May 16, IDF intelligence warned 
that the Egyptians could be planning for an attack. This aggressive belief, which was not 
far removed from the assessment of Egyptian intentions a few months earlier, was 
brought on by better intelligence about the Egyptian mobilization. The initial IDF 
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assessment on the mobilization showed that the Egyptians were moving a single division 
consisting of 15,000 troops, which seemed like a reinforcement of the 30,000 troops 







 Infantry divisions across the canal and the 6
th
 Armored division was on its way 
(Stephens 1971, 473; Oren 2002, p. 63). This brought the total mobilization to 45,000 
infantry and 100 T-54 and T-55 tanks, along with 150 armored personal carriers and a 
range of artillery weapons. The eventual mobilization was three times larger than the 
Israelis initially estimated (Eban 1991, p. 370). There were also mixed signals of 
Egyptian intent. Rabin noted that troops were digging in as though they were taking 
defensive positions, while broadcasts from Cairo took a particularly bellicose tone in 
calling for the immediate destruction of Israel (Eban 1992, p. 353). 
In addition to the revised estimates, May 16 was also the day that Egypt formally 
notified the UN that the emergency force was no longer welcome in the Sinai (James 
2006, p. 108). Nasser initially requested that the troops move into Gaza and remain in 
Sharm esh-Sheikh, the latter would keep Egypt from seizing the Straits of Tiran, but UN 
Secretary General U Thant believed that the force should retain its current disposition in 
the Sinai or leave altogether (Stephens 1971, p. 471; McNamara 2000, p. 623). Nasser 
requested that the force be withdrawn and the positions handed over to the Egyptian 
army. 
By May 17, Rabin and the IDF had changed their assessment of the mobilization 
(Rabin 1979, p. 70; Segev 2005, p. 228). The size of the mobilization, the UN 
withdrawal, and the bellicose language all suggested that Nasser was willing and possibly 
ready to go to war. Rabin requested the call-up of 18,000 reservists to begin defensive 
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preparations and Eshkol approved the order. Later that day, the Israelis faced another 
scare. For the first time, two Egyptian MiGs flew over the Dimona facility. The flight 
mission was limited to intelligence gathering, but it seemed to confirm earlier 
assessments that the Egyptians might target the facility (Oren 2002, p. 75). This did 
nothing to mollify Israeli fears, and it offered hawkish elements of the Israeli government 
the leverage needed to advocate immediate Israeli military action. The absence of 
military action would weaken Israel’s deterrent credibility, thereby encouraging Egypt to 
strike first (Rabin 1979, p. 181; Stein 1988, p. 2). Forgoing the first strike advantage, the 
army argued, would mean a longer war with higher casualties. Eban, however, was not 
convinced that Nasser wanted war (Eban 1992, p. 360). 
From May 17 to early June, the political situation deteriorated in Israel. Tom 
Segev (2005) provides voluminous detail about these intrigues, alliances, personalities, 
and compromises. Faced with possibility of an Egyptian attack, military leaders and 
government hawks assailed the leadership, and particularly Prime Minister Eshkol. The 
military argued that Israel needed to seize the initiative and waiting would severely 
weaken Israel’s fighting ability. Waiting, they argued in politically charged language, 
was tantamount to inviting a second Holocaust. The Prime Minister was sensitive to the 
accusation that he might inadvertently damage Israel’s defensive capabilities, but he also 
believed that U.S. support was vital for the long term survival of the country (Rabin 
1979, p. 78). Beating the Egyptians was important, but it was equally important to 
maintain Israel’s alliance with the Western powers. The U.S. had tacitly suggested that 
action against Syria would be acceptable, but had warned against going to war with 
Egypt (Rabin 1979, p. 77; Oren 2002, p. 77-78). If Israel was to go to war with Egypt, it 
226 
 
should only be in response to Egyptian attack or military provocation. Israel should not 
initiate such a war. Given the U.S. position, Eshkol believed it prudent to wait, despite 
the sentiments of the military leadership. General Staff meetings with the Prime Minister, 
who also served as Defense Minster, were often heated. In the later stages of the crisis, 
some military members hinted at the need to instill an emergency government or supplant 
civilian control (Segev 2005, pp. 292-294). The media and popular opinion echoed some 
of these concerns that Eshkol was not a suitable wartime president. 
The Egyptians raised the stakes once more on May 23 (James 2006, p. 113). They 
announced that the Straits of Tiran were closed to Israeli shipping, an act that Israel had 
long warned would be justification for war (Stephens 1971, p. 474; Eban 1992, p. 366). 
As the noose tightened around the Israeli leadership further, the military again stepped up 
its insistence that they attack immediately. They claimed that the Israel’s existence was 
now threatened for the first time in this crisis (Brecher 1980, p. 104). The U.S. responded 
to the announcement by asking for a 48-hour moratorium on any reaction (Rabin 1979, p. 
77). Eshkol decided to send Foreign Minister Abba Eban to the U.S. in order to explain 
the Israeli position and get a first hand impression of U.S. sentiments. He also figured 
that the mission might offer more time for diplomacy (Eban 1995, pp. 375-395). 
As soon as Eban arrived in Washington, he received a cable from Eshkol 
indicating the situation had grown even more dangerous. Between May 23 and 25, Israeli 
intelligence accurately reported that Egypt called up additional divisions. While the IDF 
had issued warnings before this latest mobilization, they now reasoned that the Egyptian 
force was large enough to mount an offensive and was outsized for defensive purposes 
(Rabin 1979, p. 85). Eban believed that Israeli intelligence and Cabinet members were 
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inflating the threat to Israel in order to pressure the U.S. into offering support (Eban 
1992, p. 285). He resented the strategy, but delivered the message. U.S. security officials 
also believed that Israel was inflating the threat as CIA estimates maintained that the 
Egyptians were not planning an imminent attack (Rabin 1979, p. 88; Robarge 2007). 
While U.S. leaders also acknowledged the gravity of the threat, they reiterated that Israel 
should not be the state to initiate hostilities. Privately, U.S. assessments indicated that 
Israeli forces would easily defeat the Egyptians, whether or not they seized the initiative 
and used surprise (Bowen 2003, p. 60; Robarge 2007). This estimate drove U.S. decision-
makers to urge patience and restraint. Eban also pushed for a response to the closing of 
the straits. He hoped that President Lyndon Johnson would agree to send the 6
th
 Fleet to 
open the straits if necessary, but failed to get a commitment (McNamara 2000, p. 631). 
Instead, the U.S. discussed the possibility of an international force to reopen the straits to 
Israeli ships. 
History shows that the Israeli intelligence assessments were better than those of 
the CIA (James 2006, p. 112). The initial Egyptian deployment in the Sinai, as 
disorganized as it was, followed the defensive plan called Operation Conqueror. The goal 
of Operation Conqueror was the remilitarization of the Sinai with rows of defensive 
fortifications capable of withstanding an IDF attack (Oren 2002, p. 65). As the crisis 
continued, Field Marshal ‘Amer began increasing the scope of military operations (Oren 
2002, p. 92-93). Newly proposed operations, first Operation Lion aimed at cutting off 
Eilat from Israel, then Operation Dawn aimed at seizing the entire Negev, were offensive. 
Some questioned why Nasser did not try to counter ‘Amer’s ambitions, particularly when 
the scope of the operations seemed far removed from realistic political goals (James 
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2006, p. 114). There are three explanations for Nasser’s behavior: the complicated 
relationship between ‘Amer and Nasser, Nasser’s conflicting feelings about war with 
Israel, and Nasser’s belief that he could terminate the operation after the planning stage 
(Oren 2002, p. 92). Irrespective of Nasser’s justification, Israeli intelligence accurately 
assessed Egypt’s changing military posture, and the offensive nature of the most recent 
mobilization. 
‘Amer reported that the preparations for Operation Dawn were complete on May 
25, however, Nasser was hesitant to approve the attack (Oren 2002, p. 94). He delayed 
attacking in order to gauge Soviet sentiment. Nasser was concerned that Egypt might 
draw the U.S. into a conflict if it attacked Israel, and wanted to avoid fighting both 
simultaneously. He dispatched a team to the Soviet Union to meet with officials (James 
2006, p. 114). The Soviets had initially supported the remilitarization of the Sinai and 
expulsion of the UN force, but they were surprised when Nasser closed the straits (Oren 
2002, p. 94-95). He had not warned the Soviets or consulted. Given the risks associated 
with closing the straits, the Soviets felt less apt to offer blanket support. While the 
Soviets encouraged the Egyptians to consolidate their gains and warned against further 
aggression, they also pledged that they could not stand by if the U.S. got involved. The 
Egyptian delegation, probably inaccurately, interpreted this as a sign of Soviet support 
and conveyed that message to Nasser (Oren 2002, p. 117). The Operation Dawn attack on 
Israel was planned for May 28, 4:00am. 
The evening of May 27, the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt Dmitri Pojidaev told 
Nasser that the Soviets had received a warning from the U.S. indicating that intelligence 
revealed preparations for an Egyptian attack on Israel (Oren 2002, p. 120). The 
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ambassador told Nasser that such a move would give the U.S. a free hand to intervene. 
Nasser reassured the ambassador that there were no such plans, then went to Supreme 
headquarters to meet with ‘Amer. Nasser immediately canceled the operation. ‘Amer 
protested, but Nasser countered that the attack would draw international support for Israel 
and warned that the U.S. might send in the 6
th
 Fleet (James 2006, p. 115). Later Nasser 
also cited security concerns. The U.S. warning to the Soviets had almost certainly come 
from the Israelis, meaning that the element of surprise was lost (Oren 2002). 
By the time Eban returned from Washington, debates had grown even more 
heated, but Eban recalls a tranquil sense (Eban 1992, p. 396). This was partially a result 
of the May 25 IDF intelligence assessment indicating that an Egyptian attack was 
imminent (Rabin 1979, p. 85). The IDF used the revised intelligence to pressure Eshkol 
and the civilian leadership for action (Weizman 1976, p. 213). On May 27 and 28, the 
Israeli Cabinet was deadlocked: nine ministers supported waiting and nine supported 
immediate war (Rabin 1979, p. 91). Eshkol, while still advocating restraint and concerned 
about U.S. support, was bolstered by Eban’s return. The Foreign Minister reported that 
the U.S. would first try to assemble an international force to reopen the straits, but would 
use the 6
th
 Fleet alone if necessary (Rabin 1979, p. 88). Eban, therefore, overstated the 
U.S. commitment, but in doing so, helped Eshkol maintain sufficient support among the 
civilian leadership (Segev 2005, p. 273). In light of U.S. support, the Cabinet 
unanimously agreed to wait two weeks in order to see if the straits would reopen (Rabin 
1979, p. 91). Military leadership, and opposition leaders such as Moshe Dayan, were 
furious with the Cabinet and privately accused them of betraying the country (Rabin 
1979, p. 92). While the media and military barrage against Eshkol escalated, the Prime 
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Minister believed that the waiting period he had secured would help maintain favorable 
relations with the U.S. even if Israel declared war later. 
For a brief time, the Israeli cabinet agreed that they should wait rather than act. 
This unanimous sentiment was undone by Nasser’s next escalatory step. Adding more 
fuel to the fire, Egypt and Jordan signed a defense pact on May 30. This dramatically 
changed the Israelis’ security situation (Stein and Tanter 1980, p. 107). For the first time 
since 1948, Israel was completely surrounded by hostile states (Stein and Tanter 1980, p. 
218). Any war with one state, would almost certainly involve war with all three (Eban 
1992, p. 401; Hammel 1992, p. 139). The IDF now had to worry about an attack from the 
West Bank along with attacks from Egypt in Sinai and Syria in the Golan. Once again, 
the IDF requested immediate action. 
While Israel was contemplating its response to the most recent provocation, 
events in Egypt seemed to have gone in a different direction. After canceling Operation 
Dawn, there is no evidence that Nasser reconsidered offensive action against Israel. 
Instead, Nasser stepped up diplomatic efforts to deescalate the crisis almost immediately 
after canceling Operation Dawn (Yost 1968, p. 315; Lacouture 1973, p. 305; Nutting 
1972 p. 408). As early as May 25, Nasser considered sending the Straits issue to the 
International Court of Justice at the Hague and entertained a US suggestion that Egypt 
allow Israeli oil shipments through the straits (Stephens 1971, p. 489). The U.S. also 
raised the possibility of using ships from the 6
th
 Fleet to escort Israeli ships not flying the 
Israeli flag, which Nasser also considered. The day after canceling Operation Dawn, U.S. 
representative Charles Yost arrived in Cairo on May 29 tasked with laying the 
groundwork for negotiations (Mor 1991, p. 369). The U.S. had hoped that Nasser might 
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be content with the remilitarization of the Sinai while agreeing to reopen the straits. 
Nasser told Yost that such an agreement was unacceptable since Egypt had merely 
overturned the injustices of the 1956 Sinai campaign (Stephens 1971, p. 479; James 2006, 
p. 116). Despite Nasser’s seemingly intractable position, he did agree to negotiations and 
planned to send his Vice President to Washington on June 5 (Stephens 1971, p. 488). 
Nasser’s actions during this period are somewhat challenging to explain. Scholars 
suggest that Nasser was of two minds (Stephens 1971, p. 487; Oren 2002, p. 158; James 
2006, p. 118): he believed that Israel was backed into a corner and would respond, but 
also believed that he might be able to achieve a bloodless victory by securing recent gains 
with negotiations. Nasser, however, was aware that the closed straits were unacceptable 
to Israel and represented a casus belli (Stephens 1971, p.479) It is, therefore, difficult to 
square the two positions in a satisfactory way. Nasser acted as though he was trying to 
consolidate the recent gains by diplomatic means (Khouri 1968, p. 247; Lacouture 1973, 
p. 305), despite the knowledge that Israel perceived those gains as unacceptable. Nasser 
publicly remarked that the crisis was subsiding and Egypt would not fire the first shot 
(Stephens 1971, p. 477). There was also sense that the crisis was subsiding in the military 
(Heikal 1968; James 2006, p. 116). In an interview with the British press on June 3, 
Nasser stated that the crisis was passing and war was unlikely (Stephens 1971, p. 480). 
There seems to be domestic tension in Egypt as ‘Amer continued to push the military 
towards a war that Nasser was not particularly eager to fight. Israel had a very different 
sense of Egyptian intentions and the threat that Egypt posed in early June. 
In Israel, political pressure mounted for Eshkol to take military action after the 
Egypt-Jordan pact was announced. The Prime Minister had held off requests to enlarge 
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the government or impose an emergency government, but the calls for a change in 
government could not be silenced any further. The military and government opposition 
parties demanded that Eshkol appoint a Defense Minster (Rabin 1979, p. 96; Segev 2005, 
p. 311). After much debate, and against his wishes, Eshkol appointed Moshe Dayan 
Minister of Defense on June 1. Dayan, a member of David Ben-Gurion’s Rafi party, 
strongly supported action, but also recognized the importance of maintaining good 
relations with the U.S. (Dayan 1979). 
The Cabinet members met with IDF leaders on June 2. The meeting began with 
briefings from the IDF intelligence chief General Aharon Yariv and Chief of Staff Rabin 
(Dayan 1976, p. 338). Yariv once again indicated that an Egyptian attack was imminent 
and stressed the need to act immediately (Dayan 1976, p. 343). His sense of concern was 
almost certainly heightened by the recently announced Egypt-Jordan defense pact, but he 
offered no new or current intelligence on military activity in support of his assessment 
(Segev 2005, p. 323). Rabin’s briefing was similar in character. Rabin also indicated that 
action was needed. He noted that Egyptian positions were defensive, but that could 
change. He went further to elucidate a general warning, but he did not elaborate on the 
source of the warning or provide detailed evidence about changes in military posture that 
might signal an attack (Segev 2005, pp. 324-25). The ensuing question and answer period 
was not timid. Cabinet members asked a series of pressing questions, but no one 
challenged the origins or justifications for the underlying threat (Segev 2005, pp. 324-
25). The Cabinet ministers, probably concerned about the recent Egypt-Jordan pact, 
ignored the vague origins of the threat and focused their questions on the logistics of an 
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Israeli attack, such as the time that northern settlements would be exposed to Syrian 
attack while the air force neutralized Egyptian targets. 
Concerns about the U.S. position were redressed on June 2. Meir Amit, head of 
the Mossad, had flown to Washington to meet with contacts. He reported that the U.S. 
was not willing to commit to reopening the straits (Segev 2005). The international force 
they hoped to assemble had not materialized, and they were not prepared to use the 6
th
 
Fleet unilaterally (Rabin 1979, p. 95; Eban 1992, p. 405). This meant that Israel had 
waited for nothing. There was a second important piece of information gained from 
Amit’s meetings with CIA and national security officials. Many insinuated that Israel had 
to defend itself however it saw fit, and it possible that they were concerned that U.S. 
demands on Israel had made the crisis more difficult to defuse (James 2006, p. 121). 
Eshkol interpreted this as tacit U.S. support for action. In light of recent developments, 
Eshkol and Eban decided that the time for restraint had come to an end (Kimche and 
Bawly 1968, p. 154; Eban 1992, p. 401). The majority of the Cabinet members were 
ready to go to war. On June 3, Eshkol approved Rabin’s plan to attack on June 5 (Rabin 
1979, p. 97). The attack caught Egypt by surprise, and the ensuing war was a tactical 
victory for the Israeli military (Hammel 1992, p. 171). 
Before applying the Bayesian and biased models to the relevant sub-cases as we 
did for the Cuban Missile Crisis above, we have to examine Israeli beliefs and the 
possibility of entrenchment. The results here are somewhat similar to the Cuban case 
whereby the Israelis seem to maintain a rational belief set throughout most of the crisis. 
At the very least, it would be difficult to argue that the Israeli decision-makers exhibited 
anchoring or entrenchment early on in any convincing way. The Israelis began with the 
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prior belief that Egypt had aggressive intentions toward Israel, which was reflected by the 
intelligence assessment in 1966-67. Concerns about Egyptian aggression were partially 
offset by the belief that Egypt was unlikely to initiate a full-scale war until after 1970, 
due to Israeli military superiority, but the Israelis were very much concerned that Nasser 
might take some aggressive action short of war. The Israelis were worried that Nasser 
might move to close the Straits of Tiran or bomb the Dimona nuclear facility. It seems 
reasonable to say that Israel felt threatened by Egypt and monitored their behavior closely 
prior to the May 14 mobilization. Israel had monitored and reacted to similar Egyptian 
mobilizations by calling up troops in the past. 
The May 14 mobilization was not, on it’s own, sufficient to bring a major change 
in Israeli beliefs about Egyptian intentions. At first, the Israelis believed that the marches 
through Cairo towards the Sinai were held in response to the annual Israeli Independence 
Day military festivities. They believed that Egyptian action warranted close monitoring 
but were not prepared to consider the mobilization a major threat. While they did 
maintain their prior beliefs about Egypt, which could be reflective of entrenchment, the 
analysis was based on the available evidence such as force disposition, the public nature 
of the action and the knowledge that there were still UN forces in the Sinai. They 
maintained this belief until May 16. 
There were two major events that caused concern for the Israelis on May 16. First, 
Israeli intelligence revised the initial troop estimate. The initial assessment suggested that 
the Egyptians were moving a single division toward the Sinai, which was not nearly 
enough to attack Israel. On May 16, that estimate had been accurately increased to four 
divisions. The larger force meant that Egypt could potentially contemplate offensive 
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action against Israel. The second event was Egypt’s demand that the UN troops withdraw 
from their positions in the Sinai. This meant there would be no buffer to stop the 
Egyptians from attacking. On May 16, two of the three assumptions that the Israelis had 
used to downplay the risk were off the table. Given this new information, it is not 
surprising that the Israelis believed that an attack could be imminent. Whether the 
magnitude of the belief change was rational or irrational is difficult to tell, but there is no 
evidence to suggest that the Israelis ignored this new information or exhibited entrenched 
beliefs at the outset of this period. 
The Israeli belief that formed on May 16 hardened throughout the crisis, but the 
information that reached Israeli decision-makers during much of that time makes it 
difficult to argue that this hardening was irrational in any way. After Nasser asked the 
UN to withdraw, the Egyptians sent MiG jets to fly over the Dimona facility on May 17. 
While the exercise was aimed at gathering intelligence it was a major cause for concern 
among the Israeli decision-makers. Nasser escalated the crisis further on May 23 by 
closing the straits, an action that the Israelis claimed justified war. Between May 23 and 
May 25, Israeli intelligence observed further military action and believed that more 
divisions were being called up. Though they did not know it at the time, these latest 
military moves were probably associated with ‘Amer’s planned surprise attack Operation 
Dawn. It is not clear whether Israeli intelligence observed the action and sounded the 
warning siren out of habit, or they actually had some intelligence on Operation Dawn. 
The Soviet warning to the Egyptians the night before the May 28 scheduled attack, by 
way of the U.S., probably indicates that the Israelis may have had some more specific 
information. There is no clear evidence to support this assertion in either direction. While 
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Nasser canceled the surprise Operation Dawn plan, he also chose to escalate the crisis 
one final time. On May 30, Egypt and Jordan signed the defense pact. Given this barrage 
of Egyptian activity, it seems perfectly reasonable that Israeli beliefs about Egyptians 
intentions hardened. 
There is some evidence that Israeli beliefs become entrenched in the last stage of 
the pre-war crisis from May 31-June 5. On June 1, Israeli leadership and the military felt 
the pressure of Nasser’s latest escalatory act, the Egypt-Jordan defense pact. In light of 
the fact that enemies with treaty obligations surrounded Israel on all three sides for the 
first time since 1948, it is not surprising that the IDF heightened their warning and 
decision-makers were receptive (Dayan 1976, p. 343). There were, however, no major 
troop movements in Jordan or Egypt after signing the pact on May 30. There were also 
more recent signals that Egypt was not planning an attack. The first sign was Nasser’s 
interviews with the foreign press, mentioned briefly above, where he stated that the crisis 
would end without war. This signal, however, could be viewed as cheap talk since there 
is little cost to making such statements, and a deception campaign associated with 
surprise attack might explicitly call for such a statement. The second sign was the 
disposition of the senior Egyptian military leadership prior to June 5. On the evening of 
June 4, the Chief of the Ground Forces Command General ‘Abd al-Mushi Kamil Murtagi 
was on vacation (Bar-Zohar 1970, p. 176), Field Marshal ‘Amer was at an all-night party 
in Cairo, Commander of the Air Force General Sidqi Mahmud was attending his 
daughter’s wedding, and subordinates were seen in Cairo playing tennis and partying 
(Churchill and Churchill 1976, p. 75). The Chief of the Air Force Major General ‘Abd al-
Hamid al-Dugheidi was dismayed that all of the commanders were away from their 
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While these first two signs classify as cheap talk, the last two are better classified 
as costly signals. The first of these costly signals was Egypt’s decision on June 2 to 
participate in diplomatic negotiations in Washington starting on June 5. While some 
diplomatic maneuvers are considered cheap talk, it is difficult to make such an argument 
in this case. Nasser’s biggest concern throughout the crisis was that each escalatory might 
trigger the U.S. to join with Israel and take action against Egypt. By agreeing to 
negotiations, Nasser had essentially tied his hands. Any surprise attack against Israel after 
he had explicitly committed to negotiations would almost certainly anger U.S. 
policymakers, all but ensuring that they would side with Israel against a deceitful Egypt. 
Anthony Nutting (1972) argues that the announcement of upcoming negotiations 
emboldened the Israelis to attack, lest their free hand be tied by U.S.-Egypt negotiations. 
There is no evidence to support this claim or that Israeli decision-makers even considered 
the upcoming negotiations announced on June 2. Consideration of U.S. diplomatic 
efforts, and how it might impact decision-making in Egypt, was noticeably absent from 
the accounts of the Cabinet meeting on June 2, as well as the memoirs of key Israeli 
decision-makers such as Eban (1992, pp. 402-409), Rabin (1979, pp. 96-99), and Dayan 
(1976, pp.338-349). The second costly signal was the disposition of Egyptian forces 
when the Israelis attacked on June 5. In light of the possibility that Egypt might avoid 
war with Israel, the High Command issued an order that no action should be taken that 
would provide Israel and excuse to attack (Bar-Zohar 1970, p. 176). The majority of 
                                                 
27
 Note that since most officers were only a few hours from their command posts, this could also be part of 
a deception campaign aimed at getting Israel to let its guard down. There is no credible information to 
suggest that this was the Egyptian intention. 
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Egyptian jets were lined up tip-to-tip in plain sight near the Egyptian airport, making 
them an easy target for the Israeli Air Force (Nutting 1972, p. 416; Hammel 1992, pp. 
168, 171). While the Egyptian army was hardening their defensive positions, they were 
doing so along forward lines meaning that a penetrating attack would leave the Sinai 
vulnerable (Oren 2002, p. 93). The poor state of Egyptian defense, and particularly their 
decision to gather the bulk of the Air Force in a single location, did not reflect a state 
ready for war. Taken together, the costly hand-tying diplomatic measures, and the poor 
logistical state of the army, both suggest that the Israelis may have irrationally 
overestimated the Egyptian threat after May 31. It is difficult to argue that their worries 
were wholly unjustified, but there were pieces of useful information that might have 
caused them to reevaluate the assessment that an Egyptian attack was imminent from 
May 31-June 5. 
There is an additional aspect that is worth noting towards the end of the pre-war 
crisis period. Israel had delayed offensive action earlier in the crisis precisely because 
they were worried about U.S. response. Eshkol believed that U.S. support of Israel was 
crucial, and the Cabinet chose to wait when it appeared as though the U.S. might act to 
open the straits (Rabin 1979, p. 91). Israel went forward with the attack only after the 
Cabinet was informed that there was no consensus for a multilateral force, the U.S. would 
not act unilaterally, and Amit reported that President Johnson did not explicitly warn 
Israel not to attack. The U.S. had a major impact on Israel throughout the crisis, but Israel 
never considered that Egypt might have the same concerns (Kam 2004, p. 12). Israel had 
specifically decided not to act when they were actively holding discussions with the U.S., 
239 
 
but assumed that these same constraints would not be sufficient to delay an Egyptian 
attack. 
It would be remiss, however, to assert that the Egypt did not contribute to the 
Israelis beliefs about their intentions and the possibility of war. Outside of the Middle 
East, Nasser had repeatedly maintained that Egypt would not fire the first shot and issued 
statements to that effect to the U.S., the Soviets and the UN (Stephens 1971, p. 480). The 
rhetoric aimed at Arabs within the Middle East had a very different tone, urging Arab 
unity and declaring that they would soon attack and destroy Israel (Cohen 1988, p. 10; 
Eban 1992, p. 353; James 2006, p. 117). By June 2 when Eban had changed his vote in 
favor of war, he believed that the rhetoric had far outpaced reasonable limits (Eban 1992, 
p. 395). This certainly contributed to the hardened belief that war was imminent, but it 
does not necessarily justify Israeli beliefs during this period given other available 
information. 
The Bayesian and biased model predictions are applied to the four sub-cases in 
Table 6.2. If the target, in this case Israel, starts with the belief that the sender is 
sufficiently threatening, then the models have divergent predictions. The theory usually 
predicts that one course of action is more likely than the other. It is important clarify the 
rationale for coding Israeli beliefs about Egypt as threatening. After all, Israel did not 
initially believe that the mobilization on May 14 was a sign of impending attack. Despite 
the belief that Egypt was not going to attack, Israel was deeply distrustful and suspicious 
of Egypt, which is evidenced by the 1966-67 intelligence assessment concluding that 
there was no serious possibility for improved diplomatic relations with Egypt and that 
relations would continue to be hostile. At the time of the assessment, Israeli decision-
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makers believed that Egypt might look to close the straits or bomb the Dimona nuclear 
facility even if they did not want to start a full-scale war. Israel might not have been 
concerned that the initial mobilization was the start of the war, but they were sufficiently 
suspicious to be monitoring Egyptian activity closely both before and after May 14. For 
these reasons, Israeli beliefs about Egypt are coded as threatening at the outset of the 
crisis. Israel might not have believed an attack was imminent prior to the crisis, but they 
certainly did not believe that the Egyptians were docile or had benign intentions toward 
them. 
The other important assumption to applying the biased model is that the sender, 
Egypt, believes that the target might be irrationally over-suspicious from entrenched 
beliefs. The target need not be entrenched, there only needs to be some probability. Given 
the historical animosity between the two countries, and Israel’s security situation, it is 
difficult to imagine that Nasser did not recognize the possibility that Israel might be 
acutely sensitive to any provocations. In a speech after the crisis, Nasser noted that he 
expected Israel to be acutely sensitive to any provocations (Mor 1991). Analysts should 
be cautious about this statement since this took place after the crisis, but it is difficult to 
imagine that Egypt did not recognize the possibility that Israel might harbor irrational 
over-suspicion. Combined with Israel’s prior belief that Egypt was threatening, this is the 
type of situation where the biased model predicts that public acts are more likely than 




Table 6.2: The 1967 War Model Comparison 












Prior to May 14:      
 Target's Belief   Aggressive; Full-scale 
War Unlikely; Closing 
Straits or Bombing 
Dimona Likely 
  
 Evidence of Entrenched Beliefs   No   
 Details of Entrenched Beliefs   1966-7 Assessment   
 Sender Concern About Target Beliefs   High   
Proposition 2 (p>p*):      
 Sender Use of Surprise
1 
Surprise or Violent 
Act Likely 
Public Act Likely Public Mobilization 0 1 
Proposition 3 (p>p*):      
 Target Response when Bayesian
2 
Mix Wait Wait; Monitor Closely 0 1 
 Target Response when Biased
2 
- Mix - - - 
 Continued…      
Note: The table shows mostly divergent predictions. The biased model appears to have better explanatory power. See the footnotes or text for details on coding 
explanations. 
1. If the Egyptians are perceived to be threatening, and they recognize the possibility that Israel might be irrationally over-suspicious, the biased model predicts 
that public challenges are more likely than the Bayesian model predicts. The Egyptians trigger the crisis publicly, meaning the biased model better captures 
Egyptian behavior. 
2. If the Egyptians are perceived to be threatening, the Bayesian model predicts the target adopts a mixed strategy, the biased model with the Bayesian type 
predicts the target waits, and the biased model with the biased type predicts a mixed strategy. Since Israel does not appear biased at this point in the crisis, the 
Bayesian model should be compared to the biased model with the Bayesian type. Since Israel does not take major action after the mobilization, waiting in the 




Table 6.2 (cont’d): The 1967 War Model Comparison 












The Initial Mobilization, May 14-15      
 Target's Belief   Aggressive; Full-scale 
War Unlikely; Closing 
Straits or Bombing 
Dimona Likely 
  
 Evidence of Entrenched Beliefs   No   
 Details of Entrenched Beliefs   Careful Monitoring   
 Sender Concern About Target Beliefs   High   
Proposition 2 (p>p*):      
 Sender Use of Surprise
3 
Surprise or Violent 
Act Likely 
Public Act Likely Request for UN 
Withdrawal 
0 1 
Proposition 3 (p>p*):      
 Target Response when Bayesian
4 
Mix Wait Wait; Monitor Closely 0 1 
 Target Response when Biased
4 
- Mix   - - 
 Continued…      
3. If the Egyptians are perceived to be threatening, and they recognize the possibility that Israel might be irrationally over-suspicious, the biased model predicts 
that public challenges are more likely than the Bayesian model predicts. The Egyptians publicly request removal of UN forces during this stage of the crisis, 
meaning the biased model better captures Egyptian behavior. 
4. If the Egyptians are perceived to be threatening, the Bayesian model predicts the target adopts a mixed strategy, the biased model with the Bayesian type 
predicts the target waits, and the biased model with the biased type predicts a mixed strategy. Since Israel does not appear biased at this point in the crisis, the 
Bayesian model should be compared to the biased model with the Bayesian type. Since Israel does not take major action after the request, waiting in the biased 




Table 6.2 (cont’d): The 1967 War Model Comparison 












Revised Troop Estimates, Closing the Straits, Surprise Plans, and Jordan May 16-30   
 Target's Belief   Aggressive; Attack 
Imminent 
  
 Evidence of Entrenched Beliefs   No   
 Details of Entrenched Beliefs   Shift in Belief of 
Attack 
  
 Sender Concern About Target Beliefs   High   
Proposition 2 (p>p*):      









Proposition 3 (p>p*):      
 Target Response when Bayesian
6 




 Target Response when Biased
6 
- Mix  - - 
5. During this stage, the Egyptians prepare for a surprise attack against Israel, deviating from their prior strategy. If the Egyptians are perceived to be threatening, and they 
recognize the possibility that Israel might be irrationally over-suspicious, the biased model predicts that public challenges are more likely than the Bayesian model predicts. The 
Bayesian model, predicting a higher probability of attempted surprise, better captures Egyptian behavior. 
6. If the Egyptians are perceived to be threatening, the Bayesian model predicts the target adopts a mixed strategy, the biased model with the Bayesian type 
predicts the target waits, and the biased model with the biased type predicts a mixed strategy. Since Israel does not appear biased at this point in the crisis, the 
Bayesian model should be compared to the biased model with the Bayesian type. Since Israel decides to wait for the U.S. and does not take major action despite 




Table 6.2 (cont’d): The 1967 War Model Comparison 












Mixed Messages, Diplomacy, and Easy Targets, May 31-June 5     
 Target's Belief   Aggressive; Attack 
Imminent 
  
 Evidence of Entrenched Beliefs   Yes   





 Sender Concern About Target Beliefs   High   
Proposition 2 (p>p*):      





Public Act Likely Public, Though 
Noisy, 
Acts to Deescalate 
0 1 
Proposition 3 (p>p*):      
 Target Response when Bayesian
8 
Mix Wait Attack 0 - 
 Target Response when Biased
8 
- Mix  - 0 
Total     1 6 
Statistical Analysis on 8 Observations      
 t-Statistic -2.376     
 P(T<=t): Two-Tail 0.049     
  t Critical Value: Two-Tail 2.365         
7. If the Egyptians are perceived to be threatening, and they recognize the possibility that Israel might be irrationally over-suspicious, the biased model predicts that public 
challenges are more likely than the Bayesian model predicts. The Egyptians make public attempts to deescalate the crisis after they abandon their surprise plan (Operation Dawn). 
The attempts to publicly deescalate the crisis means the biased model better captures Egyptian behavior. 
8. Neither model receives any points. The Bayesian model predicts a mixed strategy, while the biased model with the biased type (since the Israel is suffering 




In the period prior to May 14, the Israelis view Egypt as threatening, and while 
they believed Egypt will not initiate a full-scale war, they are concerned that Nasser 
might close the straits or attack Dimona. While there is a chance that Israel exhibited 
some bias when Egypt mobilized, there is no clear evidence to suggest they did. Egypt 
opted to trigger the crisis by publicly mobilizing their force and marching troops through 
Cairo towards the Sinai. Since the public act is more likely in the biased model than the 
Bayesian model, the biased model seems to better capture this challenge decision. The 
Bayesian model predicts that the target adopts a mixed strategy. The biased model 
predicts that a biased type selects the same mixed strategy as in the Bayesian model, but 
the Bayesian type always waits. Israel chose not to take immediate action given the 
Egyptian mobilization, so the biased model with the Bayesian type outperforms the 
Bayesian model. In each instance the biased model receives a score of 1 and the Bayesian 
model a score of 0. 
The model comparison results are very similar for the second sub-case for May 
14-15. Again, Israel views Egypt as threatening, and while they believe Egypt will not 
initiate a full-scale war, they are concerned that Nasser take the limited measures 
discussed. The Israelis carefully monitor the Egyptian mobilization, but there is no 
evidence that the initial mobilization altered the prior beliefs significantly since the 
intelligence estimate indicated only one division was moving. During this period, the 
Egyptians chose to escalate the crisis publicly by demanding the withdrawal of the UN 
troops, rather than directly initiating conflict with Israel. Since public challenges are more 
likely in the biased than the Bayesian model, the biased model performs better. Again, 
the Bayesian model and the biased model with the biased type predict that target will 
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adopt the same mixed strategy. The biased model with the Bayesian type predicts that 
target will always wait, which better describes Israel’s behavior during this time. In both 
instances the biased model receives a score of 1 and the Bayesian model a score of 0. 
The third stage of the crisis, May 16-30, differs from the first two. After the 
Egyptians demand the UN withdrawal, the Israelis recognize that the mobilization is 
larger than they initially estimated. Israeli intelligence begins to predict an attack is 
imminent. The Egyptian fly over of Dimona on May 17 and the closing of the straits on 
May 23 further aggravated Israeli fears, which grew more acute as Egypt planned the 
surprise attack Operation Dawn. The preparations were complete on May 25, but Nasser 
canceled the operation on May 28. Despite canceling the surprise, the Egyptians escalated 
the crisis once again by announcing the defense pact with Jordan. In this period, the 
Bayesian model of sender behavior outperforms the biased model. Surprise continues to 
be more likely in the Bayesian model than the biased model, and since Egypt spends 
much of the period preparing for the surprise, the Bayesian model is coded 1 and the 
biased model 0. The biased model of target behavior, however, continues to offer a closer 
explanation of behavior than the Bayesian model. Despite the revised assessment that an 
attack was imminent, Israel chose to wait, in large part hoping to get support from the 
U.S. The Bayesian model and biased model with the biased type both predict the same 
mixed strategy. The biased model with the Bayesian type predicts that the target waits 
rather than takes action. Since there is no clear evidence that Israel has entrenched 
beliefs, especially since they receive repeated aggressive signals and have more accurate 
intelligence about the Egyptian mobilization than the U.S., the biased model has better 
explanatory power. The biased model is coded 1 and the Bayesian model 0. 
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The final stage of the crisis is May 31-June 5. This is the one point in the crisis 
where the Israelis may exhibit entrenched beliefs given some of the diplomatic and 
military signals sent by the Egyptians. The Egyptians continue to adopt public measures 
of crisis behavior during this period. They continue their bellicose language, but also 
agree to negotiations with the U.S. Any plans for surprise attack seem to have been 
abandoned on May 28. Since public acts are more likely in the biased rather than the 
Bayesian model, the biased model is coded 1. Since Israel is coded as having some level 
of entrenched beliefs during this stage of the crisis, the two models predict the target 
adopts the same mixed strategy. Since both predict that the target mixes their strategy, 
and the probability with which both mix their strategy is the same, neither one 
outperforms the other or wholly captures the Israel’s behavior on June 5. Both models 
receive a score of 0. 
When we sum up the raw numbers in this case, the Bayesian model scores a one 
and the biased model scores a six. In this case, where the models often predict different 
results since the target views the sender as threatening, the biased model seems to have 
significantly outperformed the Bayesian model. The results are statically significant, 
meaning there is little chance that difference in score was due to random numerical error. 
Both the one- and two-tailed tests show that the difference is statistically significant. The 
likelihood the biased and Bayesian results are different is 95.1% on the two-tailed test. 
In this case, the biased model of decision-making faired very well relative to the 
Bayesian model. This suggests that the model has strong explanatory power in instances 
where the target is irrationally over-suspicious, or believes the sender is threatening, and 
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the sender knows that there is some probability that a target may be irrationally 
entrenched when faced with a crisis. 
 
Conclusions 
 The purpose of this case analysis was to evaluate the causal theory developed in 
the prior chapters. The cases in this chapter illustrate how entrenched beliefs can impact 
the behavior of the sender and target when triggering and responding in crisis situations. 
The cases were selected, in part, because there was variation in the dependent variables, 
specifically the crisis triggers, the target’s sense of surprise and the target’s reaction. 
Each case examined the relevant deductive propositions and explicitly compared the 
expected results of the biased model against a standard Bayesian prediction. A summary 
of these results, reordered by proposition, is in Table 6.3. 
The summary table below shows that the biased and Bayesian models performed 
equally well when their predictions converge in proposition 1. In instances where the 
actors should behave the same, irrespective of the potential biases, there is no 
differentiation between the two models. These convergent results seem to get support 
from the case history. For most of the observations in the table, propositions 2 and 3, the 
two models predict marginal or completely different outcomes. In both instances, the 
biased model appears to outperform the Bayesian rival. 
For proposition 2, the Bayesian receives an aggregate score of two, scoring one 
point in each of the two cases. It is important to note, however, that the two models 
predict convergence in Cuba from October 16-22. Both models offer identical 
deterministic outcomes, which closely track the actual case history. The other Bayesian 
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point comes from the 1967 War during the period that Egypt prepares for the surprise 
attack Operation Dawn, which Nasser eventually cancels since the Israelis and the U.S. 
get wind of the proposed surprise. The raw tally indicates that the biased model 
outperforms the Bayesian with a score of five to two. 
 
Table 6.3: Summary of Model Tests 
    Bayesian Score Biased Score 
Proposition 1: Identical Pure Strategies   
 Cuba: Prior to October 16   
 Sender Use of Surprise 1 1 
  Target Response 1 1 
Total  2 2 
    
Porposition 2: Senders Use of Surprise   
 Cuba: October 16-22 1 1 
 Cuba: Post October 22 0 1 
 1967: Prior to May 14 0 1 
 1967: May 14-15 0 1 
 1967: May 16-30 1 0 
  1967: May 31-June 5 0 1 
Total  2 5 
    
Proposition 3: Target Response   
 Cuba: October 16-22 0 1 
 Cuba: Post October 22 0 0 
 1967: Prior to May 14 0 1 
 1967: May 14-15 0 1 
 1967: May 16-30 0 1 
  1967: May 31-June 5 0 0 
Total   0 4 
 
The results are similar for proposition 3. The biased model scores four points, and 
the Bayesian model scores zero. One of the problems evaluating this proposition is that 
the Bayesian model, and the biased model with a biased target type, predict identical 
mixed target strategies, making it difficult to argue that one model performs better than 
the other. The differentiating characteristic is that the target in the biased model would 
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only use the mixed strategy, and therefore act, when they had entrenched beliefs. If the 
target were the Bayesian type they would wait. Therefore, the Bayesian model predicts 
that a Bayesian would act probabilistically, whereas the biased model predicts that only a 
biased target would act probabilistically. This is an important difference, but one that 
does not really show up in the model scoring. In aggregate, the biased model outperforms 
the Bayesian model once again. 
The final interesting aspect in the chapter was the approach to examining 
entrenched beliefs. Earlier in the text, and above in this chapter, we discussed the 
difficulty of establishing the existence of psychological biases. Simply claiming that bias 
exists is unconvincing, and the burden of proof should be on the one arguing that actors 
were biased in some way. We argued that one way to deal with entrenched beliefs was to 
trace the process over time, since entrenchment is explicitly about ignoring newer 
information relative to older beliefs or information. In strategic contexts, this is not 
always straightforward since new information may be supplied for deceptive purposes or 
may be cheap talk. It is also possible that new information is consistent with prior beliefs, 
thereby strengthening or reinforcing the Bayesian prior. This complicates the analysis 
significantly. In both case studies, however, there appears to have been new evidence that 
should have warranted a reexamining of prior assumptions at the very least, even if it did 









Conclusions, Qualifications and Implications 
 
 Two general goals were outlined in the beginning of this project. The first was to 
improve our understanding of the relationship between foreign policy decision-making 
and psychological bias. The project examined these issues by formalizing some 
commonly addressed features in a novel and rigorous, developing a mathematical 
definition of a specific type of bias called anchoring bias or deeply entrenched beliefs
28
 
and integrating anchoring bias into a competitive context. When people anchor on their 
prior beliefs they irrationally discount new information relative to their preexisting 
beliefs. The mathematical formula asserted that biased actors anchor, or irrationally 
overweigh their prior beliefs, relative to perfect rational Bayesian actors. The 
mathematical formula that captured anchoring bias was sufficiently general that it could 
be used to represent entrenched beliefs for any one possible prior belief that an actor 
might have at the outset of an interaction. This general, formalized approach to 
entrenched beliefs was then incorporated into a deductive model with two players where 
one of them might have entrenched beliefs and the other player knew that their opponent 
might be biased. This rigorous approach helped to develop deductive expectations about 
the behavior of rational and biased actors,
29
 and a comparison yielded some 
                                                 
28
 Note that when one overweighs or over-relies on their prior beliefs, they are exhibiting anchoring bias. 
29
 Where biased actors are those with deeply entrenched beliefs. 
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counterintuitive propositions underappreciated in work on psychological bias in foreign-
policy decision-making. 
 The second goal was developing a more robust theory of surprise
30
 in 
international politics, and specifically the relationship between surprise and psychological 
bias. The project developed a series of deductive models for surprise that began with a 
simple form of imperfect information whereby a target was unsure if their opponent was 
preparing for a surprise attack. Incomplete information, where the target does not know 
about their opponent’s preferences over outcomes, was then added to the basic model of 
surprise. Then the project compared a model of surprise with a perfectly Bayesian 
rational target to a model with a potentially biased target. This exercise helped to clarify 
the relationship between surprise and entrenched beliefs, providing set of propositions 
that were empirically examined later in the project quantitatively and qualitatively. Both 
empirical approaches showed that the model with a potentially biased actor appears to 
have strong explanatory power relative to a model with perfectly rational actors. 
 The primary conclusions stated and examined below were derived using a series 
of formal models, which were broadly outlined in the two paragraphs above. While some 
of the limitations of the models will be discussed in greater detail, it is important to state 
some of the explicit assumptions needed to derive the primary results. The series of 
games all involve two players with divergent preferences acting in a sequential fashion. 
The sequential movement is often referred to as an extensive form game. The games, as 
is common in extensive form games, are one-shot plays where there is no repeated 
interaction after the game concludes. All of the models address surprise and take a 
                                                 
30
 Surprise is an outcome in the model that results when a sender challenges privately (attempts surprise), 
and the target chooses to wait rather than take defensive action. 
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common structural form. As discussed above, the modeling section begins with a basic 
model of surprise driven by imperfect information. Throughout the project, surprise is 
treated as a strategic outcome rather than a reaction to unexpected events. An extension 
of the model then adds incomplete information so that the actors’ beliefs influence 
equilibrium outcomes. Once beliefs are incorporated, then the belief bias, anchoring, can 
be examined. 
 In the rest of this chapter, we examine the theoretical and empirical conclusions, 
discuss some of the limitations of the project, and then discuss some of the policy 
implications arising from this analysis. 
 
Conclusions 
Bias in Decision- Versus Game-Theoretic Settings 
 Work in foreign policy, surprise and intelligence often implies, or argues outright, 
that psychological biases increase the likelihood of suffering policy failures. This 
argument is found in the literature focusing on psychological biases as the cause of 
analytical error (Heuer 1999), poor policy outcomes (Levy 1984; Snyder 1984; Jervis 
1976), or surprise (Betts 1978; Kam 1988). Psychological biases and wishful thinking are 
supposed to blind decision-makers when crafting policy, making it more likely that the 
policy is ill suited to the current environment. This extends into intelligence literature 
where psychological biases make analysts and policymakers misinterpret signals and 
miss cues about changing conditions or impending attacks (Betts 1978; Levite 1987; Kam 
1988). In short, the conventional tenet about psychology in foreign policy dictates that 
biases contribute to poor policy outcomes. 
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 There are, however, a few important deviations from these arguments. The most 
notable is Thomas Schelling’s (1960) work on the rationality of irrationality, which was 
addressed in some detail in the introductory chapter. Schelling argued that actors may 
have incentives to appear irrational, or more accurately act in apparently irrational ways, 
in order to constrict their opponent’s behavior. In some ways, this project actually 
provides a truer deductive proof for the “rationality of irrationality” since Schelling’s 
actor remained instrumentally rational throughout the game.
31
 Schelling argued that 
actors who pre-committed themselves to a certain action, particularly one that appeared 
irrational, could derive benefits by making their opponents adopt conciliatory strategies if 
the commitment were credible. Schelling’s argument, however, does not explicitly 
incorporate an irrational actor. Schelling showed that actors might benefit by committing 
themselves before a game began, and offered logical proofs to show that seemingly 
irrational commitments could be credible under certain conditions. Schelling advocated 
two strategies discussed in the introduction, burning bridges and randomization. Both 
allow actors to make credible commitments when commitment would be otherwise 
irrational and unsustainable. The next section examines ways that this project extends 
Schelling’s work. 
 Schelling is not the only scholar to note that foreign policy decision-makers and 
analysts may benefit from psychological biases. Writing about intelligence, Heuer (1981) 
argues that biases may make actors impervious to attempted deception. This reduces the 
incentive to use deception and reduces the likelihood that it is effective when used. The 
                                                 
31
 This is discussed by Zagare and Kilgour (2000) who define instrumental rationality as an economist’s 
definition of rationality dictating that actors can compare any two possible outcomes to determine a relative 
preference and that the preference ordering be transitive (i.e. if an actor prefers option a to b and option b to 
c, they cannot prefer option c to a). 
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common theme linking Schelling’s and Heuer’s argument is the presence of a strategic or 
game-theoretic environment rather than a decision-theoretic environment. Decision 
theory focuses on the optimality of a single actor’s decision based upon factors such as 
preferences and the probability over outcomes. Some of the work on bias in foreign 
policy implicitly takes a decision-theoretic perspective whereby a unitary actor, or 
bureaucratic group, evaluate the available options in an attempt to adopt the optimal 
policy. In this context, psychological biases may distort probability assessments leading 
the decision-makers to adopt a sub-optimal policy outcome by mistake. This decision-
theoretic context, however, ignores the strategic contexts of international politics 
whereby actors usually condition their polices on the behaviors, preferences or beliefs of 
other actors. 
 While biases may distort probability assessments and lead to sub-optimal policies 
in decision-theoretic contexts, an assumption used when formalizing entrenched beliefs 
here, it does not necessarily mean that these same biases are sub-optimal in strategic 
contexts where outcomes are contingent on the behavior of others. The tendency to think 
about psychological bias in decision-theoretic contexts assumes away a vital competitive 
or interactive aspect in international politics and produces a hole in our understanding of 
foreign policy decision-making. Just as Schelling and Heuer Jr. rely on strategic contexts, 
this project provides a deductive proof that shows how bias may have some unexpected 
effects in strategic contexts under certain conditions. We turn to those unexpected effects 





Some Counterintuitive Effects of Bias 
 In the deductive game-theoretic models developed here, anchoring bias is neutral 
when it results in irrational under-suspicion
32
 and beneficial when it results in irrational 
over-suspicion.
33
 This is a very different result from the conventional tenet based on 
decision-theoretic logic arguing that biases contribute to poor policies or surprise. The 
game-theoretic conclusions substantively differ from the conventional decision-theoretic 
argument, because the former explicitly takes the opponent’s optimal strategy into 
account whereas the latter does not. An actor potentially suffering from entrenched 
beliefs may find they better off than a perfectly rational actor, if their opponent knows 
that the actor might be biased. All the opponent needs to know is that there is a 
probability that the actor has entrenched beliefs, they do not need to know whether the 
actor is biased or not. The possibility that the actor has entrenched beliefs may be 
sufficient to alter the opponent’s optimal strategy under certain conditions. The results 
and necessary conditions are briefly repeated below, we continue to use the convention of 
calling the potentially biased player the “actor” and the other player the “opponent.” 
 If the opponent has no prior knowledge about the actor’s biases, meaning they 
believe the actor is always rational, the actor’s bias has no impact on the equilibrium 
results. Since the opponent adopts a strategy that makes the actor mathematically 
indifferent between their choices, it does not matter whether the actor’s bias leads to 
inaccurate assessments or poor decision-making. The expected payoff for the biased actor 
does not change since their opponent’s rationally optimal strategy cancels out the effect 
                                                 
32
 Irrational under-suspicion occurs when an actor has a prior belief that their opponent is non-threatening 
and anchors on that belief. 
33
 Irrational over-suspicion occurs when an actor has a prior belief that their opponent is threatening and 
anchors on that belief. 
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of bias. In a game-theoretic construct, bias only matters when an opponent has some prior 
knowledge about an actor’s anchoring biases or potential anchoring biases. 
 When an opponent knows that the actor may anchor on prior beliefs, the opponent 
may have incentive to change their strategy. The opponent does not change their strategy 
when the actor believes that their opponent is non-threatening.
34
 An actor with 
entrenched beliefs and the initial belief that their opponent is non-threatening could be 
irrationally under-suspicious. One might imagine that the initiating opponent might be 
able to take advantage of that under-suspicion, but the deductive logic shows that the 
opponent already exploits the actor’s belief that the opponent is non-threatening by 
attempting surprise as much as possible. They are unable to exploit the irrational under-
suspicion any further. In other words, the opponent is already taking advantage of every 
opportunity to exploit the actor, and there is nothing more they can do even if the target 
has entrenched beliefs that would result in under-suspicion. In this instance, the biased 
actor is no better or worse off than if they were perfectly rational. Bias is neutral or 
irrelevant in its affect on the target’s success. 
 When entrenched beliefs lead an actor to be irrationally over-suspicious, which is 
to say they start with the prior belief that the opponent is threatening, the actor derives a 
benefit from their bias. An opponent aware that an actor may be irrationally over-
suspicious is best off changing their strategy, adopting a less provocative plan. In this 
instance, a target that is irrationally over-suspicious is more likely to take defensive 
action, thereby undermining the opponent’s strategy. The opponent’s best response is to 
act conservatively as long as they know that there is a chance that the actor is biased. In 
                                                 
34
 Note that non-threatening is label used to describe a situation where the prior belief that the opponent is 
aggressive is below the endogenously determined critical value (p<p*). 
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the models developed above, the opponent, or sender, attempts surprise less often when 
the actor may be biased in order to ensure that the actor does not thwart too many 
surprises. The net effect is that the actor’s bias is often beneficial under these conditions. 
This project reaches some of the same conclusions that Schelling did, but it also 
deviates from and extends it in a few important ways: 1) Schelling’s actor feigned 
irrationality for rational purposes, but actors with over-suspicion from naturally occurring 
anchoring bias can derive similar strategic benefits if an opponent recognizes the 
possibility of bias; 2) while Schelling showed that seemingly irrational commitments 
could be made credible by randomization or bridge burning, this project shows that the 
mere possibility of irrational over-suspicion is sufficient to capitalize on the benefits 
irrationality; 3) when there is a possibility that actors are actually irrational, there may be 
limits to the benefit of irrationality (which are erased when the probability of anchoring 
gets too high); 4) irrational under-suspicion does not have any meaningful impact on the 
target’s utility or likelihood of being of being surprised; and 5) Schelling talked about 
deriving rational benefits from feigning irrationality whereas the analysis here showed 
that rational types
35
 may achieve slightly higher utility than irrational types, but irrational 
types were less likely to suffer surprise. 
 Since decision-theoretic approaches to foreign policy do not consider how one 
actor’s biases impact the behavior of others, it is not surprising that the conclusions from 
decision-theoretic and game-theoretic contexts differ. This project clearly echoes some of 
the key sentiments that Schelling made, but also offers some additional insights. Some of 
these are derived from the extension of irrationality to the topic of surprise. Given that the 
                                                 
35
 In the model developed in chapter 4, the actor could be a rational type or a biased type. 
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models specifically address the issue of surprise, it makes sense to reexamine the 
relationship between surprise and psychological bias next. 
 
Surprise, Necessary Conditions and Bias 
  Scholars have come up with an array of reasons to explain why states suffer 
intelligence failures or get surprised. Some of the most commonly cited reasons include 
noisy environments that make it difficult to decipher real information from noise 
(Wohlstetter 1962), explicit attempts to deceive (Whaley 1969), organizational 
impediments (Betts 1978; George 1980) and psychological impediments (Betts 1978; 
George 1980; Heuer 1999). The earliest of these commonly cited explanations 
(Wohlstetter 1962) explicitly considered surprise and intelligence failure in game-
theoretic or strategic contexts. These later explanations focus more decision-theoretic 
environments, or at least environments where the strategic constraints come from internal 
bureaucratic sources rather than external sources. 
 The models of strategic surprise developed here show that psychological or 
organizational impediments are not necessary conditions for surprise or intelligence 
failure. There were three models of surprise developed above. The basic model 
incorporated a simple form of imperfect information where a target did not know if an 
initiator was preparing for surprise or not. Under certain preference assumptions, 
specifically when the initiators payoff for mixing between attempted surprise and 
maintaining the status quo is preferable to the payoff for a public standoff, surprise is 
expected some of the time. In a perfectly rational setting, the initiator mixes between 
attempting surprise and preserving the status quo, which we call adopting the ambiguous 
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strategy. Since the target cannot differentiate the two actions in the ambiguous strategy, 
the target responds by mixing acting and waiting. In the rational model with a simple 
information constraint, the status quo, false alarms, thwarted surprises, and successful 
surprises are all possible outcomes. Bias is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain 
surprise or intelligence failure. 
 This same result is true when an additional information constraint, incomplete 
information about the initiators preferences over outcomes, is added to the model. Once 
again, surprise is a probabilistic outcome of a perfectly rational interaction. When a target 
believes that an initiator is non-threatening, the model predicts status quo and successful 
surprise as possible outcomes. If the target initially believes that the initiator is 
threatening, they will mix between waiting and acting, while the initiator may use public 
challenges, attempted surprise or preserve the status quo. Once again, psychological bias 
or organizational impediments are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain surprise. 
 In the deductive analysis, irrational under-suspicion, the entrenched belief that a 
target is non-threatening, did not increase the likelihood of being surprised, because the 
initiator attempted surprise as much as possible without prompting the target actor to take 
action. This required playing a strategy that made a Bayesian actor indifferent, and did 
not allow the initiator to capitalize on the actor’s irrational under-suspicion. A rational 
actor that believes an opponent is non-threatening will not take defensive action since 
they do not believe it is necessary, and the opponent specifically acts to cultivate this 




Irrational over-suspicion decreased the likelihood that targets would be surprised, 
and since the initiator had less incentive to attempt surprise, they adopted a less 
provocative strategy. Ironically, when initiators adopt less provocative strategies, it is 
perfectly rational actors that are more likely to get surprised and biased types that are 
more likely to adopt an optimal response. In the next section we discuss the performance 
of the biased model and the associated propositions in the two empirical tests. 
 
Empirics: Comparing The Bayesian and Biased Models 
 The empirical analyses suggest that the model incorporating entrenched beliefs 
may capture state behavior reasonably well. Empirical examination of unobservable 
phenomena like psychological biases, particularly in the uncontrolled context of 
international crises, can be difficult to say the least. Both the quantitative and qualitative 
tests were constructed carefully in order to isolate relevant variables and case events. 
 The quantitative study relied on the International Crisis Behavior dataset, using 
existing dataset variables to test a proposition dealing with the initiator’s strategy. 
Proposition 2 in chapter 4 stated that initiators are less likely to attempt deception against 
potentially entrenched targets than they were against Bayesian targets. The quantitative 
analysis relied on instrumental variables, variables that could be representative of the 
primary variables, to test the proposition about the initiator’s behavior. A variable for 
protracted rivalry was used to identify the possible presence of irrationally entrenched 
beliefs, relying on the argument others have made that biases like entrenchment are 
common in these rivalries (Bar-Tal 2000; Thies 2001; Mor 2004; Hassner 2007). Rivals 
also have more experience with one another in conflict situations, and it is important to 
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control for prior experience if one is to separate irrational entrenchment from Bayesian 
rational entrenchment. A set of rational belief variables were designed to capture the past 
experience of crisis actors and were incorporated in the quantitative analysis. The 
dependant variable for the study was the initiators decision to use violence to trigger the 
crisis. A logit analysis showed that initiators were more likely to use violence to trigger 
crises as the probability that prior crises turned violent increased. Consistent with the 
predictions of the biased model, when controlling the violence in past crises, initiators 
were less likely to trigger a crisis violently against protracted rivals. While the use of 
instrumental variables makes this an imperfect test, it does provide illustrative support for 
the proposition. 
 The results of qualitative analysis also offered support for the biased model of 
surprise developed here. There are two case studies: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and 
the Arab-Israeli War in 1967. In the Cuban Missile Crisis case, the Soviet Union is 
treated as the initiator and the U.S. is a target that starts with belief that the Soviet aid to 
Cuba is non-threatening. Over the course of the crisis, U.S. decision-makers come to 
believe that Soviet intentions in Cuba are aggressive and eventually wind up anchoring 
on beliefs about nuclear weapons in Cuba and Soviet intentions. In the Arab-Israeli War 
case, Egypt is treated as the initiator and Israel as the target. Israel starts the crisis with 
the belief that Egypt harbors aggressive intentions toward Israel, and may even carry out 
a limited offensive move, but they do not believe a full attack is likely. As they gather 
information about Egyptian plans, they come to accurately believe that an attack is 
imminent, but do not take immediate action in the hopes that the U.S. might defuse the 
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crisis. In the later stages of the crisis, Israel anchors on the belief that an Egyptian attack 
is imminent despite some signals that warranted reconsideration of this belief. 
The two cases are used to explicitly compare the predictions from the standard 
Bayesian model and the model where the target is potentially biased. The qualitative 
analysis broke the two cases into decision-making sub-cases, and identified the 
predictions each model offered for each sub-case. The events and pertinent beliefs in each 
crisis phase or sub-case were coded and explained. Then the predicted results from the 
two models were compared against the sub-case events. Both the Bayesian and 
potentially biased models performed well in the instances where the results of the models 
converge, specifically instances where the target believed the initiator was non-
threatening. In all three pertinent sub-case observations, both models offer deterministic 
predictions that are correct. When the predictions of the models diverge, the potentially 
biased model outperformed the Bayesian model. Summary results in the conclusion of 
chapter 6 showed how the two models faired based on the major deductive propositions. 
A tally of proposition 2, focusing on the sender’s reduced likelihood of using surprise 
given a potentially biased target, showed that the potentially biased model scored five of 
a possible six and the Bayesian model scored two. The results for proposition 3, the 
target’s response and crisis outcome, favored the potentially biased model four to zero 
out of six possible observations. 
 In sum, the empirical analyses in this project do not provide confirmatory 
evidence for the logically deduced propositions, but they do suggest that the major 
deductive propositions may be empirically valid. This section started by discussing the 
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difficulty associated with empirically testing the deductive propositions, and below we 
will discuss some of the empirical and theoretical limitations associated with the project.  
 
Qualifications 
 Before discussing some of the policy implications of this work, it is important to 
confront some of the theoretical and empirical limitations of this research. In this section, 
we briefly discuss the major qualifications to the conclusions presented above. 
 
Difficulty of Studying Biases 
 One recurrent theme in both the theoretical and empirical sections was the 
difficulty associated with studying psychological bias in uncontrolled settings like 
international crises. Most psychological studies of bias take place in controlled or 
laboratory setting such that subjects can be manipulated in specific ways to test the 
impact of different treatments (Tetlock 1998a). This is impossible in historical study, and 
scholars are only left with actions, events, correspondences and the like to assess an 
actor’s rationality at the time they made a decision. This means that explanations of 
events that rely on psychological biases may appear compelling, but alternative 
explanations that do not rely on biases may be easier to prove. 
This adds an additional constraint, one that is warranted, on those advocating 
psychology-based explanations of behavior. Scholars cannot just declare that actors 
suffered from some sort of psychological bias, they must painstakingly illustrate, since 
proof is almost impossible, the existence and impact of the bias under consideration. 
Simply observing a situation where actors did not use all of the information available, 
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give it equal weight, or rely on a new piece of information that turns to be accurate, is not 
sufficient to claim that actors exhibited a psychological bias like anchoring bias. Chapter 
3 explicitly compared perfect Bayesian belief updating to irrational belief anchoring. A 
perfectly rational Bayesian actor may discount or marginalize new information if their 
prior belief is sufficiently strong. The marginalizing or discounting of new information in 
this context is perfectly rational. Studies that focus on psychological bias have to be 
careful to compare rational information discounting or limited updating to the irrational 
activity they claim to observe. This was a key aspect of the empirical analysis in chapter 
6, which explicitly compared the Bayesian and biased models in light of the case 
information. 
Related to the unobservable nature of psychological biases, is the number of 
different biases that may weigh on any given actor during a set of events.  Since 
psychological biases are difficult to observe, it is also difficult to tell which of the many 
biases an actor is suffering from. We turn to this qualification next. 
 
Anchoring as the Primary Bias 
 Psychologists have identified many different types of cognitive and decision-
making biases. Anchoring bias or entrenched beliefs, the primary focus of this paper, is 
only one of many different biases that might impact an individual or group. This means 
that decision-making may be impacted by many different biases at once. An individual 
may anchor on prior beliefs, suffer from ambiguity aversion whereby they irrationally 
overvalue guaranteed outcomes to lotteries, and may also suffer from a gambler’s fallacy 
whereby they erroneously believe that random events are somehow correlated, all at the 
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same time. Anchoring may or may not be the strongest bias in any given situation. The 
number of biases and the combinations of biases make it very difficult to talk about bias 
or psychology in foreign policy decision-making without offering numerous 
qualifications. Further, there are group decision-making biases, like groupthink where all 
the members of a group gravitate towards the same belief. 
 While it is important to recognize that there are multiple possible biases that 
might be at work in a given situation, it would be intractable and unreasonable to 
incorporate every type of bias in a deductive model. Aside from making the model 
difficult to solve, the relative importance of different biases might well alter deductive 
results in nontrivial ways, making empirical verification reliant on being able to calculate 
the strength of every bias relevant in a decision. The exercise of incorporating all of these 
factors into a formal model is unlikely to yield robust meaningful results that are testable. 
It is possible that biases have different effects and that a model incorporating ambiguity 
aversion or gamblers fallacy might yield different results. This project focused on 
anchoring bias since it is commonly employed in foreign policy and intelligence literature 
(Jervis 1976; Betts 1978; Betts 1982; George 1980; Lebow 1981; Levy 1984; Snyder 
1984; Kam 1988; Reiter 1996; Heuer 1999; Bar-Tal 2000) particularly when isolating 
reasons for failed policy and surprise. Another approach might call for modeling the 
effect of individual biases in the group settings common in foreign policy decision-
making. This, however, would require softening the unitary actor assumption used 





Unitary Actor Assumptions 
 This project followed in the footsteps of the initial realists and rational choice 
scholars that treated the state as a unitary or unified actor (Schelling 1960; Waltz 1979). 
Each player in the formal models developed here operates as a unitary actor, thereby 
assuming away organizational and bureaucratic dynamics that actually exist in reality 
(Allison 1971, 1999). The reason why many rational choice scholars of international 
relations have relied on unitary actor assumptions is that it simplifies the analysis of 
interstate interaction. Even more recent rational choice work that integrates domestic 
politics into models of international interaction (Fearon 1994; Milner 1997) does so in 
very stylized or simplistic ways. This work on the interaction between domestic and 
international politics has led to some important conclusions, but it often involves 
simplifying complex processes to make the analysis tractable. 
 One disjoint that arises from the use of the unitary actor assumption is that the 
entire state is treated like an individual suffering from anchoring bias, which is usually 
considered an individual rather than a group bias. This project, therefore, assumed that a 
group, in this case the state, suffered from an individual anchoring bias on a given issue. 
While this disjoint is real and worth mentioning, many others have applied individual 
psychological biases to state behavior (Jervis 1976; Betts 1978; Lebow 1981; Levy 1984; 
Snyder 1984; Reiter 1996). This carries over into surprise, whereby individuals within the 
state may experience or react to surprise differently. The use of surprise for this study is 





Application to Surprise 
 The project addressed foreign policy decision-making, but the formal models 
specifically addressed surprise, or more accurately crisis situations where one actor could 
attempt surprise against another. Surprise is an anomalous concept in the context of 
international politics and could refer to emotional reactions, but here it refers to an 
outcome. Surprise outcomes occur when targets do not take proper defensive or 
preemptive action to avoid or thwart the surprise. Like psychological bias, surprise can be 
difficult to study, but for different reasons. One can often observe a successful surprise 
attack easier than they can observe a psychological bias, but unsuccessful surprises, or 
canceled surprises, might be more difficult or impossible to identify. 
 The basic imperfect and incomplete models of surprise (prior to incorporating 
anchoring bias) developed for this project are applicable to any situation where one party 
has the opportunity to attempt surprise, and the opposing party can take action to thwart 
the surprise. That means the model deals with surprise as a general concept, and the 
models can be applied to instances of surprise other than attacks. One possible extension 
in the field of foreign policy could be economic action. Despite the substantive focus on 
surprise attack, the models are sufficiently general to apply broadly to foreign policy 
where there are two actors with competing preferences, they move sequentially, one 
cannot clearly observe the past actions of the other, and there is only play of the game. 
The approach to incorporating and assessing entrenched beliefs could also be transported 
to other models in international politics such as the basic deterrence model (Morrow 






 The final section of this chapter briefly summarizes some of the main policy 
implications from this research. Unlike many works on intelligence or surprise, this 
project does not offer specific organizational remedies. The basic surprise model actually 
shows that external conditions make surprise possible even when an intelligence 
organization works perfectly. The policy implications derive directly from the theoretical 
and empirical analysis and address issues that decision-makers should keep in mind when 
creating policy. 
 
Retrospective Analyses of Policy Failures 
 There are many retrospective studies of intelligence failure from both academic 
scholars and government commissions.
36
 This research suggests that scholars and 
policymakers should approach these retrospective studies with a degree of caution. Many 
of these projects identify an intelligence failure and reverse engineer causes using 
detailed analysis of information, events and decisions. The problem with these studies is 
that they often search for extenuating circumstances rather than stressing the basic logic 
of surprise. Under certain strategic conditions with information constraints, surprise is a 
perfectly rational and plausible outcome without major organizational, psychological or 
legal constraints stemming from domestic political processes and organization. It is not 
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surprising that many of these studies focus on organizational, psychological and legal 
aspects of intelligence and policymaking since this is the area that policymakers have the 
most control over. These types of recommendations can serve as prescriptions for 
policymakers. The irony is that basic competitive forces or environmental constraints are 
the primary necessary and sufficient conditions for surprise, and approaching the problem 




 The second reason to treat many retrospective studies of intelligence failure with 
some skepticism is the reliance on psychological explanations. In many of these studies, 
psychological variables emerge as causal factors either explicitly (Betts 1978; Wirtz 
1994; Heuer 1999) or implicitly (9/11 Commission 2004). Studies that focus on 
psychology explicitly, often assume that relevant decision-makers suffered from some 
bias or some set of biases because bias is a pervasive cognitive feature. In other cases, 
one might reason that a certain decision must have been motivated by bias since it 
appeared irrational otherwise. This is the type of thinking that this study has tried to move 
away from, and in so doing, has shown how some of our long-held assumptions about 
psychological biases in foreign policy decision-making may be wrong. 
 
Bias as a Stabilizing Force 
 Both the deductive theoretical proof and the quantitative analysis suggest that 
psychological bias, specifically irrationally entrenched beliefs, can act as a stabilizing 
force. While irrational under-suspicion had no impact on the deductive equilibria, the 
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mere possibility of irrational over-suspicion did alter the initiator’s optimal strategy. 
Initiators found that they were better off adopting strategies with a lower likelihood of 
attempted surprise then they would try if the target were perfectly rational. The target’s 
possibility of irrational over-suspicion reduced the likelihood that surprise attempts 
would be successful since the biased target would be more likely to take defensive action 
than a Bayesian target. Initiators respond to the threat of over-suspicion by adopting a 
signaling strategy that is more conservative or less provocative. 
 Since the mere possibility of irrational over-suspicion is sufficient to constrain an 
initiator’s aggressive behavior,
38
 the deductive proof suggests that the same 
psychological biases that are often used as reasons for policy failure may inadvertently 
contribute to policy success by acting as a stabilizing mechanism. The quantitative 
analysis across a large dataset of international crises revealed that initiators were less 
likely to use violent crisis triggers when the target was a protracted rival, controlling for 
violence in previous crises. Controlling for past experience, the animosity or over-
suspicion associated with protracted rivalry did have stabilizing impact by reducing the 
likelihood that crises were triggered violently. It is worth noting that previous violent 
experience did increase the likelihood that crises would be triggered violently, which may 
also provide some support for spiral conflict models where one actor’s provocative action 
encourages another. This suggests that previous violence in itself correlated with future 
violence, but beliefs associated with protracted rivalry may act as a stabilizing force. 
 According to both the theoretical and quantitative analysis, then, psychological 
biases are not necessarily cognitive deficiencies that should be eliminated whenever 
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possible. In some instances, it constrains an opponent’s behavior and helps policymakers 
justify taking necessary defensive action in ambiguous circumstances. 
 
Taking Others’ Biases Into Account 
 This is certainly not the first piece of scholarship in international politics to warn 
about the negative aspects or risks associated with aggressive strategies that carry the 
possibility of provoking unwanted responses. The security dilemma (Herz 1950; Jervis 
1978) argues that armament policies intended to make one state more secure might 
inadvertently provoke a rival into arming themselves since they feel more vulnerable as a 
result of the initial armament policies. Similar research has also compared and contrasted 
the deterrent model of international action, whereby actors must take credibly signal 
resolve to dissuade the opposition from undesirable action, against the spiral model, in 
which signals or actions necessary for successful deterrence actually create a spiral of 
provocative action (Jervis 1976). A similar theme is present here. The difference between 
this project and prior work warning about the dangers of provoking a rival is that the 
primary causal variable in the prior work stressed the underlying nature of the game or 
interaction. A typical example of a spiral is an arms race whereby both actors might 
benefit from cooperation, but neither can afford to fall behind. Where actors’ behavior 
and the structure of the game drive the traditional spiral, this project reinforces the 
concern that actors should also be concerned about their opponent’s biases. The mere 
possibility of over-suspicion is enough to motivate unwanted action that could create a 
situation analogous to the spiral model. 
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One of the deductive conclusions is that an actor may be able to use their own 
psychological biases to their benefit by dissuading certain behavior. It is important, 
however, not to simply treat psychological biases as shield to hide behind. This research 
shows that it is equally important to take other’s biases into account as well. The crisis 
initiator in the deductive models did not adopt a more conservative challenge strategy out 
the goodness of their theoretical heart, they did it because it offered the greatest utility 
given the possibility that their target had irrationally entrenched beliefs. This means that 
less provocative strategies, given the possibility of a biased opponent, are strategically 
optimal. Policymakers, particularly in foreign policy, would be wise to remember that 
others have biases and less provocative strategies may be strategically optimal at times, 
despite the desire to signal resolve or attempt a fait accompli. 
 
The Pitfall of Perfect Rationality 
 The final recommendation is a warning: beware the pitfall of perfect rationality. 
The pitfall here does not refer to the benefits of psychological biases despite the fact that 
biases may be strategically optimal. The pitfall refers to the desire, even obsession, to 
eliminate psychological biases from the decision-making process. Research on 
psychology and decision-making in international politics sometimes concludes either that 
bias resulting in poor outcomes is inevitable since it is impossible to eliminate (Betts 
1978), or stresses the need to minimize or eliminate biases so as to lessen their impact 
(George 1980; Heuer 1999). Neither of these approaches is necessarily correct. In the 
first case, psychological biases do not always correlate with poor decisions or outcomes, 
and may be beneficial in numerous circumstances. In the second case, the attempt to 
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minimize biases may send the inaccurate signal that one is perfectly rational. The attempt 
to appear perfectly rational eliminates the possible strategic benefits of bias since an actor 
might believe their opponent is perfectly rational. The only way to derive strategic 
benefits from bias is expose one’s possible biases to an opponent. 
Chasing after perfect rationality creates an unrealistic goal for analysts and 
policymakers. It may also be strategically sub-optimal. Instead of running away from 
biases, policymakers would be better off understanding how they impact their decisions, 
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